

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1438905-001

Total Deleted Page(s) = 4

Page 11 ~ b1 - Per CIA and FBI; b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b6; b7C; b7D;

Page 12 ~ b1 - Per CIA and FBI; b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b6; b7C; b7D;

Page 53 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;

Page 54 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X Deleted Page(s) X

X No Duplication Fee X

X For this Page X

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Automated Serial Permanent Charge-Out
FD-5a (1-5-94)

Date: 12/01/00 Time: 15:39

Case ID: [REDACTED] Serial: 1

b3
b7E

Description of Document:

Type : EC
Date : 11/22/00
To : NATIONAL SECURITY
From : WASHINGTON FIELD
Topic: EC FORWARDS ATTACHED DOCUMENT TO FBIHQ FOR INFORMATION

Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:

inadvertly serialized.

Employee: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

2993

Automated Serial Permanent Charge-Out
FD-5a (1-5-94)

Date: 12/01/00 Time: 15:37

Case ID: [REDACTED] Serial: 2

b3
b7E

Description of Document:

Type : EC

Date : 11/30/00

To : WASHINGTON FIELD

From : WASHINGTON FIELD

(U) Topic: ~~(S)~~ TO PROVIDE NS-33 WITH FINDINGS FROM A TECHNICAL

Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:

inadvertly serialized.

Employee: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

2994

04/03/01
12:56:02

View Document Attributes

ECFVA0M0

~~SECRET~~

Orig. Office : D5	Responses :
Document Type : EC	Text . . . :
Document Date : 12/19/00	FIF . . . :
To : LABORATORY *	
From : NATIONAL SECURITY	
Case ID : 	Serial : 3
Topic : SPECIAL PROJECTS ADVISORY BOARD APPROVAL	
Author :	
Approver :	
Ref. Case ID :	Serial :

b3
b7E

(U) Class Level : ~~X~~ Authority : G3 Duration : X1 SCI :
Rule 6(e) . . : Caveats . . : FD-501 . . :
Secure Doc. : IRS Tax . . :

~~SECRET~~

Command . . . > +
F1=Help F3=Exit F4=Prompt F6=Multv F12=Cancel F14=List F16=NextDoc

2995

04/03/01
12:57:23

View Document Attributes

ECFVA0M0

~~SECRET~~

Orig. Office : D5
Document Type : EC
Document Date : 02/08/01
To : NATIONAL SECURITY
From : NATIONAL SECURITY
Case ID . . . : ^{*}
Topic : NONE SEE DETAILS
Author :
Approver . . . :
Ref. Case ID :

Responses :
Text . . . :
FIF :

Serial : 4

b3
b7E

Serial :

(U) Class Level : ~~X~~ Authority : G3
Rule 6(e) . . : Caveats . . :
Secure Doc. : Y IRS Tax . . :

Duration : X1 SCI :
FD-501 . . :

~~SECRET~~

Command . . . > +
F1=Help F3=Exit F4=Prompt F6=Multv F12=Cancel F14=List F16=NextDoc

2996

Automated Serial Permanent Charge-Out
FD-5a (1-5-94)

Date: 03/14/01 Time: 11:21

Case ID: [REDACTED] Serial: 5

b3
b7E

Description of Document:

Type : EC
Date : 02/26/01
To : NATIONAL SECURITY
From : BALTIMORE
Topic: (U) RESPONDS TO LEAD.

Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:

text not to be uploaded on this case

Employee: [REDACTED]

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DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
ON 02-22-2017

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 11/22/2000

To: National Security

Attn: NS-1C

From: Washington Field

NS-33 ✓

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] ipm

(U) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending) ✓

(U) Title: (S) GRAYDAY
ESP-R
OO:WFO

(U) Synopsis: (S) EC forwards attached document to FBIHQ for information and further review. WFO is opening a full investigation, codenamed GRAYDAY, on this matter.

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Enclosure(s): (S) Copy of attached report titled "GRAYDAY," dated November 2000.

(U) Details: (S) THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY RESTRICTED INFORMATION FROM A HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCE PERTAINING TO A HIGHLY SENSITIVE INVESTIGATION. ACCESS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE WITH A STRICT NEED TO KNOW. THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT BE UPLOADED INTO THE ACS SYSTEM.

(U) (S) Attached to this EC is a report pertaining to a subject who has recently surfaced as a candidate in the GRAYSUIT investigation. WFO is opening a full investigation, codenamed GRAYDAY, on this subject.

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NOV 22 2000

~~SECRET~~

To: National Security From: Washington Field

Re: ~~(S)~~ [] 11/22/2000

b3
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

NATIONAL SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Read and Clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2050
DATE: 02-27-2017

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

GRAYDAY

NOVEMBER 2000

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X-1~~

~~SECRET~~

2999

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~

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GRAYDAY

(U) (S) GRAYDAY matches the [] lead items virtually across the board. These include the following categories of lead items.

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b7C

- (U) • (S) Professional and work assignments and a 1991 promotion.
- (U) • (S) Interaction with KGB (e.g., signal and deaddrop locations; periods of activity/inactivity).
- (U) • (S) Production (i.e., knowledge of or access to FBI, joint FBI/CIA, andUSIC information/operations/programs).
- (U) • (S) Computer and computer encryption expertise.
- (U) • (S) Personal contacts/associations.
- (U) • (S) Personal items (e.g., family, Chicago background, financial situation, general physical description, general voice pattern).

GRAYDAY AND []

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(U) (S) Listed below is a comparison of GRAYDAY and [] on specific lead items. It demonstrates how closely they match.

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1. Professional/Work Assignments and Promotion

- (U) • (S) At the beginning of his cooperation in October 1985, [] informed the KGB that his identity and the information he was planning to pass to them had to be protected. [] warned that his reporting, if viewed as a whole, would point directly to him. Over the course of the operation, [] demonstrated that he had extensive knowledge

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of FBI and joint FBI-CIA human and technical operations/programs as well as a wide array of USIC operations/programs.

(U) (S) (GRAYDAY was assigned as an SSA in FBIHQ's INTD/CI-3A Unit from 1984 to the end of 1985 and then again from 1987-90. During these periods, he had knowledge of and access to most of the sensitive FBI and joint FBI/CIA human and technical operations. He also worked extensively with NSA and other components of the U.S. Intelligence Community. CI-3 A Unit was the chief consumer and repository for documents and material coming in from the USIC. GRAYDAY had access to all of this material.)

(U) • (S) [] informed the KGB in May 1990 that because of a promotion, he will need to go on business trips often and his access to materials will be limited. [] told the KGB that in July 1991, he plans to "return to expanded possibilities." In a return letter to [] (date to be determined), the KGB expressed its regrets that contacts would not be so regular, but reassured him by saying, "You may have a contact with us anytime you want after staying away as long as you have to. So do your new job, make your trips, take your time...And we'll be in a ready-to-go mode to come over to the drop next in turn whenever you are ready: that is when you are back home and decide to communicate." On September 3, 1990, the KGB told [] that he is brilliantly handling his new responsibilities and he should not wear himself out with frequent trips. In a message to the KGB (date to be determined), [] apologized for the delay in his reporting. [] stated, "As you know, I have been traveling extensively. I understand the difficult times you face. I wish you the best. By June I should be useful again."

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(U) (S) (On May 11, 1990, GRAYDAY was reassigned from the CI-3A Unit in FBIHQ, where he enjoyed immense access to sensitive CI and FI information, to the FBI's Inspection Staff. This assignment entailed extensive TDY's to FBI field offices for inspections.)

(U) • (S) On July 15, 1991, [] passed the KGB background briefings on the FBI offices in New York, Salt Lake City, and San Francisco. In the same deaddrop package, he included a disk with a message to the KGB. [] told the KGB that he "returned, grabbed the first thing I could lay my hands on." On August 15, 1991, the KGB phoned a message to [] in English: "Welcome back. It's good to know you are here. And it's good for you to touch the green, green grass of home."

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(U) (S) (GRAYDAY may have been traveling on inspection assignments prior to July 15, 1991, possibly to NY, Salt Lake City, or San Francisco. It is conceivable that the above reference touching the green, green grass of home means that [] was overseas just prior to August 15, 1991. GRAYDAY's travel will be reviewed in this regard.)

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- (U) • (S) On December 16, 1991, [] passed a disk to the KGB telling them that he had "an increase in salary and authority...moved him temporarily out of direct responsibility, but a new mission for my new group has not been fully defined. I hope to adjust that...As General PATTON said in his closing line of his speech in front of the Third Army before the Allied invasion of Europe, let's get this over with so we can go kick the shit out of the purple pissing Japanese."

