NTSB have released their preliminary report into this crash. A copy is attached to this post.
In short, it appears a door came open in flight and (in my opinion) the pilot did not handle that situation very well. Also it appears that the pilot, who built the aircraft from a kit, failed to install all necessary parts to keep the doors properly latched and detect when a door was not properly closed.
Sadly, his poor decision making killed not only himself but his 16 year old daughter.
From the report:
The RV-10 design incorporated two “gull-wing” doors on either side of the cabin. The doors were comprised primarily of composite fiberglass construction and were mounted to the roof of the cabin by two steel hinges, with extension limited by a gas strut. In the closed position, the door was secured by fore and aft tubular aluminum latch pins, that extended into UHMW polyethylene pin blocks mounted to the forward and aft pillar structure in the airframe door opening. The latch pins were connected to the
door lock handle via a rotary gear assembly. To lock the door, the handle is rotated forward, which extends the latch pins into the pin blocks. The handle contains a release lever that locks the pins in place when they have reached the fully extended position. Once locked, the door handle cannot be moved to the open position until a button at the end of the release lever has been pressed.
The door included a secondary safety latch system, which was intended to clasp the door in the down position should the lock handle not be manually engaged. The system was comprised of a laminated aluminum hook assembly, mounted to the inner lower side of each cabin door. The system engages automatically and without pilot or passenger intervention when the door is lowered, as the hook locks into a plate fitting in the cabin door frame.
The airplanes primary kit components were shipped to the pilot between 2007 and 2008, and he completed construction in 2011. The secondary door latch was included as standard in all RV-10 finish kits shipped from January 4, 2010, onwards, with a retrofit kit available for all previously constructed airplanes. Its installation was recommended before further flight as described in Service Bulletin 10-1-4, published by Vans Aircraft on January 4, 2010. Records provided by Vans Aircraft indicated that the pilot was sent the retrofit safety latch kit on January 25, 2010.
Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed that the pilot had made a series of modifications to the standard door locking system including the use of solid steel locking pins rather than the kit-supplied aluminum pins, along with replacement of the UHMW polythene door blocks with chamfered aluminum blocks. Additionally, the secondary safety latch had not been installed, and the door latch indicator system had been modified.
The left cabin door located on the facility roof was largely intact and had pulled away from its roof hinges. Its window had shattered, and all the plexiglass pieces were accounted for in the immediate vicinity. The door handle was found just short of the forward closed and locked position (see figure 1), and because it was not fully forward, its locking button had not engaged. The lock pins were found extended about 1/2 inch out of the door ends, and when the door handle was tested by moving it forward, the pins extended a further 7/16 inch and the locking button engaged.
The door latch indicator system supplied with the kit was comprised of four magnetic reed switches, mounted individually within each door pillar. The switches were configured to confirm via LED warning lamps on the instrument panel that each door pin was in the fully extended and locked position. On the accident airplane, it appeared that only two reed switches had been installed, with each mounted to the aft pillars of both doors. As such, the modified system would not have warned the pilot if the forward latch pins had failed to fully engage.
