[duntez]

“Russian Military received two new submarines.

The strategic nuclear submarine "Alexander III" (project 955A, "Borey-A") became the seventh ship in the series of the "Borey" / "Borey-A" project, code 955/955A, and the multi-purpose "Krasnoyarsk" became the fourth in the series of ships of the "Yasen" project "/ "Yasen-M", code 885/885M.”

[duntez]

“ The extent of the Russian Federation use of electronic warfare (EW) to safeguard its military assets is literally visible from space. The powerful electromagnetic interference has been reflected in the images made by a satellite employing Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) technology.

For a brief reminder, SAR enables image acquisition through radar, enabling it to "see" through clouds, fog, smoke, and regardless of how much sunlight illuminates the surface (i.e., at night as well).” Defense Express.

There were also errors in the AIS (automatic identification system) suggesting several ships and boats have "teleported" 8 km into dry land.

[WonderMomma]

"The Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/world/putin-has-...w_article_pos3) on the opportunities and military challenges we face as we enter the coming year.

ℹ️ Putin is still a long way from conquering the Ukrainian regions claimed by Russia, let alone achieving his larger goal of conquering all of Ukraine.

The material advantages in 2024 are mostly on Russia's side, but they do not seem decisive enough for Russia to be able to achieve its political goals...It is incorrect to assume that Russia will win the war. However, unless the right choices are made next year regarding Ukraine's approach and Western resources, Ukraine's prospects for success look dim , says Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

ℹ️ The US, the European Union and the UK have an annual economy of $45 trillion - 20 times the size of Russia's economy - and superior technology. On paper, Ukraine's supporters are much stronger, but Russia is putting in much more effort.

ℹ️ The budget plan of the Russian government for 2024-26 shows that the country allocates an increasingly large share of resources to war. Next year, military spending will rise to more than $100 billion, the highest level since Soviet times. Factories are reorienting production from civilian goods to tanks and drones. Civilian sectors pay a price for this: shortages of capacity and workers lead to rising inflation. But the stimulus from military spending supports the Russian economy, offsetting the impact of Western sanctions.

ℹ️ Mass production has allowed Russia to catch up with Ukraine in the production of small combat drones, an area where Ukrainian innovation previously gave it an edge, but Ukraine's dependence on small workshops and volunteers is showing its limitations.

ℹ️ The West has taken only limited steps to increase military production. The US is increasing the production of artillery shells, but the EU countries are unable to coordinate the placement of orders and attract investments in new defense production.

ℹ️ European countries are running out of stocks of weapons and ammunition that they can provide to Ukraine. Political rifts in Washington have already slowed U.S. shipments. Shells from South Korea helped the Russian artillery achieve parity. Now the Ukrainian military says that they are once again at a disadvantage.

ℹ️ Ukraine's economy has withstood the Russian onslaught better than expected, even growing somewhat this year after a deep slump when Russia invaded in early 2022. But Ukraine relies on Western money to cover civil budget expenditures.

ℹ️ In Kyiv, the "failure" of the counteroffensive in the summer of this year with the aim of recapturing the regions occupied by Russia exacerbated the contradictions between the military and political leadership. Valery Zaluzhny, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said that the war is in a "stalemate" phase, which drew criticism from President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who wants to demonstrate to public opinion and Western allies that Ukraine can move forward.

ℹ️ The military impasse reinforces the view in Germany, which is Kyiv's most important European supporter, that a ceasefire and negotiations with Moscow would be in Ukraine's interests. However, Berlin does not want to put pressure on Zelenskyi.

ℹ️ The problem for hopes of a cease-fire remains that Putin has little reason to halt his invasion at a time when Western cohesion is weakening. Even if Putin agrees to a ceasefire, Kyiv fears he will use it to build up his forces and attack again.

ℹ️ Many Western officials believe that Putin is waiting to see who will win the US presidential election a year from now. If it is Donald Trump, European governments fear that he may end military support to Ukraine from the US and even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ℹ️ A generation of EU politicians who for years underestimated Putin's challenge to the continent's post-Cold War world order is struggling to adapt to the return of full-scale war between European powers.

