FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1406447-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 12
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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
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FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 5/7/64

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, TAMPA

UNSUBS; Training of Cubans on

5/3/64

NEUTRALITY MATTERS
IS-CUBA

and Florida,
advised telephonically on 5/6/64 that on

advised that on the morning of
talking to Fla. on

advised that the

Miami at Miami, Florida, is requested to immediately check Miami, to determine if this

3 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami (RM)
2 - Tampa
GBG:mh
(7)

MCT-32

REC- 16

3 MAY 8 1964

cc - Wich

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

72 MAY 18 1964

NAVINT. SEC.

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date: 5/14/64

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED.
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, and
SAC, TAMPA

FROM: SAC, MIAMI [redacted] (RUC)

RE: UNSUBS; Training of Cubans on
[redacted]
[redacted] Fla., 5/3/64;
NM;
IS - CUBA.

Re Tampa airtel to Bureau 5/7/64.

[redacted]

Miami indices are negative concerning [redacted]

3 - Bureau
2 - Tampa
1 - Miami

GED:GK
(6)

[redacted]

REC-102

MAY 16 1964

b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 10-29-63)

FBI

Date: 5/20/64

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, TAMPA [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

UNSUBS; TRAINING OF CUBANS ON [redacted], [redacted] 5/3/64.
NM;- IS - CUBA

ReTPairtel 5/7/64; MMairtel 5/14/64.

[redacted] advised 5/19/64, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

On 5/16/64, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

On 5/19/64, a large building was observed about ¼ mile inside property line of [redacted]. Building has tin roof, and appears recently built from used lumber. Approximately 20 men of Spanish appearance were milling around building. Some of these men have blue-green fatigue type clothing. b6 b7C

[redacted], Fla., advised 5/20/64, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b3 b7E

3-Director (RM)
2-Miami (RM)
2-Tampa
GBG/dk
(7)

REC-31

10 MAY 22 1964

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

[redacted] b3 b7E

TP [redacted] b3 b7E

1963 Volkswagen, 1964 Florida license [redacted] b6 observed at residence of [redacted] 5/19/64. License b7C issued to [redacted] Florida. Also white late model car, bearing 1964 Florida license [redacted] observed at residence.

LEADS

MIAMI DIVISION:

AT FT. LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA

Will determine if [redacted] known at Ft. Lauderdale, b6 and ascertain owner of 1964 Florida license [redacted] b7C

The Bureau is requested to determine as soon as possible through liaison channels [redacted] b3 b7E

1 - [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

June 17, 1964

Airtel

To: SAC, Tampa [redacted] (Enclosure)
2 - Miami (Enclosure)

62-103 REC-34

From: Director, FBI [redacted]

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;
Training of Cubans on [redacted]
[redacted] Florida
May 3, 1964
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
NEUTRALITY MATTERS

b6
b7C

ReBuairtel 5/26/64 which advised facts in captioned matter had been presented to Department for opinion as to whether neutrality investigation was desired and Tampa airtel 6/12/64 with enclosure, copies of which were furnished Miami.

Attached for each office is copy of self-explanatory Department letter dated 6/15/64 requesting investigation in this matter. Institute investigation.

Tampa immediately locate and interview [redacted] for all pertinent information he may have concerning training [redacted] Determine identities of organization and individuals who are reportedly involved, the nature of the training being given and the purpose for which this training is being conducted. Authority is granted to interview individuals involved and where possible endeavor to obtain signed statements. Since there is possible violation of Title 18, Section 960, United States Code, the specific knowledge each individual has concerning the purpose of the training is important since Section 960 makes it a violation for anyone in the United States to knowingly organize, provide assistance for, or to

b6
b7C

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

VHN:jmw:jwh
(6)

MAILED 19
JUN 17 1964
COMM-FBI

JUN 22 1964

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

VHN

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

participate in any expedition to be carried on from the United States. Each individual involved should be thoroughly questioned concerning his personal knowledge as to the purpose for which he is being [redacted]

Since the individuals involved are reportedly armed, Agents conducting investigation in this matter should be appropriately cautioned.

Tampa also interview [redacted] who appears to be soliciting contributions for the group involved.

b6
b7C

Miami check logical sources and informants for any information they may have concerning the group and its activities.

Both offices submit results of investigation in report form unless urgency of situation demands more expeditious handling. Keep Bureau and interested agencies locally, particularly INS, Customs and FAA, currently advised of all pertinent developments. Tampa make copy of enclosure to its 6/12/64 airtel available to interested agencies locally.

In view of seriousness of matter and interest of Department, this investigation must be given continuous and preferred attention.

NOTE:
Tampa source furnished information concerning training [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-15-2022 BY: [redacted]
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: June 15 1964

EXP. PROC.
32 JUN 16 1964

b6
b7C

FROM : Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;
Training of Cubans on [redacted]
[redacted] Florida
May 3, 1964
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
NEUTRALITY MATTERS

~~SECRET~~

Reference is made to your memorandum dated May 27, 1964, furnishing information received from a source in [redacted] Florida, concerning the training of Cubans with weapons and equipment on the [redacted] which is located in the Tampa, Florida area. You have requested to be advised expeditiously whether an investigation of the neutrality aspects of this matter is desired.

b6
b7C
b7D

In this connection, you have further advised that an informant has learned that [redacted]

Representatives of the [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

On the basis of the allegations in this matter and in the absence of any operational interest of [redacted] we are requesting that your Bureau initiate investigation under Section 960 of Title 18, United States Code, since it is conceivable that a violation of this statute could result if it were established that a group of individuals are being trained militarily within the United States for the purpose of engaging in hostile action against a foreign nation with whom the United States is at peace.

b3
b7E

REC- 34 [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

18
8 JUN 16 1964

NAT. SEC.

FD-36 (Rev. 10-29-63)

FBI

Date: 6/12/64

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

FROM: SAC, TAMPA [redacted] (P)

REC-17 file

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; TRAINING OF CUBANS ON [redacted], FLORIDA
MAY 3, 1964
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
NEUTRALITY MATTERS

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 12 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above, [redacted]

An information copy of this LHM is designated for Miami, inasmuch as Miami is OO on Anti-CASTRO Activities.

The sources referred to in enclosed LHM are identified as follows:

TP T-1 is [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7D b7E

TP T-2 is [redacted]

REC-17

TP T-3 is [redacted]

TP T-4 is [redacted]

TP T-5 is [redacted]

TP T-6 is [redacted]

C-17 - Pg. 4 w/cc Miami. Pg. 2, Para 4, line 2 Name Rey Changed to Ray Kitt 1st 6/15/64

3 - Bureau (Enc. 12) (RM)
1 - Miami [redacted] (Enc 1) (RM)
2 - Tampa [redacted]
JRMW:nh
(6)

4 JUN 15 1964

Copy to: [redacted] State/ONI/OSI/ACSI FAA/CI/Immigration, consulate cutter officers, & Coasts IS Div. - (See your letter 6/15/64) DIA/Customs/IRS NAT. INV. SEC.

by routing slip for info.
Date 6/17/64 by [redacted]

C.C. WICN

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

56 JUN 26 1964

TP [redacted] b3
b7E

The captioned LHM is classified confidential because it contains information from TP T-1, and TP T-3 through TP T-6, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in compromising the identity of the source and impairing his operating effectiveness in the field of national security, and the alleged interest by another Government agency in this matter.

Tampa will continue to follow this matter and make appropriate dissemination of pertinent information, although no active investigation being conducted pending information as to departmental opinion.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 02-08-2023 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Tampa, Florida
June 12, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS: TRAINING OF CUBANS ON [redacted]
FLORIDA, MAY 3, 1964

b6
b7C

TELEGRAM

On May 6, 1964 [redacted] Florida, advised telephonically that on [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that on the morning of [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

On May 19, 1964, TP T-1 advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

On May 16, 1964 [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

On May 19, 1964, a large building was observed approximately one-quarter of a mile inside the property line [redacted]

b6
b7C

Approximately twenty men of Latin appearance, some wearing blue-green fatigue-type clothing, were observed milling about this building.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~GROUP I~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; TRAINING OF CUBANS ON [redacted] FLORIDA

MAY 3, 1964

b6
b7C

TP T-2 advised on May 20, 1964 that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

The Tampa "Tribune", a daily newspaper of Tampa, Florida, at Page 4A of the issue for May 21, 1964, contains an article written by VANCE JOHNSTON, Tribune staff writer, captioned "Exiles Train At Camp In Mid-Florida". This article which carries the date-line "Somewhere In Central Florida", states in part as follows:

"For several months considerable numbers of Cuban exiles have been undergoing guerrilla warfare training in mid-Florida, The Tribune learned yesterday.

FLA

"The men, ranging in age from the early 20s to early 40s, are followers of MANUEL RAY. RAY, believed to be in Cuba, and his followers are expected to strike at several points on the island nation at any time.

mw 6/15/64

"The men undergoing training at a remote Central Florida location have been receiving extensive training in close order fighting, night attack techniques and one day last week spent considerable time practicing assaults on simulated bunkers.

"Those undergoing training have been living outdoors, sleeping in hammocks and taking their meals under a cookshed similar to field kitchens used by American soldiers on bivouac.

"For the past several weeks the number in training has varied. At last count, a reliable source told The Tribune, there were about 30.

"The guerrillas have been undergoing daily practice in small arms and small caliber weapons. Their training has embraced all phases of commando methods in an effort to make them experts when their D-day comes.

"Most of their field problems are conducted in heavily wooded areas or else in remote fields away from roads so as to avoid detection.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

b6
b7C

"Hardly any of those in training speak English, a reliable source told The Tribune.

"The leader at the camp has asked the exact location not be pinpointed."

TP T-3 advised that the [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

Source stated that [redacted] b7D

[redacted] The source explained that [redacted]

[redacted]

Source continued that in order for the Cuban nation to have any sort of a solid political status in the future, the nation must be able to show the world unmistakably that CASTRO was defeated and the revolution was accomplished by Cubans from within Cuba rather than Americans or any other nation who supported, fostered, aided or directed an invasion from without Cuba.

Further with regard to the [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

TP T-4 did not [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; TRAINING
OF CUBANS [redacted]
[redacted], FLORIDA MAY 3, 1964

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TP T-4 stated that [redacted]

b7D

On May 12, 1964 TP T-5 advised [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

"CUBAN NEWS BULLETIN

"Hour of Cooperation and Faith

"The Cuban patriots are preparing themselves for a final assault against the communist multitude that engulfs our beloved fatherland. The end of communist domination in Cuba is barely visible. The hour is for faith in the triumph and for total cooperation with those who fight. God should not be left out of our thoughts and to Him we must ask daily His assistance in this effort that must be arduous and painful. The fatherland needs us; let us give to her more than we are able.

"Thirty Cubans are preparing themselves for the fight in an encampment whose upkeep and maintenance have been charged to the responsibility of the Cubans who live in Lakeland, Tampa and other neighboring communities. These patriots prepare themselves under the direction of JURE, but what is important is that they are Cubans who are going to fight for the liberation of Cuba, and we must give them our assistance. That will be assistance that we are giving to Cuba.

"When you make your weekly purchase of food, would you like to add something for these Cubans? Rice, potatoes, sweet potatoes, carrots, canned vegetables, non-perishable fruits or canned fruits and sugar. You are aware of what Cubans like. Or perhaps you would like to make your contribution in cash; then

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

we can make the purchases in large quantities at reduced prices. The important thing is to help this group of Cubans. It is urgent to have these contributions each week. Do what you can, but do something for Cuba.

"Contributions can be remitted to LUIS DIAZ de ARCE, 701 Charles Street, or if you call us by telephone (683-4178), we will go to pick them up."

TP T-6 on [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

All sources whose identities are concealed in this communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ED-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Exiles Train At Camp In Mid-Florida

By VANCE JOHNSTON
Tribune Staff Writer

SOMEWHERE IN CENTRAL FLORIDA—For several months considerable numbers of Cuban exiles have been undergoing guerrilla warfare training in mid-Florida, The Tribune learned yesterday.

The men, ranging in age from the early 20s to early 40s, are followers of Manuel Ray. Ray, believed to be in Cuba, and his followers are expected to strike at several points on the island nation at any time.

Yesterday, the 62nd anniversary of Cuba's freedom from Spain, was the original target date to begin attacks to free Cubans from Communist Fidel Castro.

Live in Field

The men undergoing training at a remote Central Florida location have been receiving extensive training in close order fighting, night attack techniques and one day last week spent considerable time practicing assaults on simulated bunkers.

Those undergoing training have been living outdoors, sleeping in hammocks and taking their meals under a cookshed similar to field kitchens used by American soldiers on bivouac.

For the past several weeks the number in training has varied. At last count, a reliable source told The Tribune, there were about 30.

The guerrillas have been undergoing daily practice in small arms and small caliber weapons. Their training has embraced all phases of commando methods in an effort to make them experts when their D-day comes.

Avoid Detection

Most of their field problems are conducted in heavily wooded areas or else in remote fields away from roads so as to avoid detection.

The exiles' guerrilla camp in Central Florida, according to the source, is just one of several in Florida and elsewhere in the South.

The men trained at the camp came from various places throughout the country, with most from the southeast coast. They used various methods of transportation in reaching the camp.

Hardly any of those in training speak English, a reliable source told The Tribune.

The leader at the camp has asked the exact location not be pinpointed.

6 4 JUN 25 1964

Mr. Mohr ...

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

pg 4a Tampa Tribune
Tampa, Fla.

Date: 5/21/64
Edition: City
Author:
Editor: James A. Clendinen
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: Tampa

☐ Being Investigated

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 24 1964

b3
b7E

6/16/64

AIRTEL AIRMAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] b3 b7E

FROM: SAC, TAMPA [redacted] (P)

ANTI - FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS - CUBA
RA - CUBA
NEUTRALITY MATTERS
(OO: Miami)

Re Bureau airtel to Tampa 6/15/64 and Tampa airtel to Bureau 6/12/64 captioned UNSUBS; TRAINING OF CUBANS ON [redacted] FLORIDA, MAY 3, 1964. b6 b7C

The data in Tampa airtel dated 6/8/64 does have a connection with the activity described in Tampa file [redacted], which concerns the training of Cubans on the [redacted] b3 b6 b7C

Upon receiving from confidential sources corroborating information to this effect, Tampa accordingly included the contents of the enclosure to Tampa airtel dated 6/8/64 in an LHM submitted as an enclosure to referenced Tampa airtel dated 6/12/64. b7E

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Miami [redacted] (Info) (RM) b3 b7E
2 - Tampa
[redacted]

HAA:jw
(6)

NOT RECORDED
180 JUN 19 1964

FINAL FILM

JUN 24 1964

1 - [redacted] b6 b7C

6/15/64

Airtel [redacted] b3 b7E

To: SAC, Tampa [redacted]

From: Director, FBI [redacted]

ANTI - FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS - CUBA
RA - CUBA
NEUTRALITY MATTERS

Reurairtel 6/8/64 with enclosure.

Advise by return airtel whether the data in re airtel has any connection with the activity described in your file [redacted] which concerns the training of Cubans on [redacted] As you are aware, Bureau has presented the facts concerning this training to the Department for advice as to whether an investigation of the neutrality aspects is desired. As soon as a reply from the Department is received, you will be advised. b3 b6 b7C b7E

ORIGINAL FILED IN

1 - Miami [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

VHN:jak
(6)

NOTE:

Tampa advised that individual in its territory had mailed out news bulletin requesting material and financial support be furnished 30 Cubans who are apparently encamped in Tampa territory [redacted] and possibility exists that the group referred to in Tampa airtel 6/8/64 has some connection with the group in training. We should determine this.

