[Hunted]

The final seconds of flight and impact in Trinity Bay caught by Chamber County Sheriff's Office Surveillance Camera.

[K53]

To the crew of Atlas Air, Rest in Peace

[BrinleeReality]

Originally Posted by Hunted ↗

The final seconds of flight and impact in Trinity Bay caught by Chamber County Sheriff's Office Surveillance Camera.

Looks like if they’d had another 1000 feet of altitude they might’ve made it, looks like they were pulling out of the dive and hit the water at an almost flat angle.

[alchemistmuffin]

Anyone have photos of the remains of the pilots? Would love to see the chunky remains....

[FunkPumpkin]

*rubs hands greedily*

New Air Disasters episode coming right up!

[Hunted]

Just FYI… we’ve heard the full cockpit audio and seen the data. Here’s what really happened (name redacted please to protect the innocent!):

During the approach, at about 6,000 FT (being flown by the first officer), the Captain reached around the throttle quadrant to extend the flaps to the next position after being called to do so by the first officer (pilot flying)… very normal. In many aircraft including the 767, that’s a very odd/difficult repositioning of your hand (from the left seat, all the way around to the right side of the center console), and requires intimate familiarity and slow/non-spazzy (technical term!)/deliberate motion to do successfully.
Well in any case, it was not done so this time. The captain accidentally hit the “go around” switch while bringing his hand around for the flaps, which brought both engines up to full power. In the landing configuration, as this aircraft was transitioning into, that obviously causes a vast increase in lift… and the first officer (pilot flying) used everything he had to force the nose back down. Still not sure why that occurred, as the crew should have just “gone around” then and tried it again when properly configured… but they did not. And that started in motion a chain of events that lead to tragedy.
As the First Officer over-rotated downward, again with the engines at full power, the aircraft quickly accelerated and approached something we’re all trained to handle (at least in good training environments)… an “upset recovery”, countered by NON-AUTOMATION and basic “stick and rudder skills”. This captain however, in turn, grabbed the controls without using positive command (“I’ve got”, “My aircraft”, or anything normally done), and countered the F/O’s control input by completely hauling his control column full aft… remember, while the F/O is pushing full forward.
In the process of doing that, he broke the “shear pin” on his control column (a device/mechanical safety interlock used to separate a control column from the “innards” of the control architecture in the event one control column is doing something it should not)… and that occurred here.
The captain, a few seconds later, now accelerating downward out of the control envelope of the 767 (remember, all of this started at 6000 FT and probably took less time to get to the fatal point than it did to read this far), recognizes the has no control column and then asks the F/O to pull up, get the nose up, or something to that affect. It isn’t 100% clear what he says.
The F/O then tries to pull aft on his column (going from full forward to full aft), but isn’t getting the response he needs, because the aircraft is out of the envelope of controllability and the controls are “air-loaded” in position.
At about 2000 FT, eventually the trim motors are able to start overcoming the air-load, and the aircraft begins to attempt to arrest its rate of descent… but alas it’s far too little, far too late, and the aircraft impacts about 30-40 degrees nose down, with what is believed to be about 4-5000 FT / minute rate of descent.
Oh by the way, the throttles aren’t touched until somewhere during that last few seconds of flight… which is believed to be what enabled the trim motors to start working. Unclear who does it, and no audio indicates who it was.
Just FYI… we’ve attempted in our 767 simulators to recover from the event with the exact same setup, and thus far we’ve only had success when starting at 8000’ or higher… meaning we are fully established in the “out of control” position at 8000’, recognize it by then, and initiate recovery starting at 8000’. These guys started the whole thing at 6000’ and were much lower when a true recovery attempt was initiated. No chance, and just shows you how quickly you can get “out of the envelope” when you don’t follow procedure, try some completely erroneous recovery technique, and don’t have a clue what you’re doing.

So many things went wrong with crew coordination, basic flying skills, aircraft envelope awareness, basic procedures, and such… that this will likely go down as one of the absolute worst “pilot error” events ever. It needs to have serious impact throughout the Amazon flying circus (and associated partnerships), and show people that Jeff Bezos’ attempt to push the envelope at lower cost, all things else be damned, doesn’t apply to aviation. This accident no doubt was absolutely horrible, and three people lost their lives…one of them (the jumpseater) through absolutely no fault of his own. But making an approach into Houston, TX, it could have been so much worse. In another few miles, they would have been over major population centers and who knows what would have happened then.

Know your aircraft. Know your procedures. And for God sakes, just FLY! It’s not a video game!

[Rob98LS1]

How long did it take for this entire event to unfold? It seems either you make the right decisions in the right order with crystal clear communication or your fucked and you have only one shot. Shit is crazy.

[SpicyWeiner]

What a fuck cluster

[Azimuth]

Here is an update to this incident. There was an investigation concluded by the NTSB on 14 July 20. The final accident report is still pending as far as I know.


"The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has found that Atlas Air flight 3591 crashed outside Houston in 2019 after the first officer, due partly to sensory illusion, improperly reacted to inadvertent activation of the aircraft’s go-around mode.

The NTSB, in conclusions released July 14, also cites first officer airmanship deficiencies and shortcomings by the captain as factors playing a role in the crash.

“Also contributing were systemic deficiencies in the aviation industry’s selection and performance measurement practices, which failed to address the first officer’s aptitude-related deficiencies and maladaptive stress response,” said the safety investigatory agency in its conclusions.

The NTSB also disclosed its findings in a webcast hearing on 14 July. The investigation is complete but the final accident report has not been released.

The Federal Aviation Administration said it intends to address some of the NTSB’s concerns next year by requiring sharing of pilot records.

The Atlas Air Boeing 767-300 Boeing Converted Freighter (registration N1217A) crashed as it approached Houston’s George Bush Intercontinental airport on February 23 2019 during a flight from Miami.

Three people died in the crash: the captain, first officer and a pilot travelling as a passenger.

The accident sequence began when the aircraft was about 35nm (65km) outside Houston, descending in light turbulence through 6,300 ft with the first officer at the controls.

The turbulence likely caused the first officer’s wrist or watch to inadvertently activate the jet’s go-around switch. At the time, the first officer was likely holding the speed brake lever, which is near the go-around switch, the report says. The board calls such inadvertent go-around activation “rare and typically benign”.

Despite cockpit notifications, the pilots were apparently unaware of the flight mode transition. Seconds later, one of the pilots – likely the first officer – pushed the aircraft’s control column forward, pitching it nose down, the NTSB says.

“The first officer likely experienced a pitch-up somatogravic illusion as the airplane accelerated due to the inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which prompted him to push forward on the elevator control column,” the report says.

Such an illusion, which can cause pilots to sense that their aircraft is pitching nose up, can occur during limited outside visibility when an aircraft is accelerating.

The first officer “experienced sensations that [the] airplane was stalling. The aircraft was not stalling,” says NTSB investigator Bill English during the hearing.

Due to the control column input, the aircraft entered a dive from which the pilots were unable to recover.

“The airplane crashed into a shallow, muddy, marshy area of Trinity Bay, Texas,” NTSB board chair Robert Sumwalt says during the hearing.

The board says the captain failed to quickly recognise the first officer’s unexpected actions. Also, the captain’s attempts to arrest the dive were ineffective because the captain failed to “command a positive transfer of control” from the first officer.

But the NTSB said the first officer deliberately withheld from Atlas a history of performance issues.

“The first officer’s repeated uses of incomplete and inaccurate information about his employment history on resumes and applications were deliberate attempts to conceal his history of performance deficiencies and deprived Atlas Air and at least one other former employer of the opportunity to fully evaluate his aptitude and competency as a pilot,” the NTSB said.

The report said Atlas’ use of “designated agents” to verify pilot background records kept Atlas from fully evaluating the first officer.

Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, which owns Atlas Air, said the “NTSB’s report provides valuable findings that will help our company and the aviation community as a whole as we continue to improve safety across our industry”.

“Of critical importance is the need for an improved federal pilot records database to provide airlines with full visibility of pilot history in the hiring process,” Atlas added.

Recommendations
To prevent future such accidents, the NTSB urged the FAA to emphasise that aircraft operators should use “flight operations” experts, not designated agents, to review pilot records prior to hiring.

The board recommends that the FAA address shortcomings with an existing, but voluntary, “Pilot Records Database”, which is used to share pilot records among airlines.

The database should include all pilot training records related to airline employment processes, the NTSB said.

The NTSB also reiterated a previous recommendation that airlines, prior to hiring new pilots, be required to obtain and review “notices of disapprovals”. Such forms are records of areas where pilot applicants demonstrate unsatisfactory piloting knowledge or skill.

Asked to comment, the FAA said it expects in January 2021 to publish a rule requiring “the industry provide pilot records” to the Pilot Records Database.

“The FAA will complete the final database after the agency publishes the final rule,” it adds."

Link to Air Cargo News HERE.

[Clubhouse]

Atlas Air Flight 3591~Wiki~

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlas_Air_Flight_3591