ℹ️ The lack of ammunition also means that Ukraine is unlikely to mount another major offensive for some time. The creation of a bridgehead by Ukrainian troops on the eastern bank of the Dnieper in the Kherson region is a bright spot, albeit a small one.

ℹ️ The Russian army is also struggling to make any significant breakthroughs, despite its numerical superiority in troops and equipment. Her infantry and equipment are often older and of worse quality than the forces with which she began the invasion.

ℹ️ Both sides are struggling to advance through open, heavily mined terrain under a sky buzzing with drones.

ℹ️ Russia has concentrated its reserves in the east of Ukraine, where it is trying to break through at several points, but without much success. Even near Avdiivka, her troops advance at the cost of huge human and material losses.

ℹ️ According to Ukrainian officers and Western experts, depleted Ukrainian forces can still mount an effective defense along a 600-mile front if they mobilize their resources.

The next year can be used with advantage as a year of construction for the restoration of the Ukrainian army. Kyiv needs to improve the mobilization and training of troops, abandon large-scale offensive operations and strengthen its lines. If this does not happen, then the next year may become a turning point, after which Ukraine will find itself in an increasingly unfavorable situation.

"

=====


"The White House has released information on which states benefit from the billions of dollars spent on military aid to Ukraine.

This is how they are trying to attract the support of republicans who previously voted against aid to Kyiv.

▪️For example, Pennsylvania received the most - $2.3 billion in the form of expenditures and investments in the production of weapons and ammunition. At the same time, 3/8 of the Republican members of Congress from the state voted against the allocation of funds to Ukraine.

▪️ Texas received $1.4 billion for the production of 155-mm shells and other weapons. Although 18/25 representatives of the Republicans also opposed aid to Ukraine.

▪️ Arizona received $2.1 billion — and 3/6 representatives of the Republican Party also did not support financing Ukraine.

Joe Biden recently emphasized that weapons for Ukraine are new jobs for Americans. Another part of the funds is provided to American companies to replace equipment sent abroad.

Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-...as-2023-11-28/) reminds that Pennsylvania and Arizona are critical states for Biden in the 2024 election.

Pictured is a worker at an arms factory in Scranton, Pennsylvania, ABC News"

[WonderMomma]

"Zelensky publishes a video of the awarding of soldiers who are taking/participated in the naval operation on the left bank of the Kherson region to create bridgeheads (including Krynk)

You can see the sleeve emblems:
- 137th separate battalion of marines (as part of the 35th Brigade)
- 124th Separate Territorial Defense Brigade (which is interesting)
- 73rd Naval Special Operations Center

And maybe someone knows what kind of armband the warrior has at 00:51 sec?"

#zelenskyy

[duntez]

Forbes - the biggest problem with Ukraines M-1 tanks: They don’t like staying dirty.

Problem is in its filters which tank crews would have to clean every 12 hours or else engine could be damaged and will have to be send to Poland

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=6a29be3051f6


EDIT: WhiskeyOutpost is that a real problem, or just a whistle in the air?

[WhiskeyOutpost]

Originally Posted by duntez ↗

Forbes - the biggest problem with Ukraines M-1 tanks: They don’t like staying dirty.

Problem is in its filters which tank crews would have to clean every 12 hours or else engine could be damaged and will have to be send to Poland

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=6a29be3051f6


EDIT: WhiskeyOutpost is that a real problem, or just a whistle in the air?

This is half correct, but the every 12 hours thing is more meant for persistent desert conditions. Like Iraq. During the winter and wet conditions in Ukraine, the issue of sand and debris getting into the engine will be less, so less maintenance hours.

Regarding mobility in muddy and wet conditions - no tanks do well in that (especially underpowered Soviet era tanks).