DUPLICATE YELLOW

72 JUN 24 1964

6/8/64

AIRTEL AIRMAIL

b3
b7E

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, TAMPA

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS - CUBA;
RA - CUBA
(OO: MM)

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 12 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above, which has been disseminated locally to MM, INTC, OMI, OSI and G-2.

A copy is designated for Miami as OO on Anti-CASTRO Activities.

b7D

Tampa will continue to follow anti-CASTRO activities and will continue to make appropriate dissemination of pertinent information.

3 - Bureau (Encs. 12)(RM)
1 - Miami
2 - Tampa
MAA/mw
(6)

b3
b7E

ENCLOSURE

b3
b7E

NOT RECORDED
150 JUN 17 1964

ORIGINAL FILED IN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Tampa, Florida

June 8, 1964

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES

On May 12, 1964, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, and who is

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

"CUBAN NEWS BULLETIN

"Hour of Cooperation and Faith

"The Cuban patriots are preparing themselves for a final assault against the communist multitude that engulfs our beloved fatherland. The end of communist domination in Cuba is barely visible. The hour is for faith in the triumph and for total cooperation with those who fight. God should not be left out of our thoughts and to Him we must ask daily His assistance in this effort that must be arduous and painful. The fatherland needs us; let us give to her more than we are able.

"Thirty Cubans are preparing themselves for the fight in an encampment whose upkeep and maintenance have been charged to the responsibility of the Cubans who live in Lakeland, Tampa and other neighboring communities. These patriots prepare themselves under the direction of JURE, but what is important is that they are Cubans who are going to fight for the liberation of Cuba, and we must give them our assistance. That will be assistance that we are giving to Cuba.

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES

"When you make your weekly purchase of food, would you like to add something for these Cubans? Rice, potatoes, sweet potatoes, carrots, canned vegetables, non-perishable fruits or canned fruits and sugar. You are aware of what Cubans like. Or perhaps you would like to make your contribution in cash; then we can make the purchases in large quantities at reduced prices. The important thing is to help this group of Cubans. It is urgent to have these contributions each week. Do what you can, but do something for Cuba.

"Contributions can be remitted to LUIS DIAZ de ARCE, 701 Charles Street, or if you call us by telephone (683-4178), we will go to pick them up.

"By request of certain compatriots, we will celebrate another religious service in Spanish. It will be next Sunday, 10th of May at three in the afternoon in the church situated on South Boulevard and Finney. The service will not have any sectarian character and the meditation for the day will be concerning the words of our Lord Jesus Christ: "I say to you do not preoccupy..."

"On Friday 15th of May at 8:00 p.m., we will have a democratic reaffirmation ceremony in one of the rooms of the building situated on South Boulevard between Charles and Finney. A lecturer will be here from Tampa. The function will be exclusively for democratic instruction. We expect the assistance of a good group of Cubans. It is important that we prepare ourselves to defend democracy when we return to Cuba. Let us celebrate the 20th of May by attending this meeting on the 15th.

"LET US NOT LET OUR FAITH FAIL, COMMUNISM WILL BE DESTROYED IN CUBA. LET US COOPERATE SO IT WILL BE THAT WAY. LET US PREPARE OURSELVES FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CUBA."

On May 15, 1964, a second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

7/21/64

PLAIN TEXT

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, TAMPA (C)

aka.
IS - CUBA
(OO: LA)

Re Los Angeles airtel and LHM to the Director dated 7/10/64 and report of SA dated 7/17/64 at Tampa captioned LUIS CLEMENTE FAUSTINO POSADA CARRILES; CAMPO de INSURUGENCIA NEUTRALITY MATTERS; IS - CUBA".

Referenced report furnishes results of investigation concerning a training camp Fla. by the Cuban organization JURE for the purpose of training

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Necessary pertinent interviews conducted in this investigation reflect interest or support of this training camp and, accordingly, copies of referenced report are not being disseminated until 7/24/64, UACB.

Several semi-automatic firearms were observed at this camp by Bureau Agents, among them four converted M-1 carbine rifles, two of which were in shipping cartons, bearing labels indicating they were shipped from ,

b6
b7C

4 - Bureau (1 -
2 -
(1 -

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

2 - Los Angeles (RM)
1 - Miami (Info.) (RM)
3 - Tampa

JRMW:cc
(10)

NOT RECORDED
183 JUL 27 1964

ORIGINAL FILED IN

TP [redacted]

b3
b7E

By radiogram dated 6/26/64 from the Bureau, information was furnished that a representative of the Internal Security Division, Department of Justice, on 6/26/64, advised that in view of the involvement of JURE, the Department was not asking for further investigation at this time (captioned Tampa case), and in addition, the Department advised it would have no objection to our furnishing pertinent information to interested agencies, including [redacted] state and military intelligence agencies, customs, INS and ATTD. However, the Department specified that these agencies should be requested not to initiate any prosecutive action regarding this matter (captioned Tampa case), without consulting the Department.

Los Angeles may desire to request the Bureau to ascertain from the Department whether the instructions pertaining to instant Tampa case apply to interested outside agencies as to requesting Departmental instructions prior to initiation of any prosecutive action.

Tampa, by LHM, furnished information concerning Tampa case to interested local agencies, at the same time advising them specifically of the Departmental request regarding initiating prosecutive action.

FD-36 (Rev. 10-29-63)

F B I

Date: 7/17/64

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, TAMPA [redacted] (C)

[redacted]

LUIS CLEMENTE FAUSTINO POSADA CARRILES;
CAMPO DE INSURUGENCIA [redacted]
NEUTRALITY MATTER;
IS - CUBA

ReTPrep of SA [redacted], 12 copies of which are enclosed.

Note statement on Page 2, that local dissemination being withheld and in that regard, copies designated for other offices are likewise being retained by Tampa.

(3) - Bureau (Encs. 12)(RRR)
1 - Tampa
ECP/mw
(4)

12 ENCLOSURE

REC-9

EX 110

[redacted]

17 JUL 18 1964

C C- Wick

NAT. ENV. SEC.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

JUL 30 1964

FD-38 (Rev. 3-24-77)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
- ☐ Teletype
- ☐ Facsimile
- ☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:
- ☐ Immediate
- ☐ Priority
- ☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
- ☐ TOP SECRET
- ☐ SECRET
- ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
- ☐ E F T O
- ☐ CLEAR

Date 7/25/86

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: CID - TERRORISM SECTION

FROM: LEGAT, BOGOTA (185A-13) (RUC)

LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES,
IT - OMEGA 7
OO: MIAMI

Re Bogota teletype to Director dated 12/3/85, captioned "Omega Seven; Major Case 39; IT - Omega Seven; OO: NY" and Bogota teletype dated 7/22/86, captioned "Orlando Bosch-Avila aka - Fugitve (A); NM - Cuba, OO: NY".

Enclosed for Miami is one copy of a letter from the [redacted] Regional Security Officer (RSO), U.S. Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela, which contains a photograph and fingerprints of POSADA and [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

ICC KM. 4253/JEH

(3) - Bureau
(1 - Liaison Unit)
2 - Miami (Enc. 1) (Direct)
2 - Bogota
(1 - 2-28)

[redacted]

b3
b7E

DKS:bad
(7)

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time) Per _____ FBI/DOJ

POSADA has reportedly been seen in the Miami, Florida, area at an art exhibit given by ORLANDO BOSCH. He has allegedly had plastic surgery to alter his facial features.

LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES is described as born February 15, 1928, in Cienfuegos, Cuba; a naturalized Venezuelan citiezn on July 17, 1970; parents LUIS and DOLORES POSADA. A warrant is outstanding for POSADA in Venezuela for escape.

LEADS

MIAMI DIVISION

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA:

Determine through sources whether subject is in the Miami area and, if so, his status and activities. To date, the [redacted] b7D however he probably entered the U.S. illegally and could possibly be deported because of his criminal activity. .

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

50-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: JAN 27 1966

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (92-726) (P)

SUBJECT: FRANK LANG "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL
aka, IGA

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES
IS - CUBA

[redacted] b3 b7E

Re Miami letter to Bureau 9/30/65.

Previous investigation in this case reflected that this office supplied [redacted] with a photograph of FRANK LANG "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL, Miami gambler and hoodlum, which

[redacted] b3 b7E

4 - Bureau (RM)
1 - San Juan (Encs-2) (Info) (RM)
3 - Miami (1 - 92-726)
(1 - [redacted])
(1 - [redacted])
(1 - [redacted])
(1 - [redacted])
(1 - [redacted])
(1 - [redacted])
(1 - [redacted])

JED:ggr
(13)

REC'D RECORDED
FEB 14 1966 92-50 b3 b6 b7C b7D b7E

18 JAN 28 1966

50 FEB 1 1966

SERIALIZED FILED IN

MM 92-726

On 10/23/65, LUIS POSADA CARRILES, aka Luis Posada, Alien Registration No. A12 419 708, was interviewed by SAs [redacted] at his residence, 220 NW 56th Court, Miami. It is to be noted that POSADA [redacted] that he is working [redacted] At the same time POSADA has frequently volunteered information to SA [redacted] of this office. b3 b6 b7C b7E

POSADA readily admitted that he had been in contact [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

Information has recently been received through [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E to assassinate FIDEL CASTRO. Pursuant to Bureau instructions dated 1/13/66 in the case entitled [redacted] this office is conducting investigation concerning the [redacted]

Since LUIS POSADA is [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E the information contained in this communication is not being set forth in a form suitable for dissemination [redacted]

Pertinent information relating to the individual Cubans will be included in future reports on these individuals where the circumstances justify.

A copy of this letter is being furnished San Juan for information purposes since [redacted] b6 b7C has reportedly moved to Puerto Rico. Copies of Miami airtel dated 7/29/65 and Miami letter dated 9/30/65, with accompanying LHMs are being trasmitted herewith to San Juan.

The Miami investigative files on POSADA, ESCARDA and [redacted] b6 b7C are being closed. Investigations of [redacted] and ROSENTHAL will continue.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-4

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/30/65

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (92-726) (P)

SUBJECT: FRANK LANG "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL
AR; IGA

[redacted]

LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES
IS - CUBA

[redacted]

LUIS CLEMENTE FAUSTINO POSADA CARRILES

Re Miami airtel and LHM 7/29/65.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 12 copies of LHM dated and captioned as above.

ENCLOSURE

2- Bureau (Enc. 12) (RM)
11- Miami
(1 - 92-726) (ROSENTHAL)

[redacted]

[redacted] (POSADA)
(POSADA)

[redacted]

Copy to RAO/Stat, [redacted] Customs/Cuban Affairs/SS/Cuban Affairs/G-2/ONI/OSI
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 10-12-65
by VN-ourz

GED/neb
(13)

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE NOT RECORDED
157 OCT 18 1965

REC- 58 92-6692-44

EX 109

14 OCT 4 1965

MCT-7

FILED IN DETACHMENT

NAVAL INT. SEC.

OCT 27 1965

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Copy furnished locally to ONI, OSI, G-2, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State, [redacted], Coast Guard, Customs, Miami, Customs, Region II, Miami, Customs, Key West, Border Patrol, and INS. b3 b6 b7C b7D b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

Miami will make further efforts to establish the identity of ROSENTHAL's two companions and ascertain whether he actually acquired any weapons or explosives, or disposition of same.

b6 b7C

Miami is attempting to obtain further information concerning any possible connection between [redacted] and the MIRR, or any connection between [redacted] and the MRR with regard to the boat recently acquired by [redacted] and his companions.

Miami will also conduct further investigation concerning the activities of the other subjects mentioned in this case.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. MM 92-726 (C)

Miami, Florida
September 30, 1965

~~SECRET~~

Re: FRANK LANG "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL
ANTI-RACKETEERING
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES

b6
b7C

[redacted]

LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

[redacted]

[redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

~~SECRET~~
Group One
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2023 BY: [redacted]

[redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

92-6692-44

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Miami, Florida
September 30, 1965

b3
b7E

Title FRANK LANG "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL; ET AL

Character ANTI-RACKETEERING;
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES;
Reference INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Memorandum dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Re: FRANK LANG "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL; ET AL

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

On [redacted] MM T-4, who has been closely b7D
associated with [redacted] advised that in [redacted] LUIS POSADA CARRILES [redacted] MM T-4 possessed no information reflecting any contact by POSADA with ROSENTHAL or anyone answering the description of ROSENTHAL's [redacted]

PROPERTY OF FBI - This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2023 BY: [redacted]

FBI

Date: 7/29/65

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED SECRET (Priority or Method of Mailing)

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: SAC, Miami (92-726)(P)

FRANK LANG "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL
AR; IGA

[redacted]

LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES
IS - CUBA

[redacted]

(OO: Miami)

NOT RECORDED
165 AUG 11 1965

Classified by 9745
Declassify on: OADR
10-30-85
260,597

Off to [redacted]
Copy to [redacted]
Date 8-6-65
By VHN/ST
Remarks Pg. 4, para. 3, line 1, word "undoubtedly" changed to "possibly" Encl. pg. 5, para. 1, line 1, 2 para 2, line 2 words "probably" changed to "possibly"

Enclosed for Bureau are 12 copies LHM dated and captioned as above. This info pertains to both criminal and security matters.

3 - Bureau (Enc.12) (RM) ENCLOSURE
3 - Miami (1 - 92-726)

[redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

2 AUG 2 1965

[redacted] (Posada)
[redacted] (Posada)

Copy to: [redacted] State/INR
ONI/OSI/ACSI
by routing slip for info.
Date 8/5/65 by [redacted]

C C - WICR

GED:egh

53 AUG 27 1965

ENCLOSURE

IS-Div. - DIA/CRIMINAL [redacted]
CR-Div. - Secret Service-Calvin [redacted]
NAT. INTERESTS

SECRET

ORIGINAL FILED IN

1-13563-1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

92-726

Miami, Florida
July 29, 1965

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

b6
b7C

RE: FRANK LANG "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL
ANTI-RACKETEERING
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES

[redacted]

LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

[redacted]

On [redacted] MM T-1, [redacted] furnished the following based upon information received from a source described as usually reliable, [redacted] ~~S~~ (U) b3 b6

[redacted] identities unknown, believed to be members of a [redacted] b7C b7D b7E

[redacted] ~~X~~ (U)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2023 BY: [redacted]

Classified by 9145 1/24/08
Declassify on: ~~Group 1~~ 10-30-35
2605917

~~SECRET~~ b6 b7C
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and declassification~~

~~ENCLOSURE~~

ENCLOSURE [redacted] b3 b7E

Re: Frank Lang "Lefty" Rosenthal

~~SECRET~~

Current Developments

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Luis Clemente Posada Carriles is possibly identical with a person of the same name who was born February 15, 1928 at Cienfuegos, Cuba. Previous investigation has reflected this individual was in charge of a military training camp operated in Polk County, Florida in the Summer of 1964 by an anti-Castro organization known as Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE). He was allegedly involved in a plot [redacted] b6 b7C in Miami, to overthrow the present government of Guatemala. This plot was aborted in May, 1965 before it got under way. Posada resides at 750 Northwest 14th Street, Miami.

~~SECRET~~

4-3 (Rev. 12-14-64)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☒ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

SD-10
URGENT 7-7-65
TO DIRECTOR
FROM LEGAT MEXICO CITY NO. 409

LUIS POSADA CARRILES, IS-CUBA.

[redacted] ADVISED BY SECRET MEMORANDUM DATED [redacted] b3 b7E
LAST, NOT TO BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL
OF ISSUING OFFICE, ENTITLED [redacted]

[redacted] WHO IS ASSOCIATED WITH CUBAN ACTIVISTS b6 b7C b7D
IN THE MIAMI AREA AND WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION
IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT [redacted]

[redacted]

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU AND MIAMI.

