[zeb247]

Had no idea this was happening. They are pissed off.

[Massacreman]

Originally Posted by IvorySmith ↗

My slight understanding of tariffs are this:
If someone in the U.S. can manufacture and sell a basket for 6$, but in the U.S., we can buy a basket manufactured and sold by the UK for 5$, then those who bought the basket for less now have 1$ more to spend on something else, and the UK basket manufacturer now has 5$ to buy U.S. goods.
If tariffs raise the cost of the UK basket to 7$, then demand in the U.S. will cause the 6$ U.S.-made basket to increase in cost, meaning that there is no extra money to spend elsewhere, and the UK basket maker no longer has the money to spend on U.S. products. Tariffs hurt everyone.
However, if they're used strategically (like against the soviets), then one country could outlast another, and benefit in the long run. But no one benefits in the short run.

That's my loose understanding, but it seems to make sense. Maybe someone can correct me.

That said, I think the world is teaming up against China on this one.

This is one part of a tariff.

The main goal here is to cut reliance on China as a main producer of... fucking everything in America.

The point is to have American manufacturers bring a bunch of production back into the united states, or at the very least, to a western country that doesn't have the subjugation of western countries as their main goal.

You ever look at any "professional" or "industrial" level tools? A good chunk of them are made in European countries or US/Canada. We do tend to make higher quality implements since we have real standards to abide by, and it's a lot more of a risk that a really pissed off person could fly/walk in and punch one of the manufacturers employees in the face.

The other tariffs against the western countries are due to the fact that we haven't actually tariffed almost anything from a friendly country, but they all seem to have some ludicrous tariffs against the US.

We basically build all of the dodge vehicles major components in Canada just north of Michigan for example. Then they go around and tariff our dairy products at something like 400% amongst other things. It's silly.

It's also simply a way to show how goofy it is when they scream "I can't believe you put tariffs on our stuff!" While simultaneously taraffing literally everything from us. FFS, even Israel had a 15% Tariff on things from the U.S. like, you don't get to exist without our weapons, but you want to tariff our other shit? GTFOH with that.

And on that note, all the other countries can live so kich freer and have so much more of their socialized crap when the U.S. Basically subsidized their protection with our military.

We need to pull out of NATO and start charging to police the seas and for our military to be there. Don't like to pay? You can keep the base but we'll be gone. Oh, and if China starts eyeing you all hungry like, the cost for defense multiplies by 10x like you're calling roto-rooter for a shit-tsunami in your basement

[kellyhound]

U.S.-Israel FTA (1985): Eliminated tariffs on ~98% of goods by 2024, making trade largely duty-free except for agricultural products.

Israel faced slightly higher barriers in the U.S. (28% of agricultural tariff lines had tariffs) than the U.S. in Israel (10% of agricultural tariff lines).

Both countries protected domestic agriculture, with Israel imposing higher tariffs (10–50%) on U.S. dairy, nuts, and wine, and the U.S. applying tariffs (5–20%) on Israeli dairy and processed foods under ATAP limits.

No major retaliatory tariffs occurred before 2025, unlike U.S.-EU or U.S.-Canada disputes. Israel’s last-minute tariff elimination on U.S. goods in April 2025 was a strategic move to avoid U.S. tariffs but did not prevent a 17% U.S. tariff on Israeli goods.

Bilateral trade was $34 billion in 2024, with the U.S. as Israel’s largest trading partner. Tariffs had a limited impact due to the FTA, but non-tariff barriers (e.g., Israel’s regulatory restrictions) were more significant.

Claims of high Israeli tariffs (e.g., 33% cited by the U.S. in 2025) were disputed, as Israel’s average tariff on U.S. goods was under 1% before April 2025.

The U.S. tariff calculation (17%) was based on the $7.4 billion trade deficit, not actual Israeli tariffs, raising questions about fairness.


The Trump administration's tariff rates were calculated using a formula based on the U.S. trade deficit in goods with each country, divided by the total goods imported from that country, and then halved.

For example, for China, a $295 billion trade deficit divided by $440 billion in imports yields 67%, which was halved to 34%.

This method does not reflect actual tariffs or trade barriers imposed by other countries on U.S. goods.

Instead, it uses trade deficits as a proxy, which economists argue is not a valid measure of trade barriers or "reciprocal" tariffs.

Trade deficits can arise from various factors, such as comparative advantages, consumer preferences, or economic structures, not necessarily unfair trade practices.

The administration's chart claimed high tariff rates for other countries, such as 67% for China, 39% for the EU, and 52% for India.

However, World Trade Organization (WTO) data and reports, like one from the Cato Institute, show that actual trade-weighted average tariff rates are much lower (e.g., 3% for China, 2.7% for the EU, and 12% for India in 2023).

The inclusion of vague factors like "currency manipulation" and "non-monetary barriers" in the administration's calculations was not substantiated with clear evidence, further inflating the reported rates.

The term "reciprocal tariffs" suggests that the U.S. tariffs mirror what other countries charge the U.S. However, the formula used does not account for actual tariffs or non-tariff barriers imposed by other countries.

Countries like Lesotho or Madagascar, which face high tariffs (49% and 47%, respectively), have trade imbalances due to their economic structures (e.g., exporting low-cost goods like textiles or diamonds while importing little from the U.S.), not because of high tariffs or cheating.

The decision to divide the calculated rate by two was described by Trump as being "kind," but it lacks economic justification and introduces arbitrariness.

Other choices, such as using only 2024 trade data (which can vary year-to-year) and excluding services from trade deficit calculations, skewed results. For example, including services could have significantly altered rates for countries like Bermuda.

The formula also ignored bilateral trade agreements (e.g., USMCA, WTO preferential duties), which typically lower actual tariffs.

The methodology has been widely criticized by economists and trade experts. Anson Soderbery, an economics professor, stated that the tariff rates "certainly do not represent legislated tariffs faced by the U.S."

Other analysts have pointed out that the tariffs are designed to eliminate bilateral trade deficits, not to match actual foreign tariffs, which undermines their legitimacy as "reciprocal."


The "reciprocal tariffs" announced by President Donald Trump in April 2025 were primarily conceived and developed by Peter Navarro, who serves as Trump's senior counselor for trade and manufacturing.

Navarro, a long-time advocate of protectionist trade policies, outlined the framework for these tariffs in his contributions to Project 2025, a policy agenda for a Republican administration.

His work emphasized addressing trade deficits and perceived non-reciprocal trade practices, which became the basis for the tariff formula.

The formula itself, which calculates tariffs based on bilateral trade deficits in goods divided by imports and halved, was personally selected by Trump from a menu of options presented by his economic advisors, including those from the National Economic Council, Council of Economic Advisers, Commerce Department, and U.S. Trade Representative’s Office.

While Navarro's influence was central, other advisors like Scott Bessent and Howard Lutnick also contributed to shaping the policy, though they later lobbied to pause some tariffs due to market reactions.

Economists widely reject the idea that trade deficits are inherently harmful or indicative of cheating.

Trade deficits can result from macroeconomic factors like savings rates, investment flows, or comparative advantages, not just trade barriers.

The U.S. runs deficits partly because it consumes more than it saves, funded by foreign capital inflows. The Cato Institute and others note that Navarro's focus on deficits ignores these dynamics, leading to misguided policies that may disrupt efficient trade.

Navarro has claimed that tariffs, like the 2025 reciprocal tariffs, can reduce trade deficits by boosting domestic production and exports while deterring imports, with minimal economic downsides but studies such as those from the Peterson Institute, show that tariffs often fail to eliminate trade deficits because they don't address underlying macroeconomic drivers (e.g., fiscal policy or savings rates).

Instead, tariffs raise costs for consumers and businesses, disrupt supply chains, and invite retaliation.

For instance, Trump’s 2018 tariffs increased consumer prices by about $40 billion annually and led to retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports like agriculture, per the Tax Foundation.

Navarro's optimism overlooks these costs and the complexity of global trade.

Navarro wrote that tariffs protect U.S. industries, create jobs, and strengthen the economy by reducing reliance on imports. He downplays the risk of global trade disruptions or retaliation.

Historical evidence, including the 2018-2019 U.S.-China trade war, shows that tariffs often lead to job losses in import-dependent sectors, higher input costs for manufacturers, and reduced GDP growth.

Navarro's dismissal of these risks ignores the interconnected nature of global supply chains and trade agreements like the USMCA.

Navarro frequently cites currency manipulation by countries like China as a key reason for U.S. trade deficits, justifying tariffs to counteract this but while currency manipulation was a concern in the early 2000s, recent U.S. Treasury reports (up to 2023) have not designated major trading partners like China as currency manipulators.

The dollar's strength is influenced more by U.S. monetary policy and global demand for dollar-based assets than by foreign manipulation.

Navarro's emphasis on this issue exaggerates its current relevance and lacks supporting evidence in the 2025 tariff framework.

Navarro also has suggested that tariffs can be tailored to specific countries or industries to achieve strategic goals, such as protecting manufacturing, without broad economic harm but Tariffs are blunt instruments that affect entire supply chains and industries.

For example, the 2025 tariffs apply to all goods from targeted countries, raising costs for U.S. manufacturers reliant on imported inputs (e.g., steel or electronics components).

The 2018 tariffs led to higher prices for goods like washing machines and reduced U.S. agricultural exports due to retaliation.

Models from institutions like the Brookings Institution and IMF, grounded in historical data, consistently show that tariffs reduce GDP, increase inflation, and disrupt trade flows.

For instance, a 2023 study estimated that a 10% universal tariff could cut U.S. GDP by 1-2% over several years. Navarro's rejection of these models lacks empirical backing and ignores the consensus among trade economists.

Navarro’s misconceptions stem from his heterodox economic views, which prioritize protectionism over free trade principles.

His role in crafting the 2025 tariffs, as outlined in Project 2025, reflects his long-standing beliefs articulated in books like Death by China and his academic works.