A true thing the media has been saying about Abrams tanks - they are very maintenance heavy, even for tank standards, and are gas guzzlers. It's a literal jet engine powering it - not a more economical turbo diesel like a Leopard 2. But its engine (Honeywell AGT1500) is likely the most capable engine in any main battle tank on the planet.

I'm most concerned with the Ukrainian Army's ability to keep these beasts fed with enough fuel. That is no small task - after I was an M1 Platoon leader I was an XO.

When Abrams hit the Ukranian battlefields, we will likely see Lancet drones hitting fuel tankers.

If Ukrainian Army is able to keep these M1's fed and fixed, and with good crews, they are certified murder machines.

[WonderMomma]

"Forbes writes (https://forbes.ua/innovations/ukrain...20112023-17379) about the Ukrainian FPV industry.

ℹ️ Ukrainian companies produce approximately 50,000 FPV drones every month, Russians produce six times more, says Maksym Sheremet, the founder of DroneSpace. With the estimate that one engineer assembles about 50 FPV drones, the industry consists of about 1,000 people.

ℹ️ FPV drone manufacturers lack 2,000 engineers, says Vadym Yunyk, president of the Technological Forces of Ukraine drone manufacturers association and chairman of the supervisory board of the FRDM defense and technical company. To scale six times, you need six times as many engineers. That is, the industry should consist of 6,000 engineers.

ℹ️ In total, there are about 200 manufacturers of drones of various types in Ukraine. They provide only 10-15% of the total needs of the army. FPV drones alone need about 200,000 units per month.

ℹ️ Ukrainian manufacturers lack engineers in avionics, EW and narrower specialties. In particular, there is a shortage of computer vision and digital signal processing engineers, as well as specialists involved in the development of embedded software and mathematical modeling.

ℹ️ At the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there were seven models of drones approved for use in the Armed Forces. Since February 24, the number has increased to 62.

ℹ️ The lion's share of Ukrainian engineers were educated in the USSR and worked at enterprises such as Antonov.

They are smart, qualified, but not dynamic. And the market is dynamic, it is necessary to quickly and constantly make new iterations." For example, in just a year and a half, FPV drones have evolved from "disposable" drones to drones with an advanced reset system, which allows you to use the drone many times.

ℹ️ Drone assembly engineers in Ukraine receive from UAH 30,000. The market average is UAH 50,000. A specialist who can independently design an airplane or a copter earns from $2,000 to $5,000 per project and can work with different manufacturers at the same time. He estimates the salaries of EW specialists at $5,000–10,000."

Source posts again with this:
"I will add 2 points from myself:

ℹ️ I don't know where the figure came from that the Russians produce x6 times more, but given the number of videos with FPV damage, this is an exaggeration. We use such drones more often (so far) and the number of fixed FPV hits from our side is also higher.

ℹ️ The article contains a figure about the need for 200,000 FPV drones. Now let's count. That's 6,000 drones every day. A figure that +- repeats the intensity of work of Ukrainian artillery in the summer (peak) period, if we count by shells. We are witnessing history when classical artillery begins to be replaced by the massive use of high-precision means.

It's not the first time we've seen when a dozen FPV drones can easily "clear" a trench position (VOP). How many shells would have to be placed to achieve the same result?"

[WonderMomma]

NO MEDIA:

Columnist Mark A. Thiessen for The Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...economy-boost/)

ℹ️ Most of the funds allocated for military support to Ukraine are spent in the United States. This money does not go directly to Ukraine, but is used in the US to create new weapons or replace weapons sent to Kyiv from US stocks.

❗️ Of the 68 billion dollars in military aid that Congress approved after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, almost 90% of the interest remains in America .

ℹ️ At a time when both major US parties are vying to capture the working-class vote and strengthen the manufacturing base, military aid to Ukraine is accomplishing this task by providing a significant infusion of cash into factories across the country, directly benefiting American workers. It also creates jobs and creates opportunities for local suppliers, shops, restaurants and other businesses that support gun manufacturing plants.