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

RECEIVED: 11:27 PM CFD

[redacted]

JUL 14 1965

JUL 15 1965

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.33 (#2272)

TEXT:

MMD 0030 246 0159

RR HQ

DE MM

R 03 2130Z SEP 86

FM MIAMI (185A-202) (C-4) (C)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI ROUTINE

(ATTN: CID, TERRORISM SECTION)

LEGAT, BOGOTA (185A-13) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES, IT - OMEGA SEVEN; OO: MIAMI.

RE LEGAT, BOGOTA AIRTEL TO THE DIRECTOR DATED JULY 25, 1986.

ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1986, [redacted] INVESTIGATOR, STRATEGIC INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (SIU), MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT, MIAMI, FLORIDA, ADVISED THAT LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES A[redacted] DOCUMENTARY REGARDING NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN HONDURAS NEAR THE NICARAGUAN BORDER. POSADA IS CURRENTLY RESIDING IN HONDURAS AND HAS JOINED FORCES WITH THE NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS (CONTRAS).

NONE OF THE SOURCES OF THE MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT AND FBI HAVE REPORTED THAT POSADA HAS BEEN SEEN IN MIAMI OR HAS HAD HIS FACIAL FEATURES ALTERED THROUGH PLASTIC SURGERY.

BT

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

DE-217

12 OCT 2 1986

RELAYED TO: BG

-->

2

ICC RM. 4255 FBI

The Shadow Warrior

Clipping on vulgar mercenary

When he wasn't tilting at windmills, he was bombing them.

The voice is weak, almost choking, and amid the clatter and bells of the newsroom I strain to understand the Spanish. From somewhere in Latin America, a wounded man shouts over the crackling phone line: ". . . Tell my story . . . slurp, slurp . . . Will you come?"

Luis Posada, the notorious anti-Castro saboteur. Until now, he was just a shadow — with a chilling résumé: CIA-trained master of disguise, explosives expert, jailbreak king. A security adviser for presidents across the Caribbean. A legman for Oliver North. A co-defendant with Orlando Bosch. A fugitive with an Uzi. A killer.

Cuba wants him dead. Venezuela wants him back in prison. A year ago, he was flushed from hiding when someone pumped his car full of 40-plus bullets in Guatemala City. He almost died. Instead, he vanished, his mantle of secrecy having been torn for just a bloody moment. Since then, outside his spy-filled netherworld, no one has admitted to seeing him for six years or more.

I bought a plane ticket and called him back with the flight information from Washington. How will I know you? he demanded. I'm young, I say, with a *gringo* face and a portable computer. But I was plainly an amateur. "Carry a newspaper," he advised.

Though he was never convicted, Posada is widely suspected, along with Bosch, of blowing up a Cuban airliner in 1976 in midair, killing all 73 aboard. "A vulgar mercenary," said one official from Cuba, where he was sentenced to death in absentia. "Deranged," said a Venezuelan envoy. "That bastard," said a top U.S. diplomat. "You don't fight Castro by blowing up planes."

At the cluttered, subtropical airport in a Latin American city, a hand squeezes my elbow and I am whisked away in a shiny Japanese car. The driver is a chatty Cuban-American arms dealer, whom I'll call Emilio. The man who must be Posada, tall, gray-haired, stares silently ahead from the passenger seat.

We stop at a restaurant, and the quiet man orders fish with extra sauce. When the food arrives, he mashes it with a fork. I steal a sidelong look at him: a craggy face, green eyes, a thick crop of dark gray hair. He is trim but his cheeks slide into flappy jowls, almost as though his jaw were unhinged. He can't chew. Spittle collects on his lower lip. It's where a bullet went through.

When it is time to leave, I pause at the front door. After you, I say. He senses my nerves. "That's so I'll take the bullet," he slurps.

We drive to a safe house — a high iron gate, anonymous whitewashed walls — about 15 minutes from the center of town. Posada gestures to a bedroom. He snatches a stubby Israeli-made machine gun from one of the beds. "You can sleep here," he says.

He rests the Uzi on the kitchen counter, next to some ripening bananas and avocados, and settles into a perfunctory couch. The walls are covered with *motel moderne* oil paintings of Alpine lakes, incongruous in the clinging humidity.

Posada nibbles at a cigar, smiles, and apologizes for his sloppy speech. It's his tongue, you see; it was almost shot clean out of his mouth. "Hanging out like a piece of liver."

I blink as the bomber lights my cigar.

For three decades, Posada tells me, he has kept the flame alive. Cuba must be free. "We have maintained the belligerence . . . when people were immersed up there [in Miami] trying to live well, trying to forget Cuba. We did what we could to continue the fight. We didn't give up. Right or wrong."

My mind scrolls through familiar scenes of exile: the wealthy Cuban-Americans testifying before Congress, the wrinkled warriors of Calle Ocho, reminiscing over a battle they never really got to fight.

Now, Posada is talking about bombs and "operations" and dead people. "Wherever Castro was," he says, "there was I."

I wonder: Who is this man, whose history reads like a personal challenge to Castro's expansionist dreams? Is he a vessel of exiles' hopes? Or a cartoon of their despair? Or is he, simply, a thug? His supporters in Miami and Caracas, custodians of anti-Castro hatred, all have jobs and houses and lives. Yet Posada is a marooned Japanese soldier still fighting World War II. He is trapped in *la causa*.

"When you think about it, we've grown old with our enemies," he says, guessing my thoughts. "Bosch is really old. Fidel Castro is old. And I'm old."

He is 61. In the smoky, unstirred heat of his urban hideaway, I sense something: Luis Posada, lost

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

THE MIAMI HERALD
TROPIC MAGAZINE
NOV. 10, 1991

BY CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS

7

warrior, wants to come in from the cold.

Spoo[redacted]

Posada was born to the middle-class in Cienfuegos, Cuba — his father owned a bookstore. His family was wedged apart by the Cuban revolution. His two brothers and a sister accepted jobs as professionals in the New Cuba. Posada, outraged by the revolution's confiscations and intrusiveness, began plotting against Castro within six months. He hasn't spoken with his siblings since 1960, fearing the contact would bring them harm.

It all began rather crudely: detonating homemade bombs in government buildings in the wee hours. The goal was to sow chaos and oust the *barbudos* — the bearded ones. But Havana was teeming with Castro informants as well as plotters; before long the young bomber was jailed. He managed to escape, and forced his way, gun in hand, into the Argentine Embassy. Eventually, the Argentines granted him a safe-conduct pass to Buenos Aires. Posada flew as far as Mexico, skipped the connection, and headed for a new base of operations: Miami.

Miami, in the early '60s, mirrored Havana's tensions. Overwhelmed by refugees, it soon became a listening post and training ground for any nature of assaults on revolutionary Cuba. The CIA had set up shop in a secluded, forested corner of South Dade, erecting its largest installation in the world outside of the Langley, Va., headquarters, employing 400 officers and commanding thousands of exile informants.

Along Calle Ocho, Posada recalls, everyone knew someone working for JM WAVE, the installation's code name; you could identify them by what was then a novelty: They all wore digital watches.

Posada learned the finer points of demolitions from a friend on the CIA pa[redacted] The agent then supplied him with explosives — the cheap stuff that stained your hands — to use in Cuba. But after the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco — which Posada sat out in Guatemala with a never-deployed battalion — the CIA grew increasingly cautious. The exiles had become too brazen for Langley, and they had made grievous errors. When exile commandos shelled a Havana hotel and mistakenly sank a Spanish freighter — killing three Spaniards, injuring 17 — the CIA scrambled to remove its fingerprints, Posada says. The support for exile adventures against Castro dried up fast.

But the CIA still wanted to slip arms into Cuba for future insurrection. It turned to Posada, who went on the payroll in the mid-'60s as a $300-a-month agent. Later, in Miami, his wife, Nieves, tells me he trained infiltrators in a camp in the Everglades. But Posada doesn't want to talk about that. He is uneasy discussing his ties to the CIA, and deflects questions with shrugs and grunts. "Don't write about that," he orders.

But he denies widespread reports that he ingratiated himself to his CIA employers by informing on fellow exiles, or that he remained on the payroll for more than a decade. The CIA, distracted by Vietnam, dropped him in 1967, he says.

As a CIA gunrunner, Posada worked from a secret base on Alligator Key. He ferried machine guns wrapped in nylon sacks to the Cuban coast off Matanzas and Pinar del Río. The tiny boats made almost weekly runs.

As far as he knows, the weapons, handed

AP PHOTO



Orlando Bosch, above, was Posada's co-defendant, prison-mate, painting teacher and confidante. When Bosch was staging hunger strikes, Posada was drawing blueprints of the prison, trying out disguises. "He spent all day in jail reading spy novels. He's an innate conspirator," said Bosch.

over to Cuban contacts in choppy night seas, are still on the island, buried, awaiting Liberation Day. Just as likely, they have been discovered and distributed to Cuba's Western Army.

Life Underground

It is nighttime at the supermarket and Posada and I are stalking the aisles, scanning the floors. We retrace his footsteps from a shopping expedition he made an hour earlier: We visit the beer stack, the butcher area, the rows of crackers. No luck.

Posada has lost the keys to his safe house.

"Oh well," he says, after the cashier gives a shrug. "I have another set."

Posada seems strangely vulnerable in his underworld. Despite his training, guns and hideaways, his guard seems low. There is his telltale speech. His injuries. His age. Money is scarce.

His life style is far from clandestine. Even a man hunted by Castro has errands to run. There are calls to make, food to buy, money to change, paints and canvases to find to fill the long afternoons.

Back on the street, Posada's anonymity slips. We bump into the daughter of his doctor here. She greets him warmly, carefully avoiding talk of his outlaw wounds.

The bullet went clean through his jaw, but the bones did not fuse properly. He wants a titanium implant. "Feel this," he says, pressing my palm to his chin. "Harder." The bumpiness is awkward. And the tongue is still partially severed.

Back at home, he rips off his shirt to show the puckered skin where two other bullets penetrated. One rubbed his heart as it passed through. There is a nasty patch of red skin on his left arm where the third bullet passed.

Posada coolly takes stock.

"I don't let sadness overtake me. Or desperation. As they say, I'm bigger than whatever can happen to me," he says. "Now I'm in a very difficult predicament in my life: I'm injured, decrepit, unable to eat. But I keep on, and I will to the end of my life."

In the fight against Castro, he says, he is one of the few who carries on.

"They've all gone under. Time consumed them. Exile consumed them . . . When you can't do any more, you go to the Versailles and talk about things."

Barbarities

One afternoon in June 1967, Posada was drinking a beer with a friend at the Centro Vasco restaurant on Calle Ocho. An elegant man with a sober demeanor settled beside him. "Are you Luis Posada?"

Within a week, Posada was on a flight to Caracas, excited by the stranger's offer to work for the Venezuelan secret police, known as DISIP. Posada thinks his CIA contacts recommended him for the job.

Under the *nom de guerre* of Comisario Basilio, he rose quickly in the ranks, commanding respect as a former CIA agent. Within four years, he became head of the DISIP's security division, in charge of surveillance, VIP protection, weapons and explosives.

Cuban exiles were influential throughout Venezuela's security apparatus during the late 1960s and the 1970s. Venezuelan leaders, alarmed by Castro's efforts to create a beachhead in their country, turned to the exiles to repel him. "We were better than the Venezuelans put together," Posada brags.

Posada relished his DISIP command. A gun collector, he had his choice of weapons. He pulled in a monthly salary of $6,000. Best of all, he was fighting Castro and his minions. The Cuban leader, his eye on the oil-rich prize of Venezuela, had dispatched his finest young agents to organize its leftist guerrillas, until DISIP ran them out.

Posada commanded a corps of secret agents. There was the woman with a baby carriage who trailed a Communist diplomat. Hot dog vendors, gardeners, boys on scooters, they all answered to Posada. His agents roamed Caracas in smoky-glassed vans, stealing suspects' garbage. With Posada at the helm, the Cuban Embassy was under permanent watch: Its phones were tapped; the ambassador's bodyguards were cultivated as informants.

The DISIP had hotel rooms, embassies — even some homes — permanently bugged, with 120 secretaries transcribing around the clock. One day, as Posada tells it, an employee burst into his office with a tape, saying: "Listen, get a load of this."

Posada listened. It was, he recalls, a salacious conversation between Carlos Andrés Pérez and a woman named Cecilia Matos. Pérez, now president and then a young presidential contender for the Venezuelan Democratic Action party, was drunk, he says. "He starts to say barbarities . . . . It was a scandalous thing."

Posada, whose fortunes were tied to the Social Christian government, joined in the rib-nudging — maybe too enthusiastically. "Perhaps I didn't have the necessary discretion," he says. "Pérez began to hate me deeply."

Pérez's aides deny the tape ever existed. One longtime friend of Pérez says the president was simply not capable of such a conversation: "He's very dry in that aspect."

But Posada is convinced that Pérez's hostility later came to haunt him.

Sympathy For The Devil

We are driving through the city in a Jeep, much like the one they sprayed with bullets when they last tried to kill him. He doesn't like to ride alone anymore.

Posada has many identities. Reaching into his pocket, he produces a wallet full of them. Here is a Salvadoran police *carnet* naming him as Ramón Medina. Here is a Guatemalan telephone employee card identifying him as Juan José Rivas López. Lately, friends have been calling him José. Everyone who knew him when he was young calls him "Bambi," for his energy and spunk.

He signs "Lupo" on the paintings he sells. When you are in the trade, such details amuse. Lupo is not just a contraction of his name. "It's Italian for wolf," he chuckles.

From Bambi to Wolf in a lifetime.

He has owned passports from five countries: Venezuela, El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico and the United States. The Mexican passport cost him $2,000. He acquired the rest through "friendship or sympathy" from officials and forgers.

Survival is more than good paper work. It is remaining vigilant, hearing the front gate squeak, noticing the idling car, knowing how to shake surveillance.

Recently, he enlisted the help of three friends to make sure he was not being followed. He stationed them at various points in the city, then drove past them. They scribbled down the kinds of cars that followed him. Afterward, he compared lists. No tail.

What about the rumors in Miami that he had undergone plastic surgery to conceal his identity? Posada nods. After the attack, the doctors who worked on his jaw offered to alter his features. They started by narrowing his wide, green eyes. But it was too painful. Posada nixed anything further. "It hurt so much, I said enough is enough."

I stare through the windshield and try to think of the right way to ask him: What is it like to kill somebody?


"The human being is strange," he responds. "When you kill in combat, you feel joy. It's strange. You hug your companions and say: How terrible I must be!"

I don't ask him what it feels like to blow up a plane full of civilians.

Blood Under The Bridge

By the mid-1970s, when Carlos Andrés Pérez assumed the presidency, the Cuban exile *intelligencia* in Venezuela had reached a peak of influence. Pérez appointed his longtime Cuban friend, Orlando Garcia — whom the president knew from his own exile in Cuba during the 1940s and '50s — to be chief of state security.

In 1976, according to Posada, Garcia and his DISIP protégé, Ricardo "Monkey" Morales, decided to invite Orlando Bosch — the famous, flamboyant anti-Castro crusader — to Venezuela. Unlike Posada, who stuck to the shadows, Bosch sought out the limelight,



"There was a time," says Posada, "when I thought this was the way to liberate Cuba: Attack everything that served Fidel. Make him lose an embassy here, a consulate there. Obviously, the world has changed."

believing publicity would help his cause. After serving five years in prison for shelling a Polish freighter at the Port of Miami, Bosch jumped his U.S. parole and set about gathering funds to continue his war. He eagerly accepted the invitation to Caracas where there were many wealthy Cuban exiles.