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(U) (S) (GRAYDAY was promoted to Unit Chief of the NSTL Unit in the latter half of 1991. The NSTL Unit was a new component with a new CI concept. []

b1
b3

[] The writer and the WFO ASAC for Branch 3 recall that GRAYDAY was particularly [] fond of PATTON. The writer also recalled that the above quotation was identical or similar to one which he (GRAYDAY) had articulated to the writer on more than one occasion.)

- (U) • (S) On a disk passed to the KGB on July 15, 1991, [] reported that he had at least five years until retirement.

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b7C

(U) (S) (GRAYDAY was eligible or near eligible to retire in 1996.)

2. Interaction with the KGB

- (U) • (S) [] on his own volition, was inactive with the KGB for two lengthy periods early in the operation: November 1985 to June 1986; and August 1986 to September 1987.

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(U) (S) (GRAYDAY was reassigned from FBIHQ to Chief of the POCKETWATCH Squad in the FBI's New York Office (NYO) near the end of 1985. He served in New York throughout 1986 and into 1987. During this period, it would have been difficult for GRAYDAY to interact with the KGB in WDC. GRAYDAY's family did not move with him to New York. GRAYDAY frequently returned to WDC on the weekends.)

- (U) • (S) [] initially proposed to exchange material with the KGB at a footbridge in Nottoway Park in Vienna, Virginia. He also proposed signals sites in the area of Courthouse Road, Lemontree Lane and Sutton Road. The footbridge in Nottoway Park, which was subsequently given the codenames PRIME and PARK, remained the principal deaddrop location throughout much of the operation. Most of the signal sites for KGB callouts to [] and for have loaded and have cleared signals were located in and around the Vienna, Virginia area, and along the Route 123 corridor and the GW Parkway. The KGB and [] agreed to these sites because it was generally understood that [] routinely traveled in these areas and along these routes.

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(U) (S) (GRAYDAY's residence is on Talisman Drive off of Beulah Road, in Vienna, Virginia. He has lived there since at least 1985. His residence is close to Nottoway Park and the other principal deaddrop and signal site locations. His normal route of travel would take him past many of the signal site locations. The KGB established a pole at the intersection of Route 123 and Beulah Road as the "V" signal site to call out GRAYDAY for operational activity. This signal site is just down the street from GRAYDAY's residence.)

(U) • (S) [] signal sites to callout the KGB for a deaddrop exchange are located in the WDC NW area along routes to the old Embassy Building and the surrounding Tunlaw area.

b6
b7C

(U) (S) (GRAYDAY frequently traveled to these areas in WDC to drop his children off at private schools. He also attended meetings of religious organizations in this area.)

(U) • (S) On July 21, 1986, a KGB officer from WDC made a telephone call to a number in New York, which [] had given to the KGB, and left a message for [] indicating that a drop in the WDC area was going to be loaded for him.

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b7C

(U) (S) (GRAYDAY was assigned to the FBI's NYO in July 1986 when the KGB made this phone call to New York. It is not known at this time where GRAYDAY was residing at this time or whether he had any connections with the individuals who were listed at the New York residence where the telephone call was made.)

3. Production

(U) (S) As noted earlier in this report, [] had knowledge of or access to FBI, joint FBI/CIA, and USIC information/operations/programs) [] is replete with specific information and documents which [] passed to the KGB. Our initial review clearly shows that GRAYDAY had known or likely access to this information and these documents, although it should be emphasized that we have not yet identified all of these cases. Several unique examples were selected to show how GRAYDAY matches the [] production.

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(U) • (S) Boris told the KGB in 1988 that he could read [] file because a special project regarding [] was about to begin.

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b7C

(U) (S) (GRAYDAY was reviewing [] file in 1988 in connection with his (GRAYDAY's) participation in upcoming FBI/NSA debriefings of []

b6
b7C

•

[]

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b3
b6
b7C

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~~SECRET~~

(U) ~~(S)~~ (GRAYDAY knew about these NSA successes from his work with [] and NSA.)

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b7C

• ~~(S)~~ [] has knowledge or access []

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b6
b7C
b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ (While assigned to the CI-3A Unit, GRAYDAY had access and knowledge of all these topics. GRAYDAY set up the computer system for the FBI/ NYO lookouts and had input into the establishment of the computer system for WFO's lookouts.)

b1 Per CIA and FBI
b3 Per CIA and FBI
b6
b7C
b7E

~~(S)~~

(U) • ~~(S)~~ In his initial letter to the KGB on October 4, 1985, [] compromised the MOTORIN, MARTYNOV, and YUZHIN cases by giving their true names and the fact that they were cooperating with American intelligence.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ (GRAYDAY was in CI-3A Unit during this period. He knew the MOTORIN and YUZHIN cases and personally supervised the analysts who worked on the MARTYNOV case. He also knew the true names of each of these sources.)

(U) • ~~(S)~~ [] passed the []
[] to the KGB in 1988.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ (A copy of the [] was sent to the CI-3A Unit in August 1988. GRAYDAY would have had access to this report.)

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(U) • ~~(S)~~ [] passed [] information to the KGB on more than one occasion.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- (U) (S) (GRAYDAY worked on SDI and NRO CI/security issues while assigned to CI-3A Unit. The writer believes that GRAYDAY was the FBI representative to a group involved in the CI/security aspects of the SDI Program. He may have also worked on an NRO committee.)

4. Computer and Computer Encryption Expertise

- (U) • (S) From the very beginning of his cooperation with the KGB in 1985, [] pushed the KGB to approve the use of computers and encrypted messages on computer disks for communication purposes. [] regularly proposed new ideas on the use of computers and computer encryption, including the use of "forty trak" for encryption, computer laptops, computer bulletin boards, etc.
- (U) (S) (GRAYDAY is highly skilled in the use of computers and computer programming. He had this expertise in 1985 when few CIA or FBI employees had such knowledge.)

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5. Friends and Professional Contacts

- (U) • (S) Near the end of 1991, [] passed a message to the KGB informing them of the following: []

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- (U) (S) (The writer, [] recalled that []
- [] The writer believes that his surname may be []

b6
b7C

- (U) • (S) On March 5, 1990, [] passed a disk to the KGB in which he disclosed that he was obtaining NSA information from an NSA employee []

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b1
b3
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



b1
b3
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b7C

(U) • (S) On February 9, 1991, [] passed the KGB a disk which contained information on fourteen FBI/NYO agents in Soviet establishments in New York. [] told the KGB that he had discussions with the FBI counterintelligence leadership in New York, including [] whom he has known for many years.

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b7C

(U) (S) (GRAYDAY has known [] for years. GRAYDAY may have also been on an official inspection staff trip to NYO during this period. If so, this could have given him a pretext to inquire about such matters.)

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b7C

6. Personal Items

(U) • (S) On August 19, 1991, [] sent the KGB a disk which included a historical lesson on the effectiveness of Mayor Richard Daley in Chicago. The letter included [] philosophy on the Catholic approach to life. On October 7, 1991, the Russians sent a message to [] praising him for his "tour of Chicago" and his insights into how the Chicago system was applicable to the current situation in Moscow. [] also selected "Chicago" as the word he would use in his letters to the KGB to trigger signal and deaddrop activity.

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(U) (S) (GRAYDAY is from Chicago. His father was a Chicago policeman and GRAYDAY was also a Chicago policeman. GRAYDAY professes strong, rigid views about the correctness of the Catholic religion.)

(U) • (S) On September 26, 1988, the KGB passed [] passports, or at least information about passports, in a deaddrop operation in WDC. On August 7, 1989, the KGB wrote a message to GRAYDAY telling him that "You are a lucky man. This is not very often that a man is given a wife both beautiful and clever. And cute kids with a taste for knowledge and exploration... You've got it all at home and we wish you and your family all the best."

b6
b7C

(U) (S) (The above passage appears to suggest that, at the very least, the KGB and [] were exchanging information about passports. It is conceivable that the KGB passed fake passports to [] in connection with his earlier request for an escape plan. The above passage also suggests that [] has shared information about his family with the KGB and possibly even passed photographs of them to the KGB for passport purposes.

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~~SECRET~~

GRAYDAY has an attractive wife, who is quite intelligent. He also has [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

- (U) • (S) On February 9, 1991, [redacted] observed [redacted] at an operational site. [redacted] described [redacted] as middle age, tall, straight dark hair, combed back, high forehead, swarthy skin, handsome features (women are attracted to men like this). [redacted] recognized him as the guy at another deaddrop location on May 23, 1989. At that time, [redacted] was wearing a light brown trench coat, dark trousers, white shirt, tie. They recognized each other.