ℹ️ An analysis of contracts, press releases, and interviews with defense industry experts, diplomats, and Pentagon officials reveal that dollars are "flowing" into 117 production lines in at least 31 states and 71 US cities.

Our aid to Ukraine not only creates US jobs, but also restores our dangerously atrophied defense industrial base

ℹ️ The United States has not built any new Stinger anti-aircraft missiles since 2005. The terrorists that the Americans fought in recent decades did not have jet fighters, so production slowed down. Now, thanks to Ukraine's aid, the Pentagon last year signed a $624.6 million contract to build Stinger missiles in Tucson to replace about 1,400 missiles sent to Ukraine.

ℹ️ Another example is the $600 million that was used to build two weapons systems for Ukraine in St. Charles, Missouri. One of them is the Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM ER) – a guided missile with a range of up to 45 miles.

ℹ️ Workers in West Plains, Missouri, are using Ukrainian help to build a tracking radar for the Patriot missile system that shocked the world this year by shooting down an "unreachable" Russian hypersonic missile.

ℹ️ Among the most shocking examples of the decline of the American defense industry is the situation with the production of 155 mm artillery shells.

Ukraine produces from 6,000 to 8,000 such shells per day, and Israel orders tens of thousands of them. But before Russia invaded Ukraine last year, the United States produced fewer than 15,000 missiles a month. So the Pentagon allocated $1.5 billion to increase production by 500% and intends to increase production to 100,000 per month.

ℹ️ The United States also creates incentives for NATO allies to donate their old US-made and Soviet-era weapons systems to Ukraine, allowing the sale of new, modern American-made systems to replace them. For example, Poland sent 250 Soviet and German tanks to Ukraine and in April 2022 signed a $4.75 billion deal to buy 250 replacement M1A2 Abrams tanks to be produced at a plant in Lima, Ohio.

ℹ️ Finland, which struck a $9.4 billion deal to buy 64 F-35s, said the new planes would allow it to transfer its aging F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets to Ukraine. Norway, which transferred old F-16 fighters to Ukraine, is purchasing 52 F-35s. Denmark and the Netherlands donate 61 F-16s to Ukraine and replace them with additional F-35s.

ℹ️ Overall, the analysis found that there are at least 13 production lines in 10 states and 11 US cities that are producing new US-made weapons for NATO allies instead of the equipment they sent to Ukraine"

AND

"Interesting (https://twitter.com/Havoc_Six/status...46012625662235) about the production of artillery shells in the USA and the EU.

ℹ️ The US was able to increase the production of artillery 155-mm shells faster than predicted. In order to continue the forward pace in the US, Congress is expected to approve a bill on additional funding in the amount of $3.1 billion for 2024. However, the vote may be delayed due to bipartisan disputes over further aid to Ukraine.

ℹ️ Note: The US has a slight advantage in projectile production, as the relevant facilities are state-owned. Therefore, capacity expansion and investment attraction is somewhat easier. By 2025, the US plans to produce 1.2 million 155mm shells each year.

ℹ️ The EU collectively produces 230,000 shells each year, and plans to increase this figure to 300,000 by February next year. Potentially, by the end of 2024, this figure could reach 1 million shells, but there are restraining factors. Unlike the US, the production of projectiles is mainly in the hands of private companies, so investment or the construction of new plants is a longer and more complicated process."

[depraved1]

Originally Posted by WhiskeyOutpost ↗

I'm most concerned with the Ukrainian Army's ability to keep these beasts fed with enough fuel. That is no small task -

When Abrams hit the Ukranian battlefields, we will likely see Lancet drones hitting fuel tankers.

If Ukrainian Army is able to keep these M1's fed and fixed, and with good crews, they are certified murder machines.

CORRECT!