But Bosch had been expelled from Venezuela in 1974 after he was charged with two bombings. So Garcia slipped him back into the country in secret on Sept. 7, 1976.

Soon after Bosch arrived, things started to happen. Orlando Letelier — Chile's Socialist former ambassador to the United States and a Castro ally — was killed with an American aide when a bomb exploded in their car on Washington's Embassy Row on Sept. 21. In short order, two Cuban cargo ships were bombed in Latin American ports, and a string of bombings erupted in Colombia, Panama, Spain and the Caribbean.

Venezuelan investigators asserted that the terrorist activities had all been planned at a meeting Bosch presided over in Bonao, in the Dominican Republic, three months before he'd arrived in their country. But the most sensational — and most destructive — act of terrorism had yet to occur.

On Oct. 6, a Cubana de Aviación jet took off from Barbados — with Cuba as its final destination — on a routine island-hopping run.

Nine minutes after takeoff, at 1:24 p.m., the control tower received a message from the pilot: "We have an explosion on board." The plane crashed into the sea and sank quickly, leaving cadavers floating among the luggage, seat cushions and pieces of a bathroom. All 73 people aboard died.

The passengers were mostly Cuban, including 25 airline employees and Cuba's junior fencing team, which was returning from a competition in Guyana. The victims also included 11 Guyanese, five North Koreans, two Trinidadians, a Colombian and a Venezuelan.

Within a week, police in Caracas arrested two men whom they said had masterminded the crash:

Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada.

The case against them was circumstantial, but compelling.

When the DISIP smuggled Bosch into Venezuela, Posada — who by then had quit the government and opened his own detective agency — had supplied Bosch with a Colt .45 and a .357 Magnum and dispatched a young employee of his, Hernan Ricardo, to serve as Bosch's chauffeur and guard. Most people who have an opinion on the subject place Posada at the fateful meeting in Bonao where Bosch had pledged to carry the battle against Castro "throughout the roads of the world."

Posada says he wasn't there. He doesn't know why everybody insists that he was. But Bosch himself, interviewed in Miami, said that Posada spent the night with him in Bonao.

These things are certain: Ricardo, Posada's employee and Bosch's chauffeur, flew on the doomed plane as far as Barbados with a friend, Freddy Lugo, where they disembarked. The pair was traveling with false identification. Shortly after the plane crashed, Ricardo placed a call to Posada.

Posada did not take the call, but the incriminating contact was made. Then Ricardo and Lugo quickly boarded a flight to Trinidad, registered under new names at a Holiday Inn, and tried to reach Posada again. Soon, the Trinidadian police, acting on an anonymous phone tip from Venezuela,

arrested Ricardo and Lugo.

Ricardo confessed to Trinidadian police that he had placed two bombs on the plane. He and Lugo worked for Posada's detective firm, he said. Ricardo soon recanted, but it was too late: Posada and Bosch were arrested.

Cuba's rage and grief were thunderous. "It was extraordinarily sensitive," recalls Ariel Ricardo, a spokesman at Cuba's Interests Section in Washington. "Remember the commotion caused here by Pan Am Flight No. 103? It was the same for us."

Cuban courts promptly sentenced Posada and Bosch to death in absentia.

Venezuela claimed jurisdiction for the trial. *Vox populi* — then as now — was that Posada and Bosch were guilty. "Almost nobody doubts that in Venezuela," a senior diplomat said recently.

But the case became the political football of the decade. Bosch and Posada entered a legal purgatory in which judges felt afraid to free them and unable to condemn them. On one hand there was Castro's menacing pressure; on the other there was the formidable influence of Cuban exiles. Ricardo and Lugo were eventually sentenced to 20 years each for the bombing. The alleged masterminds were never convicted, yet remained jailed as the legal proceedings dragged on for 10 years.

Posada denies planning the bombing.

The way he tells it, Ricardo and Lugo had been traveling undercover on a mission for the DISIP to secretly photograph five North Korean diplomats en route to Cuba. "Monkey" Morales had sent them. The Monkey, Posada says, tearfully confessed to him shortly after he and Bosch were jailed. Morales said he planted the bomb and set up the young men. Why? I ask. Castro's agents paid Morales to do it, Posada says.

The problem with that alibi — apart from the difficulty in conceiving why Cubans would want to blow up their own plane — is that Morales is dead, killed in a Miami barroom brawl in 1982. Also dead is Morales' lawyer, Raymond Aguiar — who Posada says knew the truth — slain in Caracas in 1985, apparently by a thief.

Despite the implausibility of his story, and the impossibility of proving it, Posada insists that he is famous for an act he knew nothing about.

But in the next breath he seems to brag about it: The bombing was, he says, the most effective strike ever against Castro.

"What most hurt Fidel was that Cuban plane," Posada says. "Because it gave him a taste of his own medicine. The terrorism he practiced all his life was finally pointed at him . . . He didn't care about the people, those athletes. That was all for publicity."

The Day Of The Jackal

Amid the cozy clutter of the study of his West Dade home, Orlando Bosch offers a cigar and lights one himself. He is surrounded by his paintings, the fruit of a prison hobby that soothes him still. Everywhere there are palm trees, pastoral scenes, seascapes — trite but skillful. There are photos, too, and certificates. One bears the inscription of the city of Miami. It declares March 25, 1983 as Orlando Bosch Day, praising him "as a tireless fighter for the freedom of his beloved homeland."

"I have 10 more of those," Bosch observes, "but I don't have them framed yet."

Bosch — Posada's co-defendant, prison-mate, painting teacher and confidante — reflects on a quality that eventually brought him this comfort, his family, Miami, and his own day in March. He was patient.

"Luis was a bad prisoner. He never got accustomed. The poor guy. He was so impatient," Bosch says. "I knew if I fled, I would have been a fugitive all my life. Like him. The poor guy."

In prison, Bosch recalls, Posada was always scheming a new escape. When Bosch was staging hunger strikes to protest his legal limbo, Posada was drawing blueprints of the prison, trying out disguises. Posada practically memorized *The Day of the Jackal*. "He spent all day in jail reading spy novels. He's an innate conspirator," Bosch says.

Bosch recalls meeting Posada in Venezuela in 1974. Immediately, they became "intimate friends, conspirators," he says. Posada, I recall, had downplayed his relationship with Bosch, calling it "superficial" from the time they met up to when the plane crashed two years later.

Bosch categorically refuses to discuss the bombing.

Shortly after the pair was arrested, Garcia, Venezuelan President Pérez's security chief, offered Bosch his freedom through an authorized escape. With Cuban exiles clamoring for his release, Pérez was eager to wash his hands of Bosch, the celebrity militant, Bosch says.

But Bosch sensed that while Pérez was willing to let him go, he was planning to offer up the less celebrated Posada and the two Venezuelans — Ricardo and Lugo — to the other side; they would be the fall guys to appease an irate Castro. When Garcia offered Bosch $5,000 and permission to flee, Bosch refused. "CAP [Pérez's nickname] said I was stubborn. I said no, tell CAP I'm a man. I can't leave Luis Posada behind."

Bosch's noble stand, which Posada acknowledges, would cost him 10 years of freedom. Throughout the legal limbo, Bosch waited, staged nine hunger strikes and was ultimately freed by acquittal.

Today, Bosch lives in relative freedom. Since his illegal return to the United States in 1988 — he subsequently spent 29 months at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in South Dade as an excludable alien — he is restricted to his home except for 10 hours each weekday and three hours each on Saturday and Sunday. The U.S. government is not ready to forgive the old bomber.

Was his struggle and sacrifice worth it, I ask. "Of course," Bosch says. Then he reflects: "It's not really whether it's worth it

or not. When you leave the land of your birth under the agony we did, you are sort of an accomplice if you do not act . . . What we did had its historic time. We fought not as we wanted, but as we could."

Bambi In An Elephant Suit

In Cell Block "C" of the Carcel Modelo, money bought privileges; the Venezuelan guards sold anything for a price. Posada, who had savings from his detective agency, at first enjoyed VIP treatment in jail, with a television, refrigerator, and a convict he paid to sweep his cell.

Saturdays were family visits. Wednesdays, a pathetic parade: "the ugliest discarded prostitutes of the world go from cell block to block, selling their favors," he wrote in the memoir he hopes to publish someday. On occasion, fellow Cuban exiles and recent refugees would visit.

"People who fled Cuba always came to see me. To see what 'the monster' was like," Posada says. "They brought me guavas." Miami Mayor Maurice Ferré was among the South Floridians who paid their respects.

Posada painted to relax, but he still felt caged. His "Bambi" verve died. He sat in a chair in his underwear and dressed only for visitors.

"I put on my elephant skin," he says. "I learned to lose my emotions. I didn't have dreams of having a car, a suit, a woman, nothing. From Buddha, I learned disinterest. Living in complete austerity, you suffer a lot less."

The legal shenanigans depressed him; even after a military court acquitted the defendants, they were not freed. The first acquittal brought better accommodations, however. Posada moved in with Venezuelan officers facing charges of corruption, desertion, homicide. Then, when Pérez left the presidency, Posada's friends returend to the DISIP. They secretly reinstated his salary.

Posada grew sick of waiting: "I won't wait anymore," he said. "My wits and guts will give me back my freedom."

The first escape was the most elaborate.

It began in July 1982, when a friend from the DISIP brazenly walked in for a visit with a Colt .45 taped to his leg. Posada stashed the weapon in the back of his TV set. Weeks later, he stole the dry cleaning left by Venezuelan officers next door; they wore their uniforms, even in prison.

Friends smuggled in some black boots, false mustaches, eyeglasses. Posada swiped a visiting drunken colonel's hat and hid it in a wastebasket, then persuaded the visitor that he'd left it outside. He sewed a colonel's insignia onto his uniform, and amended a nameplate: "L. Losada."

He tried on his officer's disguise, stuffing cotton beside his molars to alter the line of his jaw. "I didn't recognize myself in the mirror."

He took toilet paper tubes, molded and bound them together with wax, and painted, in flawed English, "Hi (sic) Explosive" on them. Ricardo, who by then was Posada's cell mate, was amazed.

"The artifact is so perfect that my companion, Ricardo, unconsciously treats it with great care," Posada wrote.

On Aug. 8, 1982, Ricardo shaved his mustache and Posada pulled out his .45. They called on a guard with whom they were friendly. Settle a bet for us, they said: Is the key to a Ford round or square?

The young guard fished out his key chain and identified the key to his own car. Posada whipped out his weapon, Ricardo exposed the toilet roll contraption and demanded: "Do you know what this is, lieutenant?"

Posada recounts: "He answers, 'Yes, it's a bomb.' His voice begins to tremble and he asks, 'What are you going to do?' Without lowering my aim, I respond: 'Lieutenant, we're going to leave here, or we're going to die. And you with us.' "

With the frightened officer waiting, Posada and Ricardo switched into their officers' disguises in a bathroom. Then they walked out of jail to the respectful salutes of prisor guards. With friends from Miami serving as lookouts, they drove in the guard's Ford to the Embassy of Chile, forced their way in, and requested political asylum.

Their only miscalculation was political. Chile's strong-arm president, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, had chilly relations with Venezuela. But when Venezuela promised to resolve the men's legal cases within two months, Pinochet denied them asylum.

Posada and Ricardo had no choice but to surrender to the troops ringing the embassy.

Two months became two years, and still no judgment. Posada started gathering plastic explosives. Each week friends visiting him at the Carcel La Planta brought a meat and cheese *pasticcio* — one part edible, and three parts explosive. "The guards thought I was crazy about Italian food," he says.

The recipe bombed. Late one night Posada and Ricardo were caught in the glare of klieg lights when their effort to blow through a wall merely made a lot of noise.

Punishment came in the form of two months of isolation in a tiny cell with lethargic cockroaches that refused to scatter, and hungry rats that crawled up the hole Posada used to relieve himself.

Posada grew weak but stayed stubborn. He wrote: "In that moment of frustration, my will reacts and tells me you'll try it 1,001 times more. Nothing can stop you."

The third time was the charm. Some well-placed cash achieved more than all of Posada's ingenuity.

He was in maximum security detention, having been ushered into San Juan de los Morros prison in a caged van with two trucks of soldiers and a helicopter escort. His guests were strip-searched.

A friend from Miami, Gaspar Jiménez, cased the prison from the outside. Posada chose a guard to bribe: a young man named Julio who earned only $200 a month and had been hinting around for a job in Posada's company. Posada bought Julio's help for $17,000. He made impressions of Julio's

keys on a tiny DISIP-issue press, then had copies made.

Julio looked away as Posada's visi[tor] slipped him odds and ends: a priest's c[ollar], hair dye, and best of all, a prison guard's ID card.

On Aug. 18, 1985, a barely recognizable Posada — with mustache, dark hair and a blue Windbreaker — walked out of his cell and kept walking out the front of Venezuela's most secure prison.

He strode down the entrance road, stripped off his jacket and replaced it with his priest's disguise. Fortuitously, a *campesino* raced to Posada's side, seeking a prayer for a sick child. They walked 400 yards together. Posada broke away with a blessing and walked until, suddenly, he was bathed in the headlights of an approaching car. An accomplice.

The driver braked, spun around and stopped. Posada slipped in, and held his breath as they drove to the police checkpoint. He yanked off the collar and rode through easily as a civilian. Exile friends, including Jiménez and Syla Cuervo from Miami, set about the complex task of extracting Posada from the country.

South Florida was abuzz with the news. "In Miami, all the radio stations announce word of the sensational escape every 15 minutes," Posada wrote.

Emilio And The Anti-Christ

On the cool balcony offering a sweeping view of the city lights, Posada pokes at a plate of hors d'oeuvres and listens to the complaints of Emilio, the Cuban-American weapons dealer.

The wars of the region are winding down, Emilio says, offering another glass of Chilean wine. A pity. Life has been good to him here. He had hoped to build an addition onto the house.

Posada nods politely. These days, he depends on people like Emilio — to relocate, to relax. To them, he is a symbol: the incarnation of the unending fight against Castro and communism.

People in Miami help Posada so as to contribute to the cause. In Miami, 200 exiles showed up in May for an exposition of his paintings in Little Havana. The visitors paid $20,000 for 160 works. The artist himself says his oil renderings of vintage cars, lake scenes and curlews weren't worth it.

"My paintings aren't worth more than a hundred dollars apiece," Posada says. "But the Cubans buy them from me so I won't feel like a beggar."

There are other sources of help. The Miami friends who planned his jailbreak help him move around. Raúl Prat, an old college friend living in Puerto Rico, sends Posada's wife a monthly check for food and rent.

Still, Posada is a solitary sort. Curiously, he appears to tire of talk of politics, and, at times, seems less fervent than his armchair backers.


Emilio — barking orders at the maid one minute, shouting into his cellular phone the next — seems to annoy him. Now Emilio is talking about the Jesuit priests, slain in 1989 by Salvadoran soldiers. Communist sympathizers, Emilio concludes. And the slain nuns? One of them had a guerrilla lover.

Emilio looks at me. "Now there's a version you won't see in the newspapers," he says. Posada winces, then mumbles: "*That* is the version of the anti-Christ."

As we get up to leave, Posada scoops up a handful of Emilio's cigars. Each is wrapped in cellophane printed with the insignia of a prominent Central American general.

Later, I ask him if his views have moderated over the years. He nods.

"There was a time when I thought this was the way to liberate Cuba: Attack everything that served Fidel. Make him lose an embassy here, a consulate there. Whatever. Obviously, the world has changed. Many Cubans don't dare to say that. Or,



"My paintings aren't worth more than a hundred dollars apiece," Posada says. "But the Cubans buy them from me so I won't feel like a beggar."

above all, that we're out of fashion. I fought Venezuelan terrorists, and I was a terrorist myself, if that is the word.