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b7C

- (U) • (S) (GRAYDAY fits the general description in the above passage. He is tall with dark hair which is combed off his forehead. He has a large head and would appear to have a high forehead. He does not have dark, swarthy skin. However, if [redacted] observed him during evening hours, this could be the impression he received.)

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- (U) • (S) (The writer believes that the [redacted] voice pattern is similar to GRAYDAY.)

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b7C

- (U) • (S) In his second letter to the KGB on November 8, 1985, [redacted] thanked the KGB for the \$50,000. He then said, "As far as funds are concerned, I have little need or utility for more than the \$100,000. It merely provides a difficulty since I can not spend it, store it or invest it easily without tripping "drug money" warning bells. Perhaps some diamonds as security to my children and some good will so that when the time comes, you will accept by senior services as a guest lecturer. Eventually, I would appreciate an escape plan. (Nothing lasts forever.)

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- (U) • (S) [redacted] GRAYDAY has [redacted]
[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

(6/26/1998)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2050
DATE: 02-28-2017

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 11/22/2000

To: National Security

Attn: NS-1C

From: Washington Field

NS-33 ✓

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] jpm JPM

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (Pending) ✓

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ GRAYDAY
ESP-R
OO:WFO

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ EC documents significant findings in the initial review of Section 2 of GRAYDAY's personnel file.

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 11/22/2000

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY RESTRICTED INFORMATION FROM A HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCE PERTAINING TO A HIGHLY SENSITIVE INVESTIGATION. ACCESS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE WITH A STRICT NEED TO KNOW. THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT BE UPLOADED INTO THE ACS SYSTEM.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Reference WFO EC to FBIHQ captioned "GRAYDAY," dated 11/22/2000 and attached report titled, "GRAYDAY - NOVEMBER 2000."

(U) ~~(S)~~ FBIHQ and WFO NS-33 representatives conducted an initial review of Section 2 of GRAYDAY's personnel file. The following significant items were discovered during this review. These items point directly to GRAYDAY as the person identical to [REDACTED] (i.e., the GRAYSUIT subject).

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b3
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NOV 27 2000

~~SECRET~~

To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 11/22/2000

b3
b7A
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(U) 1. (S) In GRAYDAY's initial (January 12, 1976) Agent Vocation Record (FD-287a), which was found in the left section of the his personnel file, GRAYDAY lists [redacted] as one of his references. According to this reference, [redacted] was [redacted] GRAYDAY indicated that he has known [redacted] for 15 years (i.e., since GRAYDAY was seventeen years old). This is the same [redacted] The writer and other FBI personnel had recalled that GRAYDAY had a close friend named [redacted]

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(U) (S) (Note: The above information tracks perfectly with [redacted] [redacted] pertaining to [redacted] near [redacted] the end of 1991, [redacted] passed a message to the KGB informing them of the following: [redacted]

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She was sterilized, is flat-chested,----hair, relig. fanatic,---a witch, older than him. He was recently told that he would not be promoted. You can try to approach him. You can try a woman with flattery. [redacted]

(U) 2. (S) GRAYDAY resided at 9531 WHITECEDAR Court in Vienna, Virginia, from January 1981 until his departure for an assignment to FBI/NYO in September 1985. Although it still needs to be confirmed, the writer recalls that GRAYDAY's family continued to reside at the WHITECEDAR Court address when GRAYDAY was assigned to New York. GRAYDAY would return on weekends to be with them. When GRAYDAY was reassigned to FBIHQ/WDC in August 1987, he purchased a home at 9414 TALISMAN Drive, just off Beulah Road, in Vienna, Virginia.

(S) (Note: [redacted] initially proposed to exchange material with the KGB at a footbridge in Nottoway Park in Vienna, Virginia. He also proposed signal sites in the area of Courthouse Road, Lemontree Lane, and Sutton Road. The footbridge in Nottoway Park, which was subsequently given the codenames PRIME and PARK, remained the principal deaddrop location throughout much of the operation. Most of the signal sites for KGB callouts to [redacted] and for the have-loaded and have-cleared signals were located in and around the Vienna, Virginia, area, and along the Route 123 corridor and the GW Parkway. The KGB and [redacted] agreed to these sites because it was generally understood that [redacted] routinely traveled in these areas and along these routes. GRAYDAY's residence at WHITECEDAR Court is adjacent to Nottoway Park in Vienna, Virginia, and extremely close to the Courthouse Road, Lemontree Lane, and Sutton Road

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 11/22/2000

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b7E

(U) areas. His later residence on Talisman Drive is just up the street from the intersection of Beulah Road and Route 123, where the KGB had selected signal site "V" to call him out for deaddrop activity.

(U) 3. (S) There are several examples of [redacted] handprinted messages or letters to the KGB. There are also several examples of GRAYDAY's handprinted material in his personnel file. FBIHQ and WFO personnel involved in the GRAYDAY investigation have compared this handprinted material and have observed many similarities. It appears that [redacted] and GRAYDAY's handprinted material are identical. WFO will request FBI handwriting experts to conduct an evaluation of this handprinted material to determine if they match.

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(U) 4. (S) GRAYDAY EOD'd in the FBI on January 12, 1976. He would have twenty years service as an FBI SA and would be over 50 years of age in 1996. In the FBI system, GRAYDAY was eligible to retire in 1996.

(U) (S) (Note: On a disk passed to the KGB on July 15, 1991, [redacted] reported that he could retire at the earliest in five years (i.e., in 1996.)

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

NATIONAL SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Read and Clear.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/30/2000

To: National Security Division Attn: SSA [REDACTED]
NS-1C

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b7E

From: Washington Field
NS-33

Contact: IRS [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] gf

(U) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) GRAYDAY
ESP-R

(U) Synopsis: (S) Request for FBIHQ records regarding captioned subject.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) (S) Full Investigation Instituted: 11/22/2000

(U) Administrative: (S) WARNING: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION WAS RECEIVED FROM EXTREMELY SENSITIVE SOURCES WHOSE RELIABILITY HAVE BEEN DETERMINED.

(U) (S) DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION COULD CAUSE THE COMPROMISE OF THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE FBI AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORITY.

(U) (S) SUBJECT MATTER IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE AND SHOULD BE CLOSELY MAINTAINED. A BIGOT LIST HAS BEEN MAINTAINED ON THE CASE. THEREFORE, WFO/NS-33 IS TO BE ADVISED OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE ACCESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT MATTER AS A RESULT OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

(U) (S) THIS COMMUNICATION IS NOT TO BE LOADED INTO THE FBI'S AUTOMATED CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ACS).

~~SECRET~~

DO NOT UPLOAD
INTO ACS

DO NOT UPLOAD
CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFO
SUPV. INITIALS [REDACTED]

JB

JB

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DEC 1

Desk

3001

ISA G. WAS ASKED TO SIT ON
THIS UNTIL A MORE COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF LEADS WAS SUBMITTED

~~SECRET~~

To: National Security Division From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 11/30/2000

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(U) Details: (S) WFO/NS-33 is evaluating the movements and activities of captioned subject in an effort to verify his reported contacts with KGB/SVRR officers beginning in October 1985. We have acquired a record of his travel as an Inspector's Aide during the period June 1990 - June 1991. To date, we have little information regarding subject's whereabouts on any given day for the period 1985-present.

(U) (S) Most agencies have access to the Department of Treasury's U.S. Customs [REDACTED] database, which contains a record of travel of people entering U.S. airports during the period 1982 - present. This information would be very useful to us in tracking subject's travel; however, there is some question as to whether searches of this database can be tracked. Subject likely has access to this database at OFM/DOS. It is not known whether subject could determine whether his name had been used to locate travel records in this database.

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To: National Security Division From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 11/30/2000

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(U)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

NATIONAL SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

- (U) (S) 1. Provide available voucher, ingress/egress (into FBIHQ), and leave records (annual/sick) re captioned subject for the period 9/85 to present. Caution should be exercised if computer database searches are queried for this information, as subject is extremely capable and knowledgeable of computers and computer technology. He has extensive experience in this area and has been known to break into others' computers.
- (U) (S) 2. Determine whether a search of U.S. Customs [REDACTED] (travel) databases would leave traces which could alert subject. If not, query subject's travel for the period 1982 to present and forward to WFO. WFO is unaware of any aliases used by subject.