[kellyhound]

Speech, 30 November 2023. Brussels
Keynote speech by President von der Leyen at the EDA Annual Conference 2023: Powering up European Defence:

Chief Executive, dear Jiří,

Ministers,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you very much for the invitation. It is a big pleasure for me to be back to the European Defence Agency. You might not all know that, for five years, I had the honour to sit on its board. So I could witness, firsthand, the role of the EDA as the pivot of European defence cooperation. But I must also say that in the last four years, I learnt something more about the EDA. And that is how you work not only with national Defence Ministries but with all European institutions. We have seen it since Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine. All of Europe has sustained Ukraine's war effort. And of course, this has required a great deal of collaboration between different institutions, including the Agency and the Commission.

Our Defence Joint Procurement Task Force, for example, is helping us to match the demand from our Member States with the production capacities of our industry. Together, we have powered up Ukraine's resistance. We have demonstrated what we can achieve as a Union when we join forces across borders and institutions, and together with partners at NATO. And this closer defence cooperation will be more and more necessary.

We all you know that the strategic environment around us has fundamentally changed. This creates a new kind of responsibility for Europe. I call it strategic responsibility. It is a responsibility, first of all, to support Ukraine in this war, for as long as it takes. This will not be easy – but this is exactly when our commitment needs to be rock-solid. Russia is now reinforcing its positions. Trying to re-take the initiative. And this means that the situation on the battlefield remains very challenging. But this is not an argument against support. On the contrary, it is an argument for more support. Because, let us not forget: When Putin invaded Ukraine, many of us thought that it would only take days to take Kyiv. This has not happened. Currently, Putin does not even control all the territories he has already annexed. Ukraine has driven Russia out of half the territories captured after February 2022. Ukraine has even pushed the Russian fleet in the Black Sea back and is able to deliver grain again through this maritime corridor. Finland has become a NATO member, with a long border with Russia. Sweden soon will be. Ukraine is on its way to EU membership. The Kremlin has deprived itself of access to Western economies and innovation systems and made itself dependent on China. We have achieved a lot together. And all these are good arguments for sustained support to Ukraine. At the same time, we must also look at Ukraine's security in the medium and long term. Ukraine must have the capabilities to deter future attacks by Russia. This is why the EU's future security commitments to Ukraine are so vital.

But strategic responsibility is not only about Ukraine. It is also about the other future members of our Union, like the Western Balkans, where long-standing local grievances are now being manipulated by external action. And if we look only a bit further, conflicts have multiplied all around our borders. I think of course of the Middle East but also of the Sahel and the Caucasus.

Globally, strategic competition is intensifying. Our partners are asking for greater European engagement in other parts of the world, such as the Indo-Pacific. And we must recognise that our security is more closely interlinked than ever before. We have learnt that when a big country threatens a small neighbour, the whole rules-based global order is at stake. And of course, our trade routes and supply chains are also exposed. Europe might be called to play a role in any of these theatres – near or far. So we need Member States' armed forces that are prepared for all sorts of scenarios – from traditional to hybrid. On land, at sea, in the air, in outer space or cyberspace.

We always say that our Union was born as a peace project. And yes, this is right. But peace requires security. And that is why our Union was also born as a security project. Its industrial genesis, with coal and steel, had a central security dimension. In those sectors, the common industrial policy was basically security policy. And then, through the decades, this security dimension has grown. I am not only referring to the birth of this Agency, or to our missions and operations. Most of our Union's policies have direct security implications. Our transport policy, for military mobility. Our agricultural policy, for food security. From trade to research, from energy to communications. At times of unprecedented threats, we must refocus our attention on the security dimension of all our policies. We must once again think about our Union as, intrinsically, a security project.

Of course, and this is very important, collective defence remains primarily the responsibility of Member States and of NATO. And we fully respect this specific point. Our cooperation with NATO remains central – it is excellent and it is stronger than ever. But strategic responsibility also calls for a stronger European contribution within NATO and to NATO. And since the beginning of Russia's full-scale war of aggression, the idea of strategic responsibility has driven our work on defence. So today, I want to focus on how the work we have done so far can shape our future progress on European defence.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The European Defence Agency is about to turn 20. We have built our defence cooperation step by step, brick by brick. And when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, decades of patient excellent work allowed us to react quickly and decisively. We have resorted to every tool in our hands, in unprecedented ways. Let me just explain a few of those. We had created the European Peace Facility to strengthen our role as security provider on other continents. Now, for the first time ever, we are giving military aid to a country at war, right here in Europe. EUR 5.6 billion, coordinated at EU level, to deliver tanks, helicopters, air defence systems, missiles and ammunition to Ukraine.