"Things have changed."

Ollie North And Company

In the wake of Posada's escape, authorities grilled inmates, set up roadblocks and placed airports on alert. For a month, Posada lay low in Caracas, rode to the western city of Coro, then on to the Netherlands Antilles.

The Miami friends arranged for a flight in a twin-engine Cessna to El Salvador.

There, in February 1986, Posada met up with another Cuban exile — Rafael Quintero, who had launched anti-Castro attacks from Nicaragua in the early 1960s.

Quintero — a former CIA operative who was working for retired Maj. Gen. Richard Secord — told Posada of an intriguing new project to help the U.S.-backed contras fight the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The U.S. Congress, bitterly divided over the covert war, had cut off military aid to the contras 16 months earlier.

Referring to Quintero by his nickname, Posada wrote: "Chichi tells me about the supply project to the anti-Sandinista rebels . . . He asks me to help develop the operation under the direction and economic support of Lt. Col. Oliver North, adviser to President Ronald Reagan, Gen. Secord, retired from the U.S. Air Force and an ex-colonel named Dick Gart . . . ."

Posada was enlisted to work with the American pilots who would fly the supply missions. Salvadoran air force officials cooperated wholeheartedly, Posada recalls; they hated the Sandinistas, too.

North made things happen quickly. A Southern Air Transport cargo plane arrived from Miami with an entire prefabricated warehouse, which was erected in just nine days. Soon, the first shipment of 800,000 pounds of arms and materiel arrived from Portugal to stock its shelves, Posada says.

Later that month, the ringleaders arrived from Washington: North, Secord and Gart stepped off a Lear jet onto the tarmac at Ilopango air base. They spent the morning laying plans, Posada recalls, then flew off in the afternoon. Secord and North ordered three cases of tasty Salvadoran Pilsner beer loaded onto their jet.

The project, which would later explode as the Iran-contra affair, the worst scandal of the Reagan administration, was plagued with practical problems from the start. The supply flights were hindered by shoddy, primitive equipment. The planes could carry fuel for seven hours, but distances were so great that pilots routinely flew on dangerously low tanks.

Posada, who manned the radio on several flights, recounts one mission, piloted by an American named William Cooper: "There was a strong storm and all the navigation instruments were damaged. Nevertheless Cooper persisted in finding the drop spot. I reached the rebels on the radio. We flew over Nicaraguan territory and received sporadic machine-gun fire from the ground. In front of us, we could see the tracers ripping the sky. We thought we were flying at an altitude of about 2,000 feet. Suddenly, we felt a strong blow and we thought a gun had hit us from the ground. The jet's left motor used for heavy takeoffs was completely destroyed. We aborted the mission and returned to our base."

Back at the base, they inspected the motor. "We began pulling pieces of wood from inside the engine. Thinking we were flying at 2,000 feet in altitude, we had crossed over a forest and flown through the branches of a tree."

By the end of June, things got better. Equipment got more sophisticated and construction began on a clandestine runway in Costa Rica. Donald Gregg, national security adviser to then-Vice President George Bush, took an interest in the project, Posada says, and helped with staffing problems. Bush has denied any involvement in the affair. So did Reagan.

Posada: "Listen to me. The CIA had bases in Aguacate [Honduras] and at Ilopango. We saw them every day. Now, are you telling me that the president of the United States didn't know about this?"

On Oct. 5, William Cooper, the pilot Posada had flown into a tree with, was shot down with a surface-to-air missile. Eugene Hasenfus, the only airman who insisted on wearing a parachute, was the sole survivor of the crash. Captured by the Sandinistas, Hasenfus identified his two bosses: One of them was Posada.

Posada was yanked out of the shadows. "If it hadn't been for Hasenfus, he would have been able to disappear," reflects Bosch. "He could be living quietly on a farm somewhere."

Better Off Dead

In a Kendall condominium like so many others, Janet Posada, 20, fixes a misty blue gaze on her mother, Nieves, who is seated across the room. The home is sparsely furnished, but does have a score of "Lupo" paintings crowding the walls. Janet slowly utters the words that hurt about her father.

"He's a person I admire and resent at the same time," she says in Spanish. "For the life we wasted . . . He's made my mother suffer a lot. For me, it's hard to accept."

As a girl, she remembers visiting Posada in strange jails, feeling the eyes of the inmates, spooking at the sound of a prison bell. Through the years, through the painful transition from Venezuela to Miami, she watched her older brother, Jorge, battle depression and grow up deeply missing his father. She watched her mother become increasingly nervous and distracted.

She remembers feeling an object of pity. At Miami expositions of Posada's paintings, which were always half fund raising, half homage to him, she hated the sympathetic looks and clucking tongues. She felt like a

Posada is a man without a country, chased by old enemies with old scores, and the old rules apply: When you stop attacking, you must hide.

poster child.

Her father's crusade, she says, is "something he's loved all his life. He's loved it probably more than his own family."

Nieves Posada, a childhood friend of Posada's, married him in the United States after his 1958 divorce from a brief first marriage. She hasn't seen him for nearly two years, since before the last attempt on his life. She is troubled by her daughter's words and interrupts her, not necessarily in disagreement, but in explanation.

"I see it with more age. He entered a track and he couldn't get off."

Nieves Posada is proud of her husband. For her, the expositions are a source of pride. At the last one, everyone was so nice. "They said how can we ever repay Luis? They said so many nice things I started to cry." One old woman walked 20 blocks to contribute a dollar, Nieves says. She is crying now.

All of the uncertainty and late-night calls have taken a toll. "I've made a great effort to avoid going crazy," she says. "Many other people in my shoes would be."

She is idle and anxious. She doesn't work; the checks from Raúl Prat cover most expenses and the children have jobs. She waits for Luis, half believing he will come home; her heart pounds whenever there is a knock at the door.

Posada's family is his Achilles' heel, says Syla Cuervo, the long-time Miami friend who aided Posada's escape from Venezuela. "That's his big tragedy. He has a guilt complex. He feels as though he's let his children down."

I think of what Posada told me. It sounded so selfless: "We're the old soldiers," he said. "We can't hope that the youth of today will assume that role. My son and others are in the university with their lives. They don't think of Cuba. But we do. Because my friends, my brothers are in Cuba. It's my home."

Back in his family's home, Janet muses that things might have been better all around if people thought Posada had been killed by assassins. "After the attack, everyone thought he was dead," she says. For several hours, even Nieves and Janet thought so. "I can't help but think it would have been better to leave him like that."

40 Bullets

The Hasenfus debacle left Posada exposed. Fortunately for him, Salvadoran President José Napoleón Duarte needed a spy. Duarte, a centrist fighting for the middle ground in his polarized nation, enlisted Posada to perform underground detective work and neutralize threats to the presidency. The contra re-supply scandal had humiliated Duarte, because it had been a complete surprise to him — engineered by the military, under his nose. Duarte began to worry that freewheeling officers would hatch a coup.

Posada was given police credentials under his Ramón Medina alias, and began advising Duarte's security chiefs. One of Duarte's chief rivals, and Posada's primary targets, was Maj. Roberto D'Aubuissón, founder of the right-wing ARENA party. The president was powerless to stop death squads linked to D'Aubuissón, Posada says. Duarte was convinced, moreover, that the retired major had ordered the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero.

Posada got nowhere on the Romero murder, but did confirm that D'Aubuissón was in the business of prescribing death, he says. His source: a maid he had successfully infiltrated into the major's house. "She told us how he would kill people in cold blood for not paying a debt to a friend," Posada says.

Perhaps it was inevitable that Posada would soon get caught up in the brutality of the Salvadoran civil war. On his morning commute he routinely drove with a loaded shotgun across his knees. It came in handy one morning as he was idling in traffic. Two men approached his car on either side and reached for the door handles.

Posada was quicker. He raised the shotgun from his lap and blasted the man closest to him between the eyes. Dead. The other man wheeled backward in fear. Posada didn't hesitate. He shot him in the chest. The man slumped to a sitting position clasping his wound.

Posada sped off.

Castro's men, he thought. Yes, he was sure of it. They had found him. "I just knew," he said.

I ask him: What if it was some terrible mistake?

It was no mistake, Posada says. When he reached his office, he asked the police about the men. The men had been carrying no identification. The police shrugged it off. Cuban agents for sure, Posada says.

Posada's work for Duarte occasionally sent him to neighboring Guatemala. Vincio Cerezo, the freewheeling president there, was sympathetic to Duarte's difficulties, and tolerated Posada's intelligence-gathering within his borders.

Indeed, Cerezo, whose election had ended 16 years of military rule, had his own concerns about ambitious officers.

After Duarte lost power in elections, Posada moved to Guatemala at Cerezo's invitation in September 1989. The number of political murders was spiraling in Guatemala, nudging the country toward the same level of violence as El Salvador. Cerezo asked Posada — whom he knew only by his Venezuelan alias, Comisario Basilio — to help identify and neutralize the killers.

Posada says he refused that task — arguing it was too much for one man — and accepted a job providing security for the state telephone company, GUATEL.

But Cerezo's interior minister and the armed forces chief both said that Posada accepted the challenge. He began to set up a clandestine security force that answered exclusively to the president, they said.

Cerezo, for his part, denies Posada ever worked for him.

Posada was put on GUATEL's payroll under the name of Juan José Rivas López.

Once again it came during his morning commute. On Feb. 26 of last year, two cars pulled up alongside his black Suzuki Jeep in traffic. Suddenly, gunmen opened fire from both left and right in a merciless fusillade.

Posada slammed on the brakes, fumbled for his revolver. A bullet ripped through his chest. Another grazed his arm. A third blasted through his jaw, shattering the bone, turning his face into a bloody pulp. Three hits out of more than 40 rounds. His car looked like a sieve.

Still, Posada fought back. He desperately squeezed several shots from his 9mm handgun. The assailants raced off, tires screeching, in a cloud of smoke.

The wounded spy managed to continue driving down the tree-lined Vista Hermosa Boulevard, swerved into an Esso gas station, and pleaded mutely for help. On the verge of unconsciousness, he managed to scribble the phone number of his apartment. Two top Cerezo aides raced to the scene with a Posada friend. Paramedics carried him to an expensive clinic a few blocks away.

The doctors were alarmed. A bullet had rubbed his heart, but exited cleanly. With his collapsed jaw, he was having difficulty breathing. They inflated a balloon inside his mouth and inserted tubing. His tongue, dark and nearly detached, flapped loose over his chin.

"No pulse," he recalls hearing as he lay on the operating table.

When he regained consciousness, he was helpless. He couldn't eat: his weight dropped from 170 to 130 pounds. The mirror horrified him: "I was a monster."

Cerezo had sent a score of national policemen and members of his own presidential guard to protect Posada's door. The president himself never visited, Posada says, because he was worried about the publicity. The press was asking questions about the mysterious shooting victim.

15

Cerezo sent word for Posada not to worry. His hospital expenses would be covered. Posada was surprised to see his own blood-splattered briefcase in the hospital room, and even more surprised to find his gun — a key piece of evidence in the rush-hour gun battle — inside it.

He later learned that one of the shots he fired from that gun had struck and killed a bystander, a young male student. No matter. Officials had covered up the incident, he says. He shrugs: These things happen in war.

Within a month, Posada had regained his strength, but still needed corrective surgery. One day, Cerezo aides arrived at his room, helped him pack his things, escorted him to the airport and unceremoniously flew him out of the country.

Cerezo washed his hands of "Comisario Basilio," whose true identity was emerging in press accounts. "He didn't want to open the Pandora's box," Posada says.

There was a last indignity: The hospital presented Posada with a bill of $20,000. Cerezo's promise to pay had covered only the hospital bed, not the surgeons' fees.

The Man Of La Mancha

Once again Posada stepped off a plane into a new land and a new identity. This time he had few contacts and devastating wounds. He is still convalescing. He is also broke.

He wants to sell the story of his life. He needs the money. There are so many expenses, and the surgery he needs. He presents me with a manuscript of 412 typewritten pages. "Find a publisher," he says.

This is the last chapter. He knows there is no place for an old bomber in a new world.

Late one night, he allows: The future of Cuba belongs to Cubans on the island. Decisive change must come from within. "Men of courage," dissidents, rights leaders on the island will lead the way, he says — not the *americanistas*, nor the exiles who don't accept Cubans from Cuba with open arms.

"Without question, we formed a part of history," he says. "But we're not the future. We're just not."

Posada would like to move to Miami, to rest, to feel safe. Maybe tell some stories at the Versailles.

But U.S. authorities say they would arrest him as soon as he stepped on American soil. He is an international fugitive; all of his travel documents are false. If Posada surfaced, Cuba would clamor for his arrest. Venezuela would be compelled by honor to request his extradition — especially with Pérez back in power.

So Posada's conversion doesn't matter. He is a man without a country, chased by old enemies with old scores, and the old rules apply: When you stop attacking, you must hide.

In the blank safe house, I ask him: Where do I say he is?

"Say 'somewhere in Latin America,' " he responds. "Like it says in Don Quixote: '. . . *de cuyo nombre no quiero acordarme. . .*' "

A place whose name I choose not to recall.

I fancy his choice, and squint to view him this way: a decrepit knight chasing Castro's windmills. Armed with C-4 explosives, instead of a lance. Endlessly conspiring, cherishing his spy craft like chivalry, riding back streets in his Rocinante Jeep: defiant, dreamily detached from the mess he makes and the blood he spills. ■

CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS is a Herald staff writer.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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FOI/PA# 1406447-000

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FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1406447-000

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

[redacted]

United States Embassy
Panama City, Panama
October 17, 2001

b3
b7E

RE: Gaspar Eugenio Jiménez Escobedo

b6
b7C

Dear Mr. [redacted]:

The Legal Attache office has received a request from [redacted] regarding Gaspar Eugenio Jiménez Escobedo. As you are aware, Escobedo was arrested during a visit of Fidel Castro to Panama and charged with attempting to assassinate Castro. Escobedo has also been charged with utilizing an illegally acquired passport to enter the country. Escobedo had in his possession a U.S. passport in the name of Manuel Díaz.

b7D

The U.S. State Department was able to locate a copy of a passport application in the name of Manuel Díaz. This copy was furnished to the Legal Attache office at the time of Escobedo's arrest. [redacted]

b7D

certified copy of the passport application from the U.S. State Department, [redacted]

The U.S. Consulate is requested to review the attached photographs and provide a certified copy of the passport application in the name of Manuel Díaz.

GASPAR Eugenio Jimenez Escobedo, aka Manuel Díaz; Luis Posada Carriles, aka Franco Rodriguez Mena; ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE - Foreign police cooperation

Best Regards,

[redacted]

[redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E


This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI [redacted] agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
OCT 18 2001
LEGAL ATTACHE - PANAMA CITY

Open [redacted]


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
NOT VALID UNTIL SIGNED











Section 1

LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP.

DUAL CITIZENS.

TRAVEL INFORMATION.

WHEN TRAVELING

BEARER'S FOREIGN ADDRESS
ADRESSE DU TITULAIRE À L'ÉTRANGER

2. Call
647-6225
events

3. Make two
one copy
your passport.
stolen.

4. Leave a
you can be

5. When
register
Consulate.


6. Do not
from strangers.


7. Avoid
excessive

8. In order
when

9. Familiarize
which you are
laws.

10.