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~~SECRET~~



DEC 28



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BACK

~~SECRET~~

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2025
DATE: 06-28-2017

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, DC 20535
December 28, 2000



~~(S)~~

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(U)

~~(S)~~ The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Washington Field Office (WFO), is attempting to identify
individuals with possible asset potential for a sensitive FBI
investigation. The below listed individuals have been identified
as potential assets for the before mentioned matter:

NAME

SOCIAL SECURITY #

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(U)

~~(S)~~ ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

3006

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the
FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



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NAME

SOCIAL SECURITY #



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(U) ~~(S)~~ The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is requested to query the CIA employee database and determine if the before mentioned individuals have any affiliation with the CIA.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Please direct any future correspondence concerning this matter to the attention of Special Agent [redacted] of Squad NS-32 of the FBI's Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20535, telephone [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/05/2000

To: Washington Field

Attn: NS-33
SUPVR

From: Washington Field
NS-33

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

cdt

✓ Case ID #: (S)

(U) Title: (S) GRAY DAY;
ESP-R

(U) Synopsis: (S) Request SAC authorization to maintain all ELSUR indexing on the squad.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Details: (S) Due to the sensitivity of captioned investigation, SAC authorization is requested to maintain all ELSUR indexing on the squad throughout the duration of this investigation. At the conclusion of same, indexing will be conducted in accordance with normal Bureau policy.

(U) (S) Captioned investigation is a restricted access investigation with need-to-know caveats. Therefore, ELSUR coverage information including intercepts, will be excluded from the ELSUR Automated Record System (EARS) until the investigation has been closed. When the investigation is closed all court orders and intercepts will be forwarded to the ELSUR Unit for inclusion into EARS.

(U) (S) IRS [redacted] will maintain the ELSUR index for the investigation on squad NS-32 in room 5061.

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DEC 18

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[redacted] *mt*

[redacted] *JB*

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2050
DATE: 02-28-2017

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 12/14/2000

To: National Security

Attn: SC

From: Washington Field
NS-32

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (S)

(Pending)

Title: (S) GRAYDAY
ESP-R

Synopsis: (S) Lead set for NSD to approve operational concept
relating to possible imminent dead drop activity.

(U)

~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 11/22/2000

Details: (S) During a meeting at NSD on 12/05/2000, WFO SSA
Squad NS-25 (SVR, Line KR), advised that a
routine ACS review had been conducted that date by a squad case
agent. This review had revealed that as recently as 11/30/2000
captioned subject had accessed and/or printed ACS serials from
WFO files relating to FCI investigations connected with Line KR.

(S) On 12/14/2000, the same case agent, who is now
witting to this investigation, reported that additional ACS
reviews by him had determined that during October and November
2000 (ACS does not permit a case review earlier than October),
the subject had accessed and/or printed serials containing
information related to A
collection and review of these serials is being undertaken, and
the results will be forwarded separately. An initial review of

~~SECRET~~

DEC 18

Stat Claimed:

Participate in develop.
of Op Plan
49 - 2/14/02 mlc

~~SECRET~~

To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/14/2000

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(U) ~~(S)~~ the serials [redacted] suggest this source may possibly have been compromised, either on the basis of his information or his current location.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Based on the pattern noted by NS-25, a similar review of ACS records relating to the GRAY DECEIVER investigation was conducted by NS-32/33 on 12/14/2000. This revealed that during the same October/November 2000 period, subject accessed this file, and apparently succeeded in reviewing serials contained therein. These serials are being reviewed and photocopied by investigators.

(U) ~~(S)~~ On 12/13/2000 the FBI Laboratory advised subject's fingerprint(s) were positively identified on wrappings of a package [redacted] this package contained information which the KGB agent [redacted] transmitted to the KGB. It would therefore appear as though captioned subject is identical to [redacted]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ WFO cannot yet determine whether subject is an active SVR agent. Some of his recent movements, as observed by the SSG, appear somewhat suspicious, though inconclusive. One telephone conversation with his wife, relating to money, is also both suspicious but inconclusive. His queries into ACS may be an act of self-preservation rather than at the behest of the SVR. Regardless, his recent ACS retrievals concerning ongoing investigations and sensitive sources are alarming. This concern is heightened by the fact that during October and November 2000, KR officers under physical and/or GPS surveillance have been engaged in activities possibly suggesting drop activity, in locales known to be associated with [redacted]. These activities appear to shadow the subject's ACS retrievals.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ A review of the information concerning [redacted] as [redacted] reflects that drop activities relating to this agent took place on 12/26/1988, 12/25/1989, and 12/16/1991. Specifics beyond 1991 are unknown.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Assuming subject is [redacted] that he is an active agent of the SVR, and his recent ACS retrievals are preliminary to drop activity, it is possible information [redacted] could be intended for transmittal on or about 12/25/2000, if not already passed.

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To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/14/2000

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(U) (S) Therefore, WFO recommends the following general course of action:

(U) (S) For the sake of the sensitive sources, the FBI should not allow the subject to pass a package to the SVR. If subject is detected filling a dead drop (assuming dead drops are the method by which information is still being transmitted) his package should be retrieved. [redacted] of the trade craft used in the [redacted] operation is dated, a package substitution is ill-advised. In the event of a substitution, the SVR will likely conclude the FBI is responsible for the switch. While the concept of opening a package prepared by the subject, documenting its contents, evaluating those contents, and then deciding whether to let it fall into SVR hands is appealing, it is not practical. It appears that as a general rule, the drops used in connection with the [redacted] operation were cleared in a short time period. Likely there will be little time for opening, documenting, and most importantly evaluating the contents of the drop, particularly if it contains encrypted computer disks. Therefore, WFO recommends any drop made by the subject be taken, and the SVR left wondering why the drop was not filled.

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(U) (S) To this end, prior to 12/22/2000, WFO will attempt to effect surveillance of two drop sites near the subject's residence. [redacted] these sites were used on multiple occasions. Neither site is conducive to coverage via automobile or discreet pedestrian observation. Preliminary technical surveys to determine the feasibility of video surveillance have been encouraging.

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(U) (S) Based on [redacted] history during the Decembers of 1988-1991, WFO considers the Christmas 2000 weekend a logical time for drop activity, based on the assumptions mentioned above. Special attention will be afforded to the area near subject's residence wherein both these two established drop sites are located. The goal will be to identify and document any transactions between the subject and the SVR. If either of these two established sites is used, the probability of success in this effort will obviously increase.

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(U) (S) If the subject is observed dropping a package, WFO recommends it be retrieved and not replaced. If a package is placed in the drop by the SVR, WFO recommends the subject be allowed to retrieve it.

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~~SECRET~~

To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/14/2000

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(U)

(U) (S) If this general operational approach is acceptable to NSD, WFO will take additional steps to plan for this operation. If another course of action is required, NSD is requested to make it known to WFO quickly, so that an appropriate plan can be devised and executed.

~~SECRET~~

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To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/14/2000

(U)

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

NATIONAL SECURITY

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) (S) Approve the course of action generally described
above.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 12/20/2000

To: National Security

Attn: SC [REDACTED]

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From: Washington Field
NS-32

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(U) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) GRAYDAY
ESP-R

(U) Synopsis: (S) Contingencies concerning flight risk are provided for NSD approval.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) (S) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 11/22/2000

(U) (S) Reference: WFO EC 12/14/2000.

(U) Details: (S) As summarized in referenced communication, the subject has recently reviewed numerous FBI documents relating to sensitive sources and investigations. While it cannot yet be determined whether this activity is on behalf of the SVR and/or for personal security reasons, it must be concluded the subject is aware WFO is conducting espionage investigation(s) to root out KGB/SVR agents within the U.S. Intelligence Community. It is quite possible that in reviewing documents relating to the GRAY DECEIVER investigation, he has recognized that the KGB/SVR agent WFO is seeking is himself.

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[REDACTED]

JB JB

DEC 20 2000

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To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 12/20/2000

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(U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Given the likelihood subject is on guard for signs he has come under FBI scrutiny, the possibility of flight from the United States is a serious concern. Given his apparent knowledge of sensitive sources, he cannot be permitted to leave.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Accordingly, the ongoing SSG physical surveillance of the subject will be augmented with SA personnel. Should the subject fly domestically, surveillance personnel will attempt to board the same aircraft, and the subject's ultimate destination determined. Should the subject attempt to leave the United States, he will be detained by the agents involved in the surveillance. An interview will then be attempted. Recommendations in this regard will be separately submitted.

~~SECRET~~

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To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 12/20/2000

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(U)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

NATIONAL SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U)

~~(S)~~ Approve WFO's plan to detain the subject should he attempt to depart the United States.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2050
DATE: 02-28-2017

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/22/2000

To: National Security

Attn: SC [REDACTED]

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From: Washington Field
NS-32

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *2/22*
AC
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Drafted By: [REDACTED] *DSH*

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ GRAYDAY
ESP-R

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ NSD authority is requested for use of source
information in the event of an emergency subject interview.

(U) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) ~~(S)~~ Full Field Investigation Instituted: 11/20/2000

(U) Reference: ~~(S)~~ WFO EC 12/20/2000.

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ Referenced EC requested NSD approval of WFO's plan
to detain subject should he attempt to depart the United States
unexpectedly. Such a detainment would be triggered by the need
to prevent the subject from possibly compromising sensitive
sources. While the exact circumstances leading up to this action
cannot be anticipated, WFO would detain the subject if it were
concluded he intended to leave the U.S. and not return; in short,
that he was attempting to flee. Even if the subject objected to
this action, he would not be permitted to proceed.

(U) ~~(S)~~ As soon as possible in the wake of any such
detention, WFO will attempt to conduct a subject interview. As
it is unlikely the designated interviewers will have effected the
detention, some time will pass until the interview begins. The
purpose of the interview will be to solicit the subject's

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DECLASSIFIED 7/12/2000 JTD

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DSH

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To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 12/22/2000

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(U)

cooperation in obtaining details concerning the nature and extent of his relationship with the KGB/SVR. At the conclusion of the interview, the subject will not be allowed to depart the scene, while appropriate authorities are apprised of the results.

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To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 12/22/2000

(U)

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~~SECRET~~

To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 12/22/2000

(U)

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

NATIONAL SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2025

DATE: 06-28-2017

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/28/2000

To: National Security

Attn: NS-1C

From: WFO

SA [REDACTED]

NS-32

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

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Approved By:

[REDACTED]

Drafted By:

[REDACTED] smh

Case ID #: (S)

[REDACTED] (Pending)

(U)

[REDACTED] (S)

Title: (S)

(U)

GRAYDAY
ESP-R
OO: WFO

[REDACTED] (S)

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[REDACTED] JB JB

[REDACTED]

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To: National Security From: WFO
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 12/28/2000

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(U)



~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Initiation of seven new Preliminary Inquiries.

(U) ~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~


(U)



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(U) Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~ Three copies of a LHM dated 12/28/2000.

Details:



~~(S)~~

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(U) ~~(S)~~ 1.


(U) ~~(S)~~ 2.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ 5.

(U) ~~(S)~~ 6.



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BP

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To: National Security From: WFO
Re: (S) [redacted] 12/28/2000

(U)

(U)

(S)

7. [redacted]

(U)

(S)

The above listed [redacted]
[redacted].

(U)

(S)

WFO has requested the CIA to query the CIA employee database and determine if the before mentioned individuals have any affiliation with the CIA. WFO will hand deliver, UACB, a copy of the enclosed LHM to FBI SA [redacted] [redacted] CIA, CEC, during the week of 01/01/01.

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/08/2001

To: National Security

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]
NS-1C

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From: Washington Field
NS-32

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *AE*

Drafted By: [REDACTED] *G002*

(U) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) GRAYDAY
ESP-R

(U) Synopsis: (S) Request for FBIHQ records regarding captioned subject.

(U) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) (S) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 11/22/2000

(U) Administrative: (S) WARNING: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION WAS RECEIVED FROM EXTREMELY SENSITIVE SOURCES WHOSE RELIABILITY HAVE BEEN DETERMINED.

(U) (S) DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION COULD CAUSE THE COMPROMISE OF THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE FBI AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORITY.

(U) (S) SUBJECT MATTER IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE AND SHOULD BE CLOSELY MAINTAINED. A BIGOT LIST HAS BEEN MAINTAINED ON THE CASE. THEREFORE, WFO/NS-33 IS TO BE ADVISED OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE ACCESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT MATTER AS A RESULT OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

(U) (S) THIS COMMUNICATION IS NOT TO BE LOADED INTO THE FBI'S AUTOMATED CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ACS).

~~SECRET~~

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED

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[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 01/08/2001

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(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ As part of captioned investigation, WFO is evaluating all aspects of the subject's travel and movements from October 1985 through the present. Due to the nature of this investigation certain record checks cannot be conducted in the usual manner as the subject may be capable of accessing those checks. FBIHQ is requested to provide WFO with the following information once FBIHQ has made a determination the information can be obtained without the subject becoming aware of his/her name being checked. Below is a list of checks WFO requests:

1. All vouchers (travel and otherwise)
2. Ingress and egress into FBIHQ (SAC badge printout)
3. All annual leave records
4. All sick leave records
5. Indices checks
6. Bureau credit card records
7. Photos from SAC badge and credential
8. All Bureau property records
9. All firearms qualification records
10. All Bureau approved firearms records
11. Full Personnel Security file prior to 1994
12. FBIHQ Personnel Assignment charts from October 1985-present
13. [REDACTED] search (if no record is recorded)

b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ Again, WFO cautions that the above checks should only be conducted once a determination has been made that the subject cannot identify that the checks have been made.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [redacted] 01/08/2001

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(U)

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

National Security
at Washington, D.C.

(U)

(S) FBIHQ is requested to provide the following record checks to WFO, NS-33, after a determination has been made that no lead trail is generated from said checks:

1. All vouchers (travel and otherwise)
2. Ingress and egress into FBIHQ (SAC badge printout)
3. All annual leave records
4. All sick leave records
5. Indices checks
6. Bureau credit card records
7. Photos from SAC badge and credential
8. All Bureau property records
9. All firearms qualification records
10. All Bureau approved firearms records
11. Full Personnel Security file prior to 1994
12. FBIHQ Personnel Assignment charts from October 1985-present
13. [redacted] search (if no record is recorded)

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 01/08/2001

(U)

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LEAD FORM

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG []
ON 02-27-2017

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Indicate the type of Lead [CIRCLE ONE]

INTERVIEW

INVESTIGATIVE

ADMINISTRATIVE

Lead-Date: 1/8/01

DEADLINE-Date: _____

Lead Description:

FBTHQ to conduct record checks as follows:

- | | |
|---|--|
| ① All vouchers (travel and otherwise) | - ⑩ Bureau approved firearms records |
| ② Ingress and egress into FBTHQ (SAC's badge) | |
| ③ Annual leave records | ⑪ Personnel Security file prior to 1994 |
| ④ Sick leave records | |
| ⑤ Indices checks | ⑫ FBTHQ Personnel Assignment charts from 10/85-Present |
| ⑥ Bureau credit card records | |
| ⑦ Photos from SAC badge & Credentials | |
| ⑧ Bureau Property records | |
| ⑨ Firearms qualifications records | ⑬ [] search |

b7E

~~DERIVED FROM: G3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: X1~~

+++++LEAD ASSIGNMENT+++++

LEAD-OFFICE: FBTHQ

(FBI) CIA, OTHER)

ASSIGNED-TO: SSA

[]

b6
b7C

SQUAD/UNIT: FBTHQ NS-1C

+++LEAD DISPOSITION+++

COVERED-DATE: _____

COMMUNICATION RECEIVED BY NS-33: (YES) OR (NO)

TYPE/DATE OF COMMUNICATION RECEIVED: _____
(EC, 302, LAB REPORT, ETC)

COMMENTS/RESULTS:

~~SECRET~~

3009

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/29/2000

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field
NS-33

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

rkk

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

Title: (S) GRAY DAY
ESP-R

Synopsis: (S) Amateur Radio call signs.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S) WARNING: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION COULD CAUSE THE COMPROMISE OF THIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE FBI AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORITY. THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD NOT BE UPLOADED INTO THE FBI'S AUTOMATED CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ACS).

(S) A highly sensitive source provided [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] conducted a search on a covert Internet computer on the [REDACTED]

(S) The following names were searched: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] reported [REDACTED] The addresses associated with [REDACTED] are from [REDACTED] The significance of these hits are still being analyzed.

~~SECRET~~

NOV 29 2000

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 11/29/2000

(U)


b3
b7E

♦♦

~~SECRET~~




~~SECRET~~




~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~




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EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 01-31-2013

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Thank you for the 50,000.