We had organised training missions before. Now, for the first time ever, we are training troops involved in an interstate European war, with a mission commanded by the new Brussels headquarters. We had created the European Defence Fund and PESCO – I remember that very well from my time as Defence Minister – to promote cooperative defence spending. Now, for the first time ever, we are mobilising Europe's defence industry to sustain a war effort. The European Defence Fund has been complemented by EDIRPA. And it has led to ASAP, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production. 480,000 rounds of artillery shells have been either delivered or are in the pipeline. And already next year, we will be able to produce one million rounds per year. This would have been unimaginable just two years ago. And it already marks a massive step forward for our defence cooperation.

What we have done would be extraordinary in normal times. But in these extraordinary times, it is not enough. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that we need to produce more. Both to meet Ukraine's needs, and to ensure our own deterrence and defence. The war in Ukraine is consuming more hardware than any other war in recent history. Russia has fired 10 million shells in a year. Ukraine consumes 10,000 drones per month. This means that Europe's defence industry must mobilise, too. The reality is that we did not have sufficient weapons and ammunition available. No large stocks. And a lack of spare capacity. Because in peacetime, we thought we did not need them. This needed to change. In July, NATO leaders endorsed a new NATO Defence Production Action Plan. And here in the European Union, we need to be laser-focused on our own production capabilities. No industrial bottleneck should prevent us from securing Europe.

There is no lack of European instruments at our disposal. There are projects of great interest: from long-range drones to a system to detect and neutralise sea mines that could prove vital, for instance, in the Black Sea. But overall, our instruments for cooperation are still punching below their weight.

The good news is that there is much greater scope for the necessary investments, after the recent surge in many national defence budgets. The 2% NATO goal is within reach for more and more Member States. And this is good because strategic responsibility requires adequate defence spending. But how is the money spent? Collaborative spending by Member States has only slightly improved. It is still below 20%, very far from our goal of 35%. And on top of this, the latest figures show that additional funds are in large majority spent outside the European Union. We are predominantly buying alone and buying abroad.

Of course, this is happening because of the urgency to get weapons to Ukraine and restock national inventories. But this wave of short-term acquisitions will have a long-term impact: First of all, it has an economic cost. When Member States buy in an uncoordinated way, this may drive prices up. Secondly, it has a competitiveness cost for our industry. These investments could foster innovation and economies of scale in Europe, instead of buying off-the-shelf products elsewhere. Thirdly, it has a military cost. There are way too many different weapon systems in Europe. And this leads to a lack of interoperability.

There are many examples. But let me give you one. The Dutch-German brigade uses the same type of howitzer. But the Dutch have a certain type of ammunition for their howitzer; the Germans have a certain type of ammunition for their howitzer; and they are not interoperable. They cannot use each other's ammunition. This is just one example. But you all know here in the room many other examples. And we could give you many other more. This cannot continue. Finally, buying alone and buying abroad may also have a security cost. We should not assume that we will always be able to rely on the international market for our defence procurement. We must look into our strategic dependencies to avoid operational consequences on the battlefield. Just like we need military readiness in a fast-changing security environment, we also need industrial readiness. This is an essential component of strategic responsibility. We must move from a logic of emergency response to one of long-term security. We need to make up for decades of under-investment and fragmentation. And to overcome this, we need to spend more, spend better and spend together.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Transatlantic cooperation will remain essential, including from an industrial point of view. But we also need a stronger European reflex. We must think European, from planning to procurement. There are lessons here that we can learn from our recent history, beyond the defence and security field. In the four years of this mandate, Europe's way of doing industrial policy has been transformed. For instance, on hydrogen, on semiconductors – chips –, or on critical raw materials. There was, first, a political decision taken at European level. Our Union agreed to focus on certain critical industries that are central for our economy of tomorrow. Then, we improved our rules to facilitate investment and innovation. For instance, with faster permitting and emergency frameworks. And finally, we backed our new industrial priorities with European and national funds to address market failures. This is the approach that we would also like to replicate with a new European Defence Industrial Strategy. This European Defence Industrial Strategy will focus on four strands of work. Let me display them.

First, strategic planning. Of course, we can build on the Strategic Compass and on the work the EDA is doing with Member States to coordinate national defence planning. But to deliver on our strategic priorities, we need even more joint programming. We should identify flagship capabilities at European level, projects of common interest on which we must focus our efforts and resources. For instance, capabilities that are European by nature: strategic enablers, like cyber capabilities, satellites, or strategic transportation. But I also think of complex platforms that are beyond the capacity of individual Member States, like air defence, and that can benefit from European scale. So we need a strategic planning function that ties together national and EU-level planning. This will give predictability to the industry and reduce fragmentation on the demand and supply sides.

Second, we need simpler and more efficient rules. Just like we did in other fields, we can use our regulatory framework to foster and simplify cooperation. This is even more necessary in a heavily regulated sector like defence. So, in the consultation phase of our strategy, we will ask our industry how we can best support it. We need an updated regulatory framework to give the industry and Member States predictability and coherence on a continental scale.

My third point is maximise our dual-use potential. While we strengthen our defence-specific research and development, we should also better integrate civilian technologies in our defence industrial base. We have already done this, for instance on military mobility. Dual-use transport infrastructure – you are well familiar with that, like roads and bridges that are used by military convoys –, is essential for our security and deterrence. So, we have worked with the transport community, and accelerated the use of our funds and policies in that field. It is still work in progress, but it is already one of the success stories of European defence. And this dual-use model is also applied in other sectors. For instance, on satellites for global positioning and secure connectivity. We already have Galileo, and we will soon have IRIS², which are EU assets and serve a military function. And we are laying the ground for a European cyber shield. So the European Union could have a direct role in creating new dual-use infrastructure. There is so much vital innovation with defence applications that emerges from civilian activities. It is now important that we connect the dots. And for this, the Commission will set out options in a White Paper on dual-use research.

My fourth point is about mobilising public and private funding. A suite of funding instruments is already available. But we must explore all possible ways to reward, incentivise, and compensate costs of cooperation and industrial competitiveness. The Strategy will do so, including by suggesting new funding possibilities. We will propose a European Defence Industry Programme early next year. This will integrate the experience of ASAP and EDIRPA. And of course, without prejudging the negotiations on the future EU budget, it needs to be adequately funded. We are also looking at how to incentivise the transition from cooperative research under the EDF to the development and full-scale industrial production of defence systems. ASAP was a good first step, but of course it was limited to an already mature product: this is ammunition. So we should look at the whole cycle of capability development – including the stage of industrial implementation and industrial production. All with a view to guide and support our defence technological and industrial base, in light of our strategic priorities. This would allow for greater coherence and coordination.

But there are other options too. We are already working on a VAT exemption to support the joint procurement and joint ownership of defence capabilities. We have already called on the European Investment Bank to enhance its support to the European defence industry. This call was recently echoed by the Member States in the EDA Steering Board – many thanks for that. So, I believe it is time to finally move ahead. We are looking at how the defence industry's contribution to the security of the Union can be better recognised by sustainable financial investors and at how SMEs and start-ups in the defence sector can get access to growth finance. We should finally also be open to lessons from our partners. Let me give you an example: the lesson how the United States create stable demand for industry, lower costs and facilitate export transactions through their Foreign Military Sales programme.

We should also explore synergies with other industrial policies. For example, our Critical Raw Materials Act that has identified some minerals that are needed for our defence and space industries. If we are to take strategic responsibility, we need these vital value chains. And this work can only be done on a continental scale.