7
Entries / Entrées
Visas
REP. DE PANAMA
4
MIGRACION
ANULADO
SALIDA
4
PASO CANOAS
REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
23
Dirección de
MIGRACION
27 AGO 1994
Aeropuerto Int.
DOCUMEN
ENTRADA
IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
OBTAIN THE NECESSARY VISAS
LE TITULAIRE DU PASSEPORT EST
L'OBTENTION DES VISAS REQUIS


























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Entries / Entrées
USA
USA





Amendments and Ratification
A
OF
U
2






PASSPORT
United States
of America



b3
b7E

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPLICATION FOR ☐ PASSPORT ☐ REGISTRATION

INSTRUCTIONS: TYPE OR PRINT IN INK IN WHITE AREAS

PRZ 0435

1. NAME (First) MIDDLE NAME

2. MAILING ADDRESS

STREET 761 JANN AVE

CITY, STATE ZIP CODE HIALEAH, FL 33054

COUNTY IN CARE OF

3. SEX X Male Female

4. PLACE OF BIRTH City, State or Province Country VEGA BAJA P.R.

5. DATE OF BIRTH 3/20/34

6. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 581-44-8229

SEE FEDERAL TAX LAW NOTICE ON REVERSE SIDE

7. HEIGHT 5'4"

8. COLOR OF HAIR BROWN

9. COLOR OF EYES BROWN

10. (Area Code) HOME PHONE 305 681 2466

11. (Area Code) BUSINESS PHONE

12. PERMANENT ADDRESS (Street, City, State, Zip Code) SAME

13. OCCUPATION Retired

14. PARENT'S NAME Sotero Diaz

BIRTHPLACE Utuado P.R.

BIRTH DATE ?

U.S. CITIZEN X YES NO

15. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME Bacardi Feliciano

BIRTHPLACE Morovis P.R.

BIRTH DATE ?

U.S. CITIZEN X YES NO

16. TRAVEL PLANS (If Mandatory)

COUNTRIES Near South America

DEPARTURE DATE 8/24 Month

LENGTH OF STAY 1 week

17. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ISSUED A U.S. PASSPORT? YES NO X

IF YES, SUBMIT PASSPORT IF AVAILABLE. Submitted

IF UNABLE TO SUBMIT MOST RECENT PASSPORT, STATE ITS DISPOSITION: LOST, STOLEN, VOIDED, ETC.

WHEN ISSUED PASSPORT NUMBER ISSUE DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) DISPOSITION

SUBMIT TWO RECENT IDENTICAL PHOTOS 2" x 2"



18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN MARRIED? YES X NO

IF YES, GIVE DATE Month Day Year

WIDOWED/DIVORCED? YES NO IF YES, GIVE DATE Month Day Year

SPOUSE'S FULL BIRTH NAME SPOUSE'S BIRTHPLACE

19. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, NOTIFY (Person Not Traveling) (Not Mandatory)

FULL NAME Norma Vazquez RELATIONSHIP friend

ADDRESS 76 JANN AVE #REAR (Area Code) PHONE NUMBER 305 681 2466

20. TO BE COMPLETED BY AN APPLICANT WHO BECAME A CITIZEN THROUGH NATURALIZATION

I IMMIGRATED TO THE U.S. (Month, Year)

I RESIDED CONTINUOUSLY IN THE U.S. From (Mo., Yr.) To (Mo., Yr.)

DATE NATURALIZED (Mo., Day, Yr.)

PLACE

21. DO NOT SIGN APPLICATION UNTIL REQUESTED TO DO SO BY PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

I have not since acquiring United States citizenship, performed any of the acts listed under "Acts or Conditions" on the reverse of this application (unless explanatory statement is attached). I solemnly swear (or affirm) that the statements made on this application are true and the photograph(s) attached is a picture of me.

Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me Month Day Year

AUG 22 1994

☐ Clerk of Court or ☐ PASSPORT Agent ☐ Postal Employee ☐ Other Designated Official

(Signature of person authorized to accept applic...)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(Signature of person administering oath)

22. APPLICANT'S IDENTIFYING DOCUMENTS

ISSUE DATE Month Day Year

EXPIRATION DATE Month Day Year

PASSPORT ☐ DRIVER'S LICENSE ☐ OTHER (Specify) ID

PLACE OF ISSUE FL

No. D200-540-64-010-0

ISSUED IN THE NAME OF Manuel Diaz

23. FOR ISSUING OFFICE USE ONLY (Applicant's evidence of citizenship)

X Birth Certificate SR CR City Presented 5/28/34/92

Passport Book Number

Report of Birth

Naturalization Certificate No.

Other

Sworn Statement

Witness

APPLICATION APPROVED

Examiner Initials

Issue Date

24. FEE $ EXEC

08/22/94 660 AP 300 CA 055.00

13:53 REG1 55.00 C

POST

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE)

FORM DSP-11 (12-87)

Form Approved OMB No. 1405-0004 (Exp. 8-1-89)

[redacted] b3
b7E

SEARCHED [redacted] INDEXED [redacted]
SERIALIZED [redacted] FILED [redacted]
OCT 31 2001
LEGAL ATTACHE – PANAMA CITY

[redacted] b7E

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-448 (Rev. 6-2-97)

FBI FACSIMILE

COVER SHEET

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ Immediate
- ☐ Priority
- ☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION

- ☐ Top Secret
- ☐ Secret
- ☐ Confidential
- ☐ Sensitive
- ☐ Unclassified

Time Transmitted: 10:30 AM
Sender's Initials: [redacted]
Number of Pages: 29
(including cover sheet)

To: Legat Panama Date: 5-9-01
Name of Office

Facsimile Number: [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

Attn: [redacted]

From: Expedite Service Unit
Name of Office

Subject:

Special Handling Instructions:

Originator's Name: [redacted] Telephone: [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

Originator's Facsimile Number:

Approved: [redacted]

Brief Description of Communication Faxed:

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
CLARKSBURG, WV 26306

MFBIPC00

ICN ISIS0004000007414717

PMFBIPC00
LEGAL ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY-PANAMA
UNIT 0945
APO,AA 34002

FROM (THU) 8. 9'01 10:55/ST. 10:54/NO. 4863243018 P 2

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CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
CLARKSBURG, WV 26306

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HIS RECORD CONCERNS THE PERSON IN WHOM YOU ARE INTERESTED.

—DESCRIPTORS ON FILE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

AME POSADA CARRILES,LUIS CLEMENTE

EX	RACE	BIRTH DATE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR
'ALE	WHITE	1928/02/15	510	175	HAZEL	BROWN

IRTH CITY	BIRTH PLACE
'NREPORTED	CUBA

'ATTERN CLASS
.S RS RS WU UC LS LS LS LS LS
AU LS AU WU
RS

)THER BIRTH)ATES	SCARS-MARKS-TATTOOS	SOCIAL SECURITY	MISC NUMBERS

.LIAS NAME(S)
'OSADA,LUIS

:ND OF COVER SHEET

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
CLARKSBURG, WV 26306

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NAME	FBI NO.	DATE REQUESTED
POSADA CARRILES,LUIS CLEMENTE	123502E	2001/08/09

SEX	RACE	BIRTH DATE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR	BIRTH PLACE
M	W	1928/02/15	510	175	HAZ	BRO	CUBA

FINGERPRINT CLASS	PATTERN CLASS									
14 TT 09 CI PM	RS	RS	RS	WU	UC	LS	LS	LS	LS	LS
17 TT 09 13 09			AU		LS		AU		WU	
							RS			

1-ARRESTED OR RECEIVED 1961/06/15
AGENCY-USINS MIAMI (FLINS1800)
AGENCY CASE-A12419708
CHARGE 1-VIO OF IMM LAWS

RECORD UPDATED 1998/09/03

ALL ARREST ENTRIES CONTAINED IN THIS FBI RECORD ARE BASED ON FINGERPRINT COMPARISONS AND PERTAIN TO THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

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CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
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PMFBIPC00 ICN ISIS00030000007453605

PMFBIPC00
LEGAL ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY-PANAMA
UNIT 0945
APO,AA 34002

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--DESCRIPTORS ON FILE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

NAME JIMENEZ ESCOBEDO,GASPAR E

SEX	RACE	BIRTH DATE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR
MALE	WHITE	1935/10/06	607	126	BROWN	BLACK

BIRTH CITY	BIRTH PLACE
UNREPORTED	CUBA

PATTERN CLASS
WU WU RS WU RS LS WU LS LS LS
LS WU WU

OTHER BIRTH DATES	SCARS-MARKS-TATTOOS	SOCIAL SECURITY	MISC NUMBERS
NONE	NONE	263-60-8518	NONE

ALIAS NAME(S)
JIMENEZ E,GASPAR EUGENIO
JIMENEZ,CASPAR EUGENIO
JIMENEZ,GASPAR
JIMENEZ,GASPAR EUGENIO
JIMENEZ-ESCOBDO,CASPAR E
JIMENEZ-ESCOBEDO,GASPAR E
JIMENEZ-ESCOBEDO,GASPER E

END OF COVER SHEET

FROM (THU) 8. 9'01 10:56/ST. 10:54/NO. 4863243018 P 6

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
CLARKSBURG, WV 26306

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- FBI IDENTIFICATION RECORD -

WHEN EXPLANATION OF A CHARGE OR DISPOSITION IS NEEDED, COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE AGENCY THAT FURNISHED THE DATA TO THE FBI.

NAME	FBI NO.	DATE REQUESTED
JIMENEZ ESCOBEDO,GASPAR E	904285C	2001/08/08

SEX	RACE	BIRTH DATE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR	BIRTH PLACE
M	W	1935/10/06	607	126	BRO	BLK	CUBA

FINGERPRINT CLASS PATTERN CLASS
PO CI 16 PO 17 WU WU RS WU RS LS WU LS LS LS
17 PO 17 18 17 LS WU WU

1-ARRESTED OR RECEIVED 1958/06/09
AGENCY-USINS MIAMI (FLINSMM00)
AGENCY CASE-A11260264M NAME USED-JIMENEZ-ESCOBDO,CASPAR E
CHARGE 1-DEPORTATION

COURT-
CHARGE-DEPORTATION
SENTENCE-
DEPORTED FROM MIA TO CUBA ON PRIVATE PLANE AT OWN EXPENSE

2-ARRESTED OR RECEIVED 1961/03/15
AGENCY-USINS MIAMI (FLINSMM00)
AGENCY CASE-A11260264
CHARGE 1-VIO OF IMM LAWS

COURT-
CHARGE-VIO OF IMM LAWS
SENTENCE-
STATUS ADJUSTED UNDER 89-732 TO PERMANENT 7-7-67

3-ARRESTED OR RECEIVED 1976/07/28
AGENCY-FED JUD POL NUEVO LAREDO NL (MM95NL03Z)
NAME USED-JIMENEZ-ESCOBEDO,GASPAR E
CHARGE 1-ATT KIDNAPPING OF CUBAN CONSUL

END OF PART 1 - PART 2 TO FOLLOW

(THU) 8. 9'01 10:56/ST. 10:54/NO. 4863243018 P 7 FROM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
CLARKSBURG, WV 26306

?MFBIPC00 ICN ISIS0003000007453605
?ART 2

- FBI IDENTIFICATION RECORD - FBI NO-904285C
RECORD UPDATED 1994/02/15

.LL ARREST ENTRIES CONTAINED IN THIS FBI RECORD ARE BASED ON
'INGERPRINT COMPARISONS AND PERTAIN TO THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

'HE USE OF THIS RECORD IS REGULATED BY LAW. IT IS PROVIDED FOR OFFICIAL
'SE ONLY AND MAY BE USED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE REQUESTED.

FROM (THU) 8. 9'01 10:57/ST. 10:54/NO. 4863243018 P 8

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
CLARKSBURG, WV 26306

?MFBIPC00 ICN ISIS0003000007453605

- FBI IDENTIFICATION RECORD -

NAME	FBI NO.	DATE REQUESTED
JIMENEZ ESCOBEDO,GASPAR E	904285C	2001/08/08

SEX	RACE	BIRTH DATE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR	BIRTH PLACE
1	W	1935/10/06	607	126	BRO	BLK	CUBA

FINGERPRINT CLASS PATTERN CLASS
?O CI 16 PO 17 WU WU RS WU RS LS WU LS LS LS
.7 PO 17 18 17 LS WU WU

.-DATE OF APPLICATION 1957/10/10V (PRT REC)
AGENCY-USINS HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON (USINS0000)
AGENCY CASE-V-139872 NAME USED-JIMENEZ,CASPAR EUGENIO
CIVIL PRINT-01/28/94

:-DATE OF APPLICATION 1967/06/07V (PRT REC)
AGENCY-USINS MIAMI (FLINSMM00)
AGENCY CASE-A11260264 NAME USED-JIMENEZ-ESCOBEDO,GASPER E
CIVIL PRINT-01/28/94

.-DATE OF APPLICATION 1974/02/20V (PRT REC)
AGENCY-USINS MIAMI (FLINSMM00)
AGENCY CASE-A1126264 NAME USED-JIMENEZ,GASPAR EUGENIO
CIVIL PRINT-01/28/94

-DATE OF APPLICATION 1993/10/29R (DATE FP)
AGENCY-SECRETARY ST-LIC DIV TALLAHASSEE (FL920610Z)
AGENCY CASE-W8714570 NAME USED-JIMENEZ,GASPAR EUGENIO
RETURN CIVIL PRINT-02/03/94

****THIS PAGE SHOULD NOT BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE FBI*****
ND OF BUREAU SHEET

FROM (THU) 8. 9'01 10:57/ST. 10:54/NO. 4863243018 P 9

EVX

Washington Passport Agency
1111 19th Street N.W. Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20036-3870

APPLICATION FOR U.S. PASSPORT OR REGISTRATION — THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INSTRUCTIONS: TYPE OR PRINT IN INK IN WHITE AREAS

1. NAME (First) Manuel — MIDDLE NAME C/C 8/23 — (Last) Diaz

2. MAILING ADDRESS
STREET 761 JANY AVE
CITY, STATE, ZIP CODE OPA LOCKA, FL 33054
COUNTRY — IN CARE OF

04417940

☐ 5 Yr. ☐ 10 Yr. Issue Date: — End. # — Exp.