I also appreciate your courage and perseverance in the face of generically reported bureaucratic obstacles. I would not have contacted you if it were not reported that you were held in esteem within your organization, an organization I have studied for years. I did expect some communication plan in your response. I viewed the postal delivery as a necessary risk and do not wish to trust again that channel with valuable material. I did this only because I had to so you would take my offer seriously, that there be no misunderstanding as to my long-term value, and to obtain appropriate security for our relationship from the start

(S) [REDACTED]

b1
b3

[REDACTED] You place a microcomputer "bulletin board" at this location. With appropriate encryption [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

As far as funds are concerned, I have little need or utility for more than the 100,000. It merely provides a difficulty since I can not spend it, store it or invest it easily without tripping "drug money" warning bells. Perhaps some diamonds as security to my children and some good will so that when the time comes, you will accept by senior services as a guest lecturer. Eventually, I would appreciate an escape plan. (Nothing lasts forever.)

Let us use the same site again. Same timing. Same signals.

b1
b3

(S) On September 9. [REDACTED]

I can not provide documentary substantiating evidence without arousing suspicion at this time. Never-the-less, it is from my own knowledge as a member of the community effort to capitalize on the information from which I speak. I have seen video tapes of debriefings and physically saw the last, though we were not introduced. The names were provided to me as part of my duties as one of the few who needed to know. You have some avenues of inquiry. Substantial funds were provided in excess of what could have been skimmed from their agents. The active one has always (in the past) used a concealment device -- a bag with bank notes sewn in the base during home leaves.

One other item. NSA has a new technique [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

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b3
b6
b7C

11/8/85 ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 01-31-2013

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I apologize for the delay since our break in communications. I wanted to determine if there was any cause for concern over security. I have only seen one item which has given (S) the pause. When the FBI was first given access to Victor Petrovich Gundarev, they asked [redacted]

[redacted] if Gundarev knew Viktor Cherkashin. I thought this unusual. I had seen no report indicating that Viktor Cherkashin was handling an important agent, and here-to-fore he was looked at with the usual lethargy awarded Line Chiefs. The question came to mind, are they somehow able to monitor funds, ie., to know that Viktor Cherkashin received a large amount of money for an agent? I am unaware of any such ability, but I might not know that type of (S) source reporting.

b1
b3

b1
b3

If you wish to continue our discussions, please have someone run an advertisement in the Washington Times during the week of 1/12/87 or 1/19/87, for sale, "Dodge Diplomat, 1971, needs engine work, \$1000." Give a phone number and time-of-day in the advertisement where I can call. I will call and leave a phone number where a recorded message can be left for me in one hour. I will say, "Hello, my name is Ramon. I am calling about the car you offered for sale in the Times." You will respond, "I'm sorry, but the man with the car is not here, can I get your number." The number will be in Area Code 212. I will not specify that Area Code on the line.

Ramon

6/30/86
~~SECRET~~

9/25/81
01

1

I found the site empty. Possibly I had the time wrong. I work from memory. My recollection was for you to fill before 1:00 a.m. I believe Viktor Degtyar was in the church driveway off Rt. 123, but I did not know how he would react to an approach. My schedule was tight to make this at all. Because of my work, I had to synchronize explanations and flights while not leaving a pattern of absence or travel that could later be correlated with communication times. This is difficult and expensive.

I will call the number you gave me on 2/24, 2/26 or 2/28 at 1:00 a.m., EDST. Please plan filled signals. Empty sites bother me. I like to know before I commit myself as I'm sure you do also. Let's not use the original site so early at least until the seasons change. Some type of call-out signal to you when I have a package or when I can receive one would be useful. Also, please be specific about dates, e.g., 2/24. Scheduling is not simple for me because of frequent travel Any ambiguity multiplies the problems.

My security concerns may seem excessive. I believe experience has shown them to be necessary. I am much safer if you know little about me. Neither of us are children about these things. Over time, I can cut your losses rather than become one.

Ramon

P.S. Your "thank you" was deeply appreciated.

8/7/86

9/25/81
281

~~SECRET~~

DEAR MR. CHERKASHIN:

SOON. I WILL SEND A BOX OF DOCUMENTS TO MR. DEGTYAR. THEY ARE FROM CERTAIN OF THE MOST SENSITIVE AND HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED PROJECTS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL ARE ORIGINALS TO AID IN VERIFYING THEIR AUTHENTICITY. PLEASE RECOGNIZE FOR OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS THAT THERE ARE A LIMITED NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH THIS ARRAY OF CLEARANCES. AS A COLLECTION THEY POINT TO ME. I TRUST THAT AN OFFICER OF YOUR EXPERIENCE WILL HANDLE THEM APPROPRIATELY. I BELIEVE THEY ARE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A \$100,000 PAYMENT TO ME.

I MUST WARN OF CERTAIN RISKS TO MY SECURITY OF WHICH YOU MAY NOT BE AWARE. YOUR SERVICE HAS RECENTLY SUFFERED SOME SETBACKS. I WARN THAT MR. BORIS YUZIN (LINE PR, SF), MR. SERGEY MOTORIN, (LINE PR, WASH.) AND MR. VALERIY MARTYNOV (LINE X, WASH.) HAVE BEEN RECRUITED BY OUR "SPECIAL SERVICES."

(S)

b1
b3

(S)

(S)

TO FURTHER SUPPORT MY BONA FIDES.

(S)

b1
b3

DETAILS REGARDING PAYMENT AND FUTURE CONTACT WILL BE SENT TO YOU PERSONALLY.

b1
b3

(S)

MY IDENTITY AND ACTUAL POSITION IN THE COMMUNITY MUST BE LEFT UNSTATED TO ENSURE MY SECURITY. I AM OPEN TO COMM suggestions BUT WANT NO SPECIALIZED TRADECRAFT. I WILL ADD 6, (YOU SUBTRACT 6) FROM STATED MONTHS, DAYS AND TIMES IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OF OUR FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

DROP LOCATION

Please leave your package for me under the corner (nearest the street) of the wooden foot bridge located just west of the entrance to Nottoway Park. (ADC Northern Virginia Street Map, #14, D3)

PACKAGE PREPARATION

Use a green or brown plastic trash bag and trash to cover a waterproofed package.

SIGNAL LOCATION

Signal site will be the pictorial "pedestrian-crossing" signpost just west of the main Nottoway Park entrance on Old Courthouse Road. (The sign is the one nearest the bridge just mentioned.)

SIGNALS

My signal to you: One vertical mark of white adhesive tape meaning I am ready to receive your package.

Your signal to me: One horizontal mark of white adhesive tape meaning drop filled.

My signal to you: One vertical mark of white adhesive tape meaning I have received your package.

(Remove old tape before leaving signal.)

TIMING

Date: May 8

My first signal to you before 12:45 am.

Your fill and signal to me before 2:45 am. (12:45 + 2 hrs.)

My cleared signal to you before 3:45 am. (12:45 + 3 hrs.)

OTHER

I will acknowledge amount with my next package.

RECEIVED \$10,000.00

RAMON

~~SECRET~~

-@ BOB
ON 6/22;
T. DEVICE APPROVED
6/16, COMING
SOON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Dear Friends:

No, I have decided. It must be on my original terms or not at all. I will not meet abroad or here. I will not maintain lists of sites or modified equipment. I will help you when I can, and in time we will develop methods of efficient communication. Unless I see an abort signal on our post from you by 3/16, I will mail my contact a valuable package timed to arrive on 3/18. I will await your signal and package to be in place before 1:00 p.m. on 3/22 or alternately the following three weeks, same day and time. If my terms are unacceptable then place no signals and withdraw my contact. Excellent work by him has ensured this channel is secure for now. My regards to him and to the professional way you have handled this matter.

sincerely,

Ramon

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MY FRIENDS:

THANK YOU FOR THE \$10,000.

I AM NOT A YOUNG MAN, AND THE COMMITMENTS
ON MY TIME PREVENT USING DISTANT DROPS

SUCH AS YOU SUGGEST. I KNOW IN THIS I

AM MOVING YOU OUT OF YOUR SET MODES OF DOING

BUSINESS, BUT MY EXPERIENCE TELLS ME THE WE

CAN BE ACTUALLY MORE SECURE IN EASIER MODES.

b1
b3

(S)

(S)

FIND A COMFORTABLE

VIENNA VA. SIGNAL SITE TO CALL ME

TO AN EXCHANGE ^{ANY} ~~THE~~ FOLLOWING MORAY.

GOOD LUCK WITH YOUR WORK. THIS ONCE

[IF YOU CAN NOT DO THIS I WILL CLEAR ^{AN}]

~~ON~~ (RATHER THAN THE OTHER) RAN ON

~~SECRET~~

9/26/87

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 01-31-2013

9/27/91
DM

ON YOUR
SCHEDULED
DATE

UNABLE TO LOCATE AM BASED ON
YOUR DESCRIPTION AT NIGHT. RECOGNIZE
THAT I AM DRESSED IN BUSINESS SUIT
AND CAN NOT SLOG AROUND IN SUCH
DEEP MUD. I SUGGEST WE USE
ONCE AGAIN ORIGINAL SITE. I WILL
PLACE MY URGENT MATERIAL THERE AT
NEXT AM TIMES. REPLACE IT WITH
YOUR PACKAGE. I WILL SELECT SOME
FEW SIDES GOOD FOR ME AND PASS
THEM TO YOU. PLEASE GIVE NEW
CONSTANT CONDITIONS OF RECONTACT
AS ADDRESS TO WRITE. WILL NOT PUT
SUBSTANTIVE MATERIAL THROUGH IT. ONLY
INSTRUCTIONS AS USUAL FORMAT.

Ramon

11/17/87

4/27/01
OH

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 01-31-2013
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-31-2038

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

K>SG:Dear Friend:

Time is flying. As a poet said: "What's our life,
If full of care
You have no time

To stop and stare

You've managed to slow down the speed of Your running life to send us a
message. And we appreciate it.

We hope You're O'K and Your family is fine too. We are sure You're doing
great at Your job. As before, we'll keep staying alert to respond to any
call from You whenever You need it.

We acknowledge receiving one disk through CHARLIE. One disk of mystery
and intrigue. Thank You.

Not much of a business letter this time. Just formalities. We consider
Site-9 cancelled. And we are sure You remember: our next contact is due
at ELLIS.

Frankly, we are looking forward to JUNE. Every new season brings new expectations.

Enclosed in our today's package please find \$10,000...Thank You for Your
friendship and help.

We attach some information requests. We hope You'll be able to assist us
on them.

Take care and good luck.
Sincerely,

Your friends.

b1
b3

(S)

X

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 01-31-2013
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-31-2038

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

x9-#Dear friend:

(S)

Acknowledging the disk and materials on [redacted] received through
"DORIS" we also acknowledge once again Your superb sense of humor
and Your sharp-as-a-razor mind. We highly appreciate both.

Don't worry. We will not steam out incorrect conclusions from Your
materials. Actually, Your information gratefully assisted us in seeing
more clearly many issues and we are not ashamed to correct our
notions if we have some. So, thank You for Your help. But if some
of our requests seem a bit strange to You, please try to believe us
there were sufficient reasons to put them and what we wanted was to
sort them out with Your help.

b1
b3

In regard to our "memo" on Your security. Just one more remark.
If our natural wish to capitalize on Your information confronts
in any way Your security interests we definitely cut down our
thirst for profit and choose Your security. The same goes with any
other aspect of Your case. That's why we say Your security goes
first.

(S)

b1
b3

We are sure You remember our next contact is due at "FLO".

As always we attach some information requests, which are of current
interest to us.

We thank You and wish You the very best.

Sincerely,

Your friends.

b1
b3

Enclosed in the package please find \$12,000.

(S)

~~X~~

7/15/91

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 01-31-2013
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-31-2038

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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}6ep1Dear friend:

(S) Thanks for the package of 02.13. [redacted] materials are very promising, we intend to work on the scenario so wisely suggested by You. And the magical history tour to Chicago was mysteriously well timed. Have You ever thought of fortelling the things? After Your retirement for instance in some sort of Your own "Cristall Ball and Intelligence Agency" (CBIA)? There are always so many people in this world eager to get a glimps of the future.

b1
b3

But now back to where we belong. There have been many important developments in our country lately. So many that we'd like to reassure You once again. Like we said: we've done all in order that none of those events ever affects Your security and our ability to maintain the operation with You. And of course there can be no doubt of our commitment to Your friendship and cooperation which are too important to us to loose.

b1
b3

(S)

Please note: our next contact is due at HELEN.

Enclosed in the package please find \$12,000 and attached as always are some information requests which we'd ask Your kind attention to.

Thank You and good luck.

Sincerely,

Your friends.


b1
b3

(S)

X

~~SECRET~~


(S)



b1
b3

It's fun to read about the life in the Universe to understand better what's going on on our own planet.

(S)



Sometimes it happens,
we understand. Life is becoming too fast.

b1
b3

~~SECRET~~

Dear Ramon:

We are glad to use this possibility to thank You for Your striving for going on contact with us.

We received Your message. The truth is that we expended a lot of efforts to decipher it.

First of all we would like to emphasize that all well known events which had taken place in this country and in our homeland had not affected our resources and we reaffirm our strong intentions to maintain and to ensure safely our long-term cooperation with You.

We perceive Your actions as a manifestation of Your confidence in our service and from our part we assure You that we shall take all necessary measures to ensure Your personal security as much as possible.

Just because proceeding from our golden rule - to ensure Your personal security in the first place - we have proposed to carry out our next exchange operation at the place which had been used ~~in last august. We did not like to give You any occasion to charge us with an inadequate attention to problems of Your security. We are happy that, according to the version You have proposed in Your last letter, our suggestions about DD, known as "Ellis", coincided completely. However a situation around our colleagues at the end of passed year made us to refuse this operation at set day.~~

1. We thank You for information, which is of a great interest for us and highly evaluated in our service.

We hope that during future exchanges we shall receive Your materials, which will deal with a work of IC, the FBI and CIA in the first place, against our representatives and officers. We do mean its human, electronic and technical penetrations in our residences here and in other countries. ~~We are very interested in getting of the objective information on the work of a special group which searches "mole" in CIA and FBI. We need this information especially to take necessary additional steps to ensure Your personal security.~~

Any supplementary information about an investigation of all persons mentioned in Your last message will be highly appreciated too.

We are very concerned by tragic events which had occurred with our friends from the beginning of 1994. We are very interested in getting real information about reasons of the failure. With great attention and interest we shall read Your advice on how we could support our friends' families. Any Your thoughts about this will be valuable for us.

2. Before stating a communication plan that we propose for a next future, we would like to precise a following problem. Do You have any possibility to meet our colleagues or to undertake the exchange ops in other countries? If yes, what are these countries? Until we receive Your answer at this questions and set up a new communication plan, we propose to use for the exchange ops DD according to the following schedule:

= DD "LEWIS" on 27 of may 2001 (with a coefficient it will mean on 21 of november 2000). We draw Your attention on the fact that we used a former coefficient - 6 (sender adds, addressee subtracts). A time will be shown at real sense. We will be ready to withdraw Your package beginning by 8 PM on 27 may 2001 after

b7E

we shall read Your signal. After that we put DD our package for You. Remove Your signal and place our signal by 9 PM of the same day. After that You will withdraw our package and remove our signal. That will mean an exchange operation is over. We shall check signal site (i.e., its absence) the next day (28 of May) till 9 PM. If by this time a signal had not be removed we shall withdraw our package and shall put it in for You repeatedly dates with DD "ELLIS" - in each seven days after 28 May till 19 of June 2001 (i.e., 13 of December 2000).

= We propose to carry out our next operation on 16 of october 2001 (i.e., 10 of April) at the DD "LINDA" in "Round Tree park" (if this place suits for Your we would like to receive Your opinion about that during exchange in may). A time of operation from 8 pm to 9 pm, signals and schedule of alternate dates are the same. In the course of exchange ops we shall pass to You descriptions of new DD and SS that You can check them before. You will find with this letter descriptions of two new DD "LINDA" and "TOM". Hope to have Your opinion about them.

In case of break off in our contacts we propose to use DD "ELLIS" that you indicated in your first message. Your note about a second bridge across the street from the 'F' sign, as back up, is approved. We propose to use "ELLIS" once a year on 12 August (i.e., with coeff. it will be 18 February) at the same time as it was in August 1999. On that day we can carry out a full exchange operation -- You will enload your package and put a signal, we shall withdraw it, load our package and put our signal. You will remove our package and put your signal. Alternate dates - in seven days 'til next month.

= As it appears from your message, you continue to use post channel as a means of communication with us. You know very well our negative attitude toward this method. However if you send by post a short note where date (i.e., with coefficient), time and name of DD for urgent exchange are mentioned, you could do it by using address you had used in September (i.e., with coeff.) putting in a sealed envelope for V.K.

In future it is inexpedient to use a V.K. name as a sender. It will be better to choose any well known name in this country as you did it before.

3. We shall continue work up new variants of exchanging messages including PC disks. Of course we shall submit them to your approval in advance. If you use a PC disk for next time, please give us key numbers and program you have used.

4. We would like to tell you that an insignificant number of persons know about you, your information and our relationship.

5. We assess as very risky to transfer money in Zurich because now it is impossible to hide its origin.

-- Attachment:

Location of DD "LINDA": first bridge on asphalt hiking trail in Round Tree Park, 250 yards away from the park's parking lot near the intersection of Annandale Road and Roundtree Estates Court (N. Virginia map, page 15, grid F90. Put your package under the near-left corner of the bridge, which is also the nearest corner to the parking lot.

After parking your car, follow the asphalt trail down to the park, make a right turn where it divides and enter the park near the playground.

Location of the signal: a telephone booth to the left from the entrance to Westlawn Supermarket in Westlawn Shopping Center (south-west corner of intersection of Arlington Boulevard and Annadale Road) - same map, grid J6.

Your signal about filling the package in: a pink chalk mark of "Z" in the same place.

Signals about clearing the DD by both sides: removing the marks.

Location DD "TOM": first bridge on asphalt hiking trail in Providence Park, 150 yards away from the Providence Recreation Center's Parking lot (N. Virginia Map, page 15, grid C8). Put your package inside the square hollow metal beam under the far-left corner of the bridge, which is also the farthest corner from the parking lot. Size of the hollow is 4.5" x 4.5".

The hiking trail begins at the south-west corner of the parking, to the right from the Recreation Center.

Location of the signal: the right (nearest to Arlington Boulevard) booth of two public phones at the entrance to the parking lot of Thomas Jefferson Public Library (same map, grid E7).

The library's address is: 7415 Arlington Boulevard, Falls Church.

Your signal about filling the package in the DD: a pink chalk mark of "X" in the middle of the outer right side of the booth.

Our signal about filling the package in: a pink chalk mark of "Z" in the same place.

Signals about clearing the DD by both sides: removing the marks.

Good luck to you.

Your friends:

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 01-31-2013
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-31-2038

HANSEN

k&*lhd8y3; //

(S) I have come about as close as I ever want to come to sacrificing myself to help you, and I get silence. I hate silence.

b1
b3

--Conclusion-- One might propose that I am either insanely brave or quite insane. I'd answer neither. I'd say, insanely loyal. Take your pick. There is insanity in all the answers.

I have, however, come as close to the edge as I can without being truly insane. My security concerns have proven reality-based. I'd say, pin your hopes on 'insanely loyal' and go for it. Only I can lose.

I decided on this course when I was 14 years old. I'd read Philby's book. Now that is insane, eh! My only hesitations were my security concerns under uncertainty. I hate uncertainty. So far I have judged the edge correctly. Give me credit for that.

Set the signal at my site any Tuesday evening. I will read your answer. Please, at least say goodbye. It's been a long time my dear friends, a long and lonely time.

(S) Ramon Garcia

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

attach some information requests which we ask Your kind assistance for.
We are very cautious about using Your info and materials so that none of our
actions in no way causes no harm to Your security. With this on our mind we
are asking that sensitive materials and information (especially hot and
demanding some actions) be accompanied by some sort of Your comments or
some guidance on how we may or may not use it with regard to Your security.

We wish You good luck and enclose \$35,000.

Thank You.

Sincerely,

Your friends.

(S)

b1
b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 02-01-2013

CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as

REASON: 1.4 (c)

DECLASSIFY ON: 02-01-2038

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ASgDear Friend:

Congratulations on Your promotion. We wish You all the very best
in Your life and career.

We appreciate Your sympathy for some difficulties our people face -
Your friendship and understanding are very important to us. Of course
You are right, no system is perfect and we do understand this.

Speaking about the systems. We don't see any problem for the system
of our future communications in regard to the new circumstances of Yours.
Though we can't but regret that our contacts may be not so regular as
before, like You said.

We believe our current commo plan - though neither perfect - covers
rather flexibly Your needs: You may have a contact with us anytime You
want after staying away as long as You have to. So, do Your new job,
make Your trips, take Your time. The commo plan we have will be still
working. We'll keep covering the active call out signal site no matter
how long it's needed. And we'll be in a ready-to-go mode to come over
to the drop next in turn whenever You are ready: that is when You are
back home and decide to communicate. All You'll have to do is to put
Your call out signal, just as now. And You have two addresses to use
to recontact us only if the signal sites for some reason don't work or
can't be used.

b1
b3

But in any case be sure: You may have a contact anytime
because the active call out site is always covered according to the
schedule no matter how long You've been away.

b1
b3


interesting people in
the right places give us some good leads to possible
recruitments

b1
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5/21/90 ~~SECRET~~

18/1
206


~~SECRET~~



Thank You and good luck.

Sincerely,

Your friends.



~~SECRET~~

b1
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b1
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(01/26/1998)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 02-01-2013
FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON:
02-01-2038

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 11/13/2000

To: National Security

Attn: NS-1C

From: Washington Field

NS-33 ✓

Contact: [REDACTED]

x4864

b1
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b6
b7C
b7D

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S) Case ID #:

[REDACTED]

(Pending)

(Pending) ✓

(S) Title:

[REDACTED]

OO:WFO

(S)

[REDACTED]

OO:WFO

b1
b3
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b7C
b7D

(S) Synopsis:

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

b1
b3
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b7D

(S)

Enclosures:

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~ THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY RESTRICTED
INFORMATION FROM A HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCE. ACCESS SHOULD BE
LIMITED TO THOSE WITH A STRICT NEED TO KNOW. THIS DOCUMENT
SHOULD NOT BE UPLOADED INTO THE ACS SYSTEM.

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[REDACTED]

NOV 13

[REDACTED]

JPM

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: 11/13/2000

(S)

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] 11/13/2000

b1
b3

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:

NATIONAL SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and Clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

(01/26/1998)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 02-01-2013
FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON:
02-01-2038

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 11/11/2000

To: National Security

Attn: NS-1C

From: Washington Field

NS-33 ✓

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

per

(S) Case ID #:

[REDACTED]

(Pending)
(Pending) ✓

Title:

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

Synopsis:

[REDACTED]

(S)

(U) (S)

Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

(S)

(S)

(U) Details: (S) NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY SENSITIVE AND RESTRICTED INFORMATION FROM A HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCE. ACCESS SHOULD BE GIVEN ON A STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS. THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT BE UPLOADED INTO THE ACS SYSTEM.

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[REDACTED]

NOV 13

b1
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b7D

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] 11/11/2000

(S)

"Perhaps some diamonds as security to my children and some good will so that when the time comes, you will accept by senior services as a guest lecturer. Eventually, I would appreciate an escape plan. (Nothing lasts forever.)"

b1
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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: National Security From: Washington Field
Re: [REDACTED] 11/11/2000

b1
b3

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 02-01-2013
FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON:
02-01-2038

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/11/2000

To: WFO

From: WFO

NS-33

Contact: SA [redacted]

X4864

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

frm

(S) Case ID #: [redacted] (Pending)

(S) Title: [redacted]

(S) Synopsis: [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Details: [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

(S)

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OCT 11

SE

SEM

~~SECRET~~

To: WFO From: WFO

(S) Re: 10/11/2000

(S)



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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 02-01-2013
FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON:
02-01-2038

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/04/2000

To: National Security

Attn: NS-1C, SSA [redacted]

From: WFO

NS-33

Contact: SA [redacted]

X4864

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

frm

(S) Case ID #: [redacted]

(Pending)

(S) Title: [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Synopsis: Information to be disseminated to the Department of Justice (DOJ).

(U) ~~(S)~~

~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Enclosure(s): [redacted]

(S)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Details: The enclosed documents will be disseminated to DOJ/Internal Security Service (ISS) Senior Trial Attorney [redacted]

and Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [redacted]

[redacted] These documents have been redacted to include only material pertinent to captioned investigation.

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~~SECRET~~

(S)

OCT 5 2000

SEN

Info hand delivered to include
to be forwarded to DOJ
was faxed to NS-1C SSA
(attached)

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: National Security From: WFO
Re: 10/04/2000

b1
b3

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

NATIONAL SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~DATE: 02-01-2013
CLASSIFIED BY NSICG as
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-01-2038

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISEDate of transcription 02/07/2001

(U) ~~(S)~~ On 01/08/2001 SA photographed the
following areas:

(S)

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~~Derived By: G-3~~
~~Declassify on: X1~~

Investigation on 01/08/2001 at Washington, DC

(S)

File # Date dictated by SA b1
b3
b6
b7C~~SECRET~~

NEXT OCT. 13.01 TOM. ALT. 20,27.