And finally, my fifth point, we must close the discussions on how defence investments can be taken into account under our fiscal governance rules. As a matter of transparency, spending on defence must be counted in public debt and deficits, like any other category. It can and should meet two compatible objectives: ensure sustainable public finances, and support Member States' investment efforts in strategic public goods.

And this applies also to defence capabilities, in response to the more threatening geopolitical context. Especially because Member States have very different starting points in this area. So already in the Commission's proposal last April, we identified defence among the EU priorities for investment and reforms. This could underpin the extension of a Member State's fiscal adjustment period. In the Council, there is now broad support to consider increases in defence spending as a relevant factor when we assess whether a Member State has an excessive deficit or not. And there is room for further targeted and time-limited adaptations – to reduce the near-term fiscal efforts for Member States that are simultaneously increasing their defence spending. This could be particularly relevant for investments in the identified critical capability gaps. In addition, these investments would have to be European collaborative projects. This would generate a specific incentive for cross-border projects in Europe that are so much needed. If acceptable, co-legislators could consider these suggestions while finalising the current proposals. This could be a game changer for the Union's defence and its defence industrial policies in these exceptional times.

So: Strategic focus. Better rules. Dual use. And funding. These are the four main pillars of our upcoming strategy. But at the end, there are some more topics that I want to raise about the geographic scope of our work. A strategic approach to our defence industry must also look into the question of Ukraine's defence capabilities on top of our own needs. Our Strategy can only be complete if it also takes into account Ukraine's needs and Ukraine's industrial capacity. The first step to achieve this is to involve Ukraine in the consultation process of the Industrial Strategy. This should lead to integrating Ukraine in some of our defence programmes, with the agreement of the European Parliament and Council, where necessary. This would not only help us cater for Ukraine's defence needs. It would of course also encourage convergence and joint planning, between our militaries and defence industries. Ukraine is a future member of our European Union. So it must get much closer to us and much faster. And we should use all our tools to make this happen.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

These last years have shown that when there is a political will, there is a way. When we come together, things that were stuck for years can start moving again. In these eventful times, we must be driven by a strong sense of urgency. And we must expand our cooperation as much as possible, in the current institutional boundaries. But we should not shy away from asking bold questions about the future of European defence. We will not be able to answer all these questions in the short term, in the few months ahead of the European elections. But we should still strive to set out a vision for the next steps. And imagine how the industrial and security policy tools that support our strategic responsibility can help to complete our European Defence Union. To me, the most urgent would be to look into new possibilities for our defence cooperation under the current Treaties. There are strong arguments to align the procurement conditions of the EPF and EDIRPA. Both can serve the immediate procurement needs of Member States and of Ukraine, as well as reinforcing the European and Ukrainian defence industrial bases. Both functions are vital to the long-term security of the Member States and of Ukraine. And while respecting the constraints of the Treaties, I see scope to discuss whether at least that function of the EPF could be supported by the Union budget, in a future Multiannual Financial Framework.

These are questions that we should ask already today. And this is why we will already make proposals in our contribution to the Leaders' discussions on the future of Europe, that will be held under the Belgian Presidency in the first half of 2024.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Our Union's founders believed that defence and security had to be central in the European project. Today, this is more true than ever before. We have made tangible progress towards a European Defence Union. But the strategic challenges we face have grown even faster. Now, look at how much our Union has changed in recent years. When the pandemic hit, we all realised that we needed more integration to address health emergencies. And since then, we have laid the foundations of a European Health Union. When Russia tried to blackmail us with gas, we all realised that we needed common investment, common action and even a common aggregate purchase of gas. And since then, the European Energy Union has advanced more than ever before. The next chapter is a fully fledged European Defence Union. So that Europe can finally take strategic responsibility for its own future. It is one of the big tasks that our Union faces for the years ahead. And I am confident that Europe will once again answer to the call of history.

Thank you very much, and long live Europe.