3. SEX: X Male ☐ Female
4. PLACE OF BIRTH: City, State or Province, Country — VEGA BAJA P.R.
5. DATE OF BIRTH: 03 (Mo.) 22 (Day) 34 (Yr.)
6. SEE FEDERAL TAX LAW NOTICE ON REVERSE SIDE — SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 581-14-8249
7. HEIGHT: 5'6" (Feet, Inches)
8. COLOR OF HAIR: BROWN
9. COLOR OF EYES: BROWN
10. (Area Code) HOME PHONE: 305 681 9766
11. (Area Code) BUSINESS PHONE
12. PERMANENT ADDRESS (Street, City, State, ZIP Code): SAME
13. OCCUPATION: Retired

14. FATHER'S NAME: Secundio Diaz — BIRTHPLACE: UVARDO, P.R. — BIRTH DATE: ? — U.S. CITIZEN: X YES ☐ NO
15. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME: Bernarda Ortega — BIRTHPLACE: MOROVIS P.R. — BIRTH DATE: ? — U.S. CITIZEN: X YES ☐ NO

16. TRAVEL PLANS (Not Mandatory)
COUNTRIES: Venezuela, Caracas.
DEPARTURE DATE: 8/24
LENGTH OF STAY: 1 week.

17. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ISSUED A U.S. PASSPORT? ☐ YES ☐ NO X — IF YES, SUBMIT PASSPORT IF AVAILABLE. ☐ Submitted
IF UNABLE TO SUBMIT MOST RECENT PASSPORT, STATE ITS DISPOSITION: COMPLETE NEXT LINE
PLACE IN WHICH ISSUED | PASSPORT NUMBER | ISSUE DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) | DISPOSITION

SUBMIT TWO RECENT IDENTICAL PHOTOS



18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN MARRIED? ☐ YES X NO — DATE OF MOST RECENT MARRIAGE: Mo. Day Year
WIDOWED/DIVORCED? ☐ YES ☐ NO — IF YES, GIVE DATE: Mo. Day Year
SPOUSE'S FULL BIRTH NAME — SPOUSE'S BIRTHPLACE

19. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, NOTIFY (Person Not Traveling With) (Not Mandatory)
FULL NAME: Norma Vazquez — RELATIONSHIP: Friend.
ADDRESS: 761 JANY AVE #REAR. — (Area Code) PHONE NUMBER: 305 681 9766

20. TO BE COMPLETED BY AN APPLICANT WHO BECAME A CITIZEN THROUGH NATURALIZATION
IMMIGRATED TO THE U.S. (Month, Year) — RESIDED CONTINUOUSLY IN THE U.S. From (Mo., Yr.) To (Mo., Yr.) — DATE NATURALIZED (Mo., Day, Yr.) — PLACE

21. DO NOT SIGN APPLICATION UNTIL REQUESTED TO DO SO BY PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH
I have not, since acquiring United States citizenship, performed any of the acts listed under "Acts or Conditions" on the reverse of this application form (unless explanatory statement is attached). I solemnly swear (or affirm) that the statements made on this application are true and the photograph attached is a true likeness of me.
Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me — Month Day Year: AUG 22 1994
☐ Clerk of Court or ☐ PASSPORT Agent ☐ Postal Employee ☐ (Vice) Consul, U.S. — ☐ Notary Public ☐ Other Authorized Official
(Signature of person authorized to accept application)
MEMBER OF STATE
(Sign in presence of person authorized to accept application)

22. APPLICANT'S IDENTIFYING DOCUMENTS: ☐ PASSPORT ☐ DRIVER'S LICENSE ☐ OTHER (Specify)
ISSUE DATE: 3 30 87 (Month, Day, Year) — EXPIRATION DATE: 3 30 97 (Month, Day, Year) — PLACE OF ISSUE: FL ID S06 — No: D200540341960 — ISSUED IN THE NAME OF: Manuel Diaz

23. FOR ISSUING OFFICE USE ONLY (Applicant's evidence of citizenship)
X Birth Cert. SR (CR) City — Filed/Issued: 3/28/34/92
☐ Passport — Bearer's Name: Diaz Ortega
☐ Report of Birth
☐ Naturalization/Citizenship Cert. — No.
☐ Other
Seen & Returned
Attached FL ID S5 and,

APPLICATION APPROVAL
Examiner Name
Office, Date

24. 08722754 689 89 309 CA $63.00
13153 REG 1 $5.00 C
FEE $63 cash — EXEC. — POST

FORM DSP-11 (12-07) (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE) Form Approved OMB No. 1405-0004 (Exp. 8/1/89)

FOLD

8047825 11/1/93

Manuel Diaz Ortega

Embassy of the United States of America

Panama, October 19, 2001

Your Ref: File No. [redacted] b3 b7E

Dear [redacted] b6 b7C

As per your request, attached find a certified copy of the original passport application in the name of Manuel Diaz, whose passport was used by Gaspar Eugenio Jimenez Escobedo to enter Panama.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
Acting Consul General

b6 b7C

[redacted] b3 b7E

SEARCHED____ INDEXED____
SERIALIZED____ FILED____

DEC 28 2001

LEGAL ATTACHE – PANAMA CITY

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 08/02/2002

To: Miami **Attn:** .Det. [redacted]

Investigative Services SSA [redacted] IOU-II
[redacted] Liaison Analyst

From: Panama City
Contact: [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (Pending)

Title: [redacted]

Synopsis: Provide results of lead requesting information regarding [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7D b7E

Reference: [redacted]

Enclosure(s): For Miami, (1) one FD-340 containing information on [redacted] LUIS POSADA CARRILES; (2) one FD-340 containing information on [redacted] LUIS POSADA CARRILES (Telephone Records); and (3) one FD-340 containing information on the search of the [redacted]

Details: Referenced communication requested that Legat Panama City provide the information contained in the enclosed FD-302 about the [redacted] and obtain any information of value from the [redacted] regarding the [redacted] and LUIS POSADA CARRILES. b6 b7C b7D

The information contained in the FD-302 was provided to [redacted] Prosecutor, [redacted] regarding the [redacted] This information was used to conduct a search at the [redacted] with negative results. [redacted] has requested that Miami debrief the source regarding a more [redacted] (See enclosure 3). b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] provided information on the [redacted] LUIS POSADA CARRILES and the other Cuban exiles

SEARCHED [redacted] INDEXED [redacted]
SERIALIZED [redacted] FILED [redacted]
OCT 03 2002
[redacted] b3 b7E

b3
b7E

presently held in Panama for the failed plot to assassinate FIDEL CASTRO. [redacted] provided a synopsis of information contained in their files that show an association between [redacted] POSADA and the other Cuban exiles (See enclosure 1). When POSADA and the other Cuban exiles were arrested, several cellular telephones, Beeper and VHF portable radios were seized. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

Inasmuch as all requested investigation has been completed, Legat Panama City considers this lead closed.

To: Miami From: Panama City
Re: [redacted], 08/02/2002

b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

It is requested that Miami source be debriefed regarding [redacted]

Set Lead 2:

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Read and Clear

♦♦

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

SEARCHED_____INDEXED_____
SERIALIZED_____FILED_____

JAN 10 2002

LEGAL ATTACHE – PANAMA CITY

0 3 EML 3003

LEG-11a (Rev. 6-21-2000)

FAX TRANSMISSION

Office of the Legal Attache
United States Embassy
Avenida Balboa y Calle 38
Panama City, Panama
Telephone #: [redacted] b7E
Fax #: [redacted]

To: [redacted] **Date:** August 8, 2001 b3 b6 b7C b7E

Expedite Services Unit

Fax #: [redacted] **Pages:** , including this cover sheet.

Voice #:

From: Office of the Legal Attache

Subject: Criminal History Checks

Case ID: [redacted]

Comments:

[redacted] Please run criminal history checks on the individuals identified on the attached sheets. Our ORI# is **PMFBIPC00**. Thanks b3 b6 b7C b7E

A/LEGAT

[redacted]

PLEASE FILE IN [redacted] Thanks

[redacted]

(Rev. 10-01-1999)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 01/23/2003

To: International Operations **Attn:** SSA [redacted] IOU-II b6 b7C b7E
Panama City ALAT [redacted]

From: Miami
T-6
Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (Pending) b3 b6 b7C b7D b7E

Title: [redacted]

Synopsis: Provide results of lead requesting that Miami source be debriefed [redacted]

Reference: [redacted]

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Legat Panama City are the following: 1) One copy of a [redacted] b6 b7C b7D 2) One copy of [redacted] dated [redacted] 3) Florida Driver's License information on [redacted] 4) Florida Driver's License information on [redacted] and 5) A copy of a news article published on GRANMA INTERNACIONAL newspaper.

Details: Referenced communication requested that the Miami Division debrief Source regarding [redacted] b7D

The Source in this investigation was closed by the FBI in 1997. However, Detective [redacted] b6 b7C the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, continued to operate the Source and document his information. Detective [redacted] was contacted by writer in an effort to obtain information on the whereabouts and contact information for said Source. Detective [redacted] did not provide the whereabouts or contact information for the Source, but instead debriefed the Source regarding requested information.

[redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

Read were I labbel.

To: International Operations From: Miami
Re: [redacted] 01/23/2003 b3 b7E

On 01/14/2003, writer received a [redacted] dated [redacted]. The report contains the debrief of the Source done by Detective [redacted]. The Source informed Detective [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

VALLADARES Sr. allegedly passed away recently.

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

According to the Source, [redacted]. The Source believes that [redacted]. The Source claimed that [redacted]

On 01/23/2003, Detective [redacted] forwarded several additional documents relating to captioned investigation. These documents include an [redacted] Florida Driver's License information of [redacted] and an internet print-out of a news article printed in the GRANMA INTERNACIONAL newspaper. b6 b7C b7D

During the [redacted] the Source informed that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

According to the Source, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

To: International Operations From: Miami
Re: [redacted] 01/23/2003

b3
b7E

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

The Source added that [redacted]

The aforementioned reports will be enclosed with this communication. It should be noted that the [redacted] It is requested that Legat Panama take all the necessary precautions when disseminating this information to [redacted] so as to protect the Source's true identity.

To: International Operations From: Miami
Re: [redacted], 01/23/2003

b3
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

For information only.

♦♦

GO auto con chofer



• SUSCRIPTION TO THE PRINTED EDITION
52 issues per year

PANAMA

Behind Posada: Drug Trafficking

• Panamanian sources confirm links between José Valladares Acosta, accomplice of terrorist gang leader Luis Posada Carriles and Orestes Cosío, recently deported from the United States for drug trafficking and involvement in three murders • The extremely dangerous terrorist has always maintained links with drug trafficking circles in Miami - the U.S. drugs capital

BY JEAN-GUY ALLARD -Special for Granma International-

ON October 7, José Valladares Acosta, a fugitive from U.S. justice, died from natural causes in Panama. He was waiting to be tried as an accomplice of terrorist gang boss Luis Posada Carriles on a charge of conspiracy to assassinate Fidel Castro. He was a crony of Cuban-American Orestes Cosío, deported to the United States on May 22 for drug trafficking and taking part in three murders.

Sources in Panama revealed to **Granma International** that Cosío, who lived in Chiriqui province under the alias Luis "Mack" Navarro, associated with José "Pepe" Valladares and Pedro Caridad Gordillo Serrano, a retired Miami police officer also linked to drug trafficking, in a mechanics workshop known as the "Big Truck". Chiriqui is a town bordering on Costa Rica, some 450 kilometers west of the Panamanian capital.

After Posada Carriles and his accomplices were arrested on November 17, 2000 at the Coral Suite Hotel in Panama City, when they had completed their preparations to assassinate Fidel Castro, the Panamanian authorities discovered that the detained men had been helped by Valladares Acosta.

They later discovered that the four individuals had stashed C-4 and Semtex explosives at Valladares' farm in Boquete, Chiriqui province, where they had stayed three days before being arrested in the capital.

Born on February 7, 1934 in Pinar del Río (Cuba), Valladares died from coronary complications on October 7 in Boquete, where he had been living for many years. In Panama he was known successively as "Pepe el Largo", "Pepe el Flaco", "Pepe el Cubano" and "El Cojo". He had a U.S. passport: No. 04499538.

b3
b7E

Last May 22, Panama's Immigration Office informed that Orestes Cosío had been deported to the United States after being arrested in Chiriqui in possession of a forged U.S. passport and two weapons. One of the guns had been stolen in Panama. He had lived in Chiriqui since 1998 and was involved in various businesses. The Cuban American had various stamps in his false passport for trips to Central America.

Posada, aged 74; Gaspar Jiménez Escobedo, 67; Guillermo Novo Sampoll, 62; and Pedro Remón, 58, are all being held in El Renacer prison, Panama City awaiting the preliminary hearing of their trial, scheduled to begin on December 5. The four terrorists were arrested shortly after Cuba informed the Panamanian authorities of a conspiracy to assassinate President Fidel Castro in the midst of a student gathering.

The four are represented by lawyer Rogelio Cruz, former attorney of the Republic, sacked for his links with Colombian cartels. Cruz has traveled to Miami on various occasions to meet members of the Miami clique who are paying Posada's defense costs.

VALLADARES, ACCOMPLICE OF ORLANDO BOSCH

According to data disclosed by a source close to Valladares, the businessman's links with the Miami terrorist *camarilla* date back close to 30 years to when he helped Orlando Bosch, a terrorist of Cuban-American origin, with preparations for blowing up a Cubana Airlines plane over Barbados in 1976. The attack caused the death of 73 people. Luis Posada Carriles was later identified as Bosch's partner in the crime and sentenced in Venezuela.

When Bosch was freed, thanks to the intervention of Cuban-American Otto Reich, then the U.S. ambassador to Caracas, and that of the White House, he went to stay in one of Valladares' houses in Miami.

Other sources - linked to the April 1999 trial in Panama that took place after Cuba exposed Luis Posada Carriles' presence in El Salvador, which obliged him to flee the country and hide in Honduras and Costa Rica - affirm that the terrorist boss directed one of his contacts in the United States to contact "Pepe" Valladares and tell him about his situation.

When the frustrated attempt on the Cuban President's life was revealed, Valladares abandoned his home to take refuge in an unknown location.

100 POUNDS OF C-4 FOUND IN COLON

At the end of September 2001, the Panamanian DA's Office obtained information stating that certain individuals in the city of Colón were trying to sell some 100 pounds of C-4 explosive. The DA's Office

associated the information with the missing explosives from the Posada conspiracy and ordered an immediate investigation.

Coincidentally, on October 19, DA Argentina Barrera, at the time responsible for Posada's dossier, plus other members of the DA Office were called to the office of FBI investigator Ramón Quijana at the U.S. embassy. He gave them the same information and proposed a joint "controlled purchase" operation. The FBI man added that he likewise believed that the explosives were part of the batch that Posada and his group had thought to use.

At the end of the same month, Miles Burden - head of the FBI at the U.S. embassy in Panama - sent a report to DA Barrera indicating he had information about weapons and possibly explosives hidden at Valladares' farm in Chiriqui. The DA's Office asked the FBI for technical aid because the farm was so large, and the FBI agreed. However, a few days later Miles' posting came to an end, which seems to have frustrated buying up the cache.

After his arrest, Valladares Acosta told the Panamanian DA that Posada Carriles and his group had been at his house.

The suspect claimed that he had recommended the terrorist gang leader to use a rifle with a telescopic lens to murder the Cuban president instead of explosives, which could kill many innocent people.

The four terrorists proposed dynamiting the University of Panama's Aula Magna where Fidel Castro was to speak after the Ibero-American Summit.

After being found guilty of complicity, Valladares was placed under house arrest to await trial.

"THE MOST DANGEROUS TERRORIST"

Luis Posada Carriles and Miami's Orlando Bosch share the FBI's descriptive title "most dangerous terrorist in the hemisphere".

Without exception, their three accomplices have a comprehensive past in terrorism. Among other crimes, Jiménez murdered Cuban technician Artagnan Díaz in Mérida, Mexico. Remón killed Félix García Rodríguez, a Cuban diplomat at the United Nations in New York. Novo assassinated Chilean leader Orlando Letelier in Washington.

On December 5, Judge Enrique Paniza will determine whether or not there is a case against the four individuals. He must analyze the dossier complied by DA Dimas Guevara who recommended charging Posada and

his group with four lesser crimes but not intent to murder, on the grounds of the absence of an explosive valve in the evidence. Nevertheless, popular organizations are planning to ask the judge to try the accused on other charges, including the attempted assassination of the Cuban head of state.

According to lawyer Julio Berrios, Judge Paniza will be asked to add the charge of attempted collective homicide, beating in mind the catastrophe that an explosion could have caused in the University amphitheater.

The four terrorists' lawyer Rogelio Cruz has tried in vain to get Judge Paniza removed from the trial, by alleging that he had a "special interest" in implementing the charges. The judge denied the claim and the request was rejected by a higher court.

Luis Posada Carriles' links with the drug trafficking world began in the 1980's when he was acting as Félix Rodríguez' right-hand man at the Salvadoran base of Llopang, in a shadowy chapter of the misnamed Iran-Contra scandal. To this day he remains unpunished. The boss of the terrorist gang has always maintained his links with drug trafficking circles in Miami, the U.S. drugs capital.

Cosío's drug trafficking links with his accomplice José Valladares once again confirm the constant trading in narcotics that lies behind the activities of this extremely dangerous terrorist.

Subscription to the Weekly Newsletter PRINT THIS ARTICLE

Editor-in-chief: Frank Aguero Gomez / **Editor:** Gabriel Molina Franchossi
HOSPEDAJE: Teledatos-Cubaweb
EN CUBAWEB: http://www.granma.cu/

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UP

06/04/03 Close Case ICMCME38
15:06:40 Page 1 of 2
Type Closing Status, then press F11 to record Result

Case ID . . . . : [ ] b3 b7E
Status . . . . : PENDING

Title
JIMENEZ, ESCOBEDO, GASPAR EUGENIO
POSADA, CARRILES, LUIS
GASPAR EUGENIO JIMENEZ ESCOBEDO, AKA MANUEL DIAZ; LUIS
POSADA CARRILES, AKA, FRANCO RODRIGUEZ MENA; ATTEMPTED HOMO

[ ] b7E

Command . . > ..... +
F1=Help,F3=Exit,F4=Prompt,F11=NextPg,F12=Cancel

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 06/04/2003

To: Panama City

From: Panama City
Contact: [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

Approved B [redacted]

Drafted By [redacted]

Case ID #: [redacted] (Pending)

Title: LUIS POSADA CARRILES, ET AL
FPC-PANAMA

Synopsis: Close captioned matter.

Details: On 06/04/2003, Legat Panama City contacted the office of [redacted] of LUIS POSADA CARRILES, [redacted] and GASPAR EUGENIO JIMENEZ for an attempt to assassinate President Fidel Castro. According to the [redacted] the four Cuban exiles were charged with possession of explosives, possession of explosives with the intention of committing an act of terrorism, illicit association with the intention of committing a crime against society and using fraudulent documents. [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b7D

Inasmuch as all requested assistance has been provided, it is recommended that this case be closed.

♦♦

[redacted] b3 b7E

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JUN 0[illegible] 2003
LEGAL ATTACHE - PANAMA CITY

EC uploaded, Case closed 6/4/03

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people, organizing bomb attacks on hotels and restaurants in Cuba in 1997 and conspiring to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro in Panama in 2000.

In the 1980s, Posada escaped from a Venezuelan prison during a Venezuelan government appeal of his acquittal by a Venezuelan court in the airliner bombing.

Now, President Hugo Chávez's government wants him extradited to stand trial again in the case.

Some U.S. officials, according to the federal source, said they don't want to reward Chávez, given Chávez's increasingly anti-U.S. stance and cozy ties with Fidel Castro. The U.S. position has gone from hostility to understanding -- marking a milestone in Posada's quest for U.S. protection.

FAILED TALKS

Eduardo Soto, Posada's lead lawyer, said the government contacted his office before the trial offering to settle the case -- but negotiations broke down. Matthew Archambeault, another Posada attorney, said Homeland Security offered to support Posada's bid not to be sent to Cuba in exchange for withdrawal of his asylum application, but the deal fell through because the agency would not make the same offer on Venezuela.

Gina Garrett-Jackson, a Department of Homeland Security assistant chief counsel, told immigration Judge William Abbott discussions involved Homeland Security and the U.S. State and Justice departments.

Russ Knocke, a Homeland Security spokesman in Washington, insisted that the agency's position on Posada hasn't changed.

Before the El Paso trial, Posada said in his asylum application that he would "more likely than not" be tortured in Venezuela were he to be expelled there.

Posada had applied for U.S. asylum and two other forms of protection: withholding of removal and deferral of removal. Deferral is a specific protection under terms of the Convention Against Torture, widely known as CAT by immigration lawyers.

ASYLUM RULES

Under U.S. immigration law, a foreign national is barred from receiving asylum and withholding if he is a terror suspect or is believed to have committed "serious nonpolitical" crimes abroad -- but he is not barred from deferral under CAT.

Judge Abbott initially designated Venezuela as the country of removal -- and dismissed Cuba as a destination, amid fears Posada could be executed there.

But by the time the hearing ended Wednesday, Abbott said that Posada had tentatively convinced him he may be eligible to stay in the United States because he could face torture in Venezuela.

It isn't known when Abbott will make a final ruling, which can be appealed. Even if Abbott rules in Posada's favor, it doesn't mean Posada will be released.

Posada could remain in indefinite detention and could eventually be deported, but perhaps only when Chávez and Castro are no longer in power -- or if the U.S. government finds a third country to take him. Homeland Security could also release Posada under supervised conditions.

Posada's only witness was Joaquin Chaffardet, a longtime friend and Caracas lawyer, who told Abbott Posada not only would be tortured in Venezuela but would be turned over to Cuba.

Jose Pertierra, the Venezuelan government's lawyer in Washington, said Venezuela does not torture prisoners.

Venezuelan Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel recently promised that Posada would not be delivered to Cuba.

Pertierra said Garrett-Jackson should have questioned Chaffardet's credentials as an expert on Venezuela.

SIMILAR EXAMPLE

In a somewhat similar case last year, Garrett-Jackson and a colleague -- Carlos Lopez -- acted much more aggressively in challenging witnesses for two former Venezuelan national guard lieutenants seeking asylum after being accused of bombing two diplomatic missions in Caracas.

Garrett-Jackson and Lopez sought to show that Lts. Jose Antonio Colina and German Rodolfo Varela were fleeing prosecution -- not persecution -- and did not deserve asylum.

When Miami Judge Neale Foster granted Colina and Varela CAT deferral, Homeland Security appealed the decision on the ground that a former general recently detained in connection with the bombing case had not been tortured.

Abbott said he may consider the relevance of Foster's ruling in the Posada case.

Ultimately, Archambeault withdrew Posada's asylum application and conceded his client did not qualify for withholding because of his background as a terror suspect and his criminal record.

Outside court, Archambeault said he also withdrew the application because Posada did not wish to reveal "sensitive" information that could "embarrass" the U.S. government.

"It was never his intention to use his knowledge as a bargaining chip," Archambeault said.

The move didn't affect Abbott's ruling options.

Garrett-Jackson said she planned to prepare a case against Posada's deferral plea. Abbott set Sept. 26 as the date for government rebuttal.

Back to headlines

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chavez Seeks Equality In A Socialist Society

By Ian James, Caracas
6 September 2005
The Irish Examiner

THE shopping mall is a blur of Guess jeans, Louis Vuitton purses and Motorola mobile phones, a temple of consumerism in a country that is supposed to be on a path toward socialism.
So popular is the Sambil Mall that 'Sambil society' has become a derogatory term in the Venezuelan

Precedence: IMMEDIATE Date: 05/19/2005

To: [redacted]
Attn: UC [redacted] CD-2B; b6
Attn: SSA [redacted] b7C
IA [redacted] DTOU; b7E
Attn: SSA [redacted]
LA [redacted] IOU I;
A/AD [redacted] Interpol;
Caracas Attn: Legat [redacted]
Panama City Attn: [redacted];
Miami Attn: SSA [redacted]
SA [redacted] T-6;

From: Rome
Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]:mrf

Case ID #: [redacted] (Pending)

Title: [redacted] b3
b6
GASPAR EUGENIO JIMENEZ, aka b7C
Gaspar Eugenio Jimenez-Escobedo, b7E
[redacted]
LUIS POSADA-CARRILES, aka
Luis Clemente Posada;
[redacted]

Synopsis: To inform receiving offices as to response by the [redacted] b7D

Reference: [redacted]

Details: In referenced serial, Legat Rome requested that the [redacted] search their data bases and inform whether or not there existed an investigation on Posada Carriles for his alleged involvement in the bombing which resulted in the death of an Italian tourist.

The [redacted] was further requested to forward the request to other Italian agencies to determine if any of them had an open investigation on Posada Carriles.

In a letter [redacted] (received at Legat Rome at 1000 hours on 19 May 2005), the [redacted] responded as follows: (Note: Translation of cited document completed at Legat Rome):

OA - Pls open CR "Info" file for Captioned Case.

Case ID : [redacted] Serial : [redacted] b3
b7E

A+C 5/23/05 mkr

Abdfss

OA. [redacted]

With reference to the letter nr. [redacted] b3 b7D b7E

The stated judicial event and the cited individual have only been marginally of note to the [redacted]. Evidence has not emerged to initiate a full investigation concerning the death of FABIO DI CELMO, born in Genoa, Italy on 1 June 1965. Victim died as a result of injuries received during the explosion at the Copacabana Hotel in Havana, Cuba on 14 September 1997.

However, [redacted] Genoa, Italy (where victim resided), are [redacted] Posada Carriles. b7D

We are requesting all information reference the involvement of the cited Posada Carriles in the events which have caused the death of the already mentioned FABIO DI CELMO.

Subsequent to the receipt of the above cited letter, Legat Rome telephoned [redacted] Legat thanked [redacted] for the prompt response to its request. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] Genoa requesting all information reference their investigation into the events which led to the death of FABIO DI CELMO. [redacted]

Legat Rome will keep receiving offices apprized of any further developments.

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

For Information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

ROME

AT GENOA, ITALY

Will continue to insist that the Italian authorities provide information reference their investigations into the death of FABIO DI CELMO.

[redacted] b7E

CR 149-D-1C + 1D

Pozodan Caulk pl

[redacted]

b3
b7E

800

[redacted] (CR) (FBI)

b6
b7C

From: [redacted] (OIO) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 7:53 AM
To: [redacted] (CR) (FBI); [redacted] (OIO) (FBI); [redacted] (OIO) (FBI)
Subject: Washington Post article on Carriles case

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

In 30-Year-Old Terror Case, A Test For The U.S.

Decision Due On Cuban Exile Suspected In Airliner Blast

The Washington Post

By Manuel Roig-Franzia

October 5, 2006

HAVANA, CUBA -- A quarter-century before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a bomb ripped a gash in a civilian jetliner in the skies off Barbados.

The Cubana Airlines plane plummeted into the Caribbean Sea just before noon on Oct. 6, 1976. All 73 people on board died, including teenage members of Cuba's national fencing team who were returning to Havana after winning gold and silver medals at a tournament in Venezuela. The attack marked a new era of fear. It was the first act of midair airline terrorism in the Western Hemisphere. The 30th anniversary of the bombing is Friday, and it coincides with a critical juncture in the case of Luis Posada Carriles, a main suspect in the bombing who has been held on immigration charges in the United States for the past 16 months. Posada Carriles's legal odyssey has turned into a diplomatic quandary for the Bush administration and a test of the president's post-Sept. 11 credo that nations that harbor terrorists are guilty of terrorism.

While the United States does not want to free a terrorism suspect, it is also reluctant to send him to Cuba or Venezuela, countries that not only remain hostile to the Bush administration but that, according to court testimony of a Posada Carriles ally, also might torture him. Attorneys for the Justice Department must respond by Thursday to a Texas magistrate's recommendation that Posada Carriles be freed by a federal judge because he has not been officially designated a terrorist in the United States and cannot be held indefinitely on immigration charges. "This is the moment of truth for the Bush administration," said Peter Kornbluh, a senior Cuba analyst with the National Security Archive, a nonprofit research library at George Washington University.

The prospect of freeing Posada Carriles, who is also a suspect in a series of 1997 hotel

bombings in Havana that left one Italian tourist dead, has outraged Cuban leaders. Havana is papered with Cuban government posters and billboards invoking President Bush's position on harboring terrorists. "It's as if you were to say to the American people that country X has found Osama bin Laden, who arrived without a passport or a visa, and that he is being held as an illegal immigrant but will not be sent back to the U.S.," Ricardo Alarcón, president of Cuba's general assembly, said in an interview. Posada Carriles, 78, sneaked into the United States in March 2005. He did little to hide his presence in Miami's exile community and joked about being recognized at doctors' appointments.

He wasn't arrested until he gave a newspaper interview and appeared at a news conference in May 2005, moves that seemed to taunt law enforcement officials. At the time of his arrest, Posada Carriles, who was born in Cienfuegos, Cuba, had spent more than four decades engaged in fruitless schemes to kill Cuban leader Fidel Castro and topple his government. The immigration judge who oversaw Posada Carriles's case said his history "reads like one of Robert Ludlum's espionage thrillers, with all the plot twists and turns Ludlum is famous for." Posada Carriles was trained by the CIA, along with other Cuban exiles, for the botched Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

He eventually made his way to Venezuela, where he became head of the secret police surveillance division. Venezuelan officials later accused him of masterminding the Cubana bombing, which claimed the lives of 57 Cubans, as well as passengers from Guyana and North Korea. But he escaped from a Venezuelan prison in 1985 while prosecutors were appealing his acquittal in a military trial. Since then, he has survived a 1990 assassination attempt, which scarred half his face, and has managed to wriggle out of legal trouble while on the run in Central America. He was arrested in 2000 in Panama for allegedly plotting to set off 30 pounds of explosives during a speech by Castro at the University of Panama, but the charges were dropped.

Posada Carriles's attorney has said that his client, who has a heart condition, no longer plans violence against the Castro government. "The Cuban government is in a very deteriorated condition, inexorably reaching its end, and I sincerely believe that nothing would help to go back to the past with sabotage campaigns," Posada Carriles said in a statement released by his attorney. U.S. officials see the aging Castro opponent as a more sinister figure. A field officer at the Department of Homeland Security who follows Posada Carriles's case described him as a "present danger to the community" whose "propensity to engage in terrorist activities poses a national security risk to the United States."

All of which makes the actions of the U.S. government in the case puzzling to critics, who say Posada Carriles should be prosecuted or at least confined to prison. Even some Cuba hard-liners in the United States confide privately that the case has turned into an embarrassment for the United States. "They're just dancing around," Wayne Smith, a former head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and vocal critic of the Bush administration's Cuba policies, said of prosecutors. "They have all kinds of evidence

against him." It's clear that the U.S. government would prefer to make Posada Carriles someone else's problem. According to court documents, the Department of Homeland Security failed to persuade seven countries to take him -- Canada, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica.

The magistrate in Posada Carriles's case said that the Justice Department could have legally held him for a longer period if it had officially certified him as a terrorist, but that prosecutors did not do so. "The problem is that the American government created him, it taught him, and now it's hard for the government to punish him," Camilo Rojo Alvarez, son of a crew member who died in the 1976 attack, said in an interview. Much of the evidence against Posada Carriles has been drawn from the U.S. government's own files, including declassified FBI and CIA documents. One declassified CIA intelligence report, citing information from informants, said Posada Carriles attended a $1,000-a-person fundraising and planning dinner for anti-Castro activities in September 1976 along with Orlando Bosch, another prime suspect in the Cubana bombing.

Not long afterward, the report stated, Posada Carriles said, "We are going to hit a Cuban airplane. Orlando has the details." Bosch was once in a position similar to that of Posada Carriles, and the outcome of his case unnerves Cubans now focused on Posada Carriles. In 1990, the administration of George H.W. Bush released Bosch from prison after he, like Posada Carriles, was caught entering the country illegally. Cuba had been the only country willing to take him, and the U.S. refused to send him to the island. Bosch, an 80-year-old retired physician who now lives in a Miami suburb, has stopped just short of claiming that his and Posada Carriles's group was responsible for the Cubana bombing.

Earlier this year, he told the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia that the Cubana flight was a "legitimate target." And in an Atlantic Monthly interview with "Cuba Confidential" author Ann Louise Bardach that is to be published this week, Bosch said: "We were at war with Castro, and in war, everything is valid." Declassified documents state that the two men who placed the bomb on the Cubana flight worked for Posada Carriles. After getting off the plane in Barbados, one of the men called his girlfriend, who was also a Posada Carriles employee, and delivered a coded message to report the attack was successful. The message: "The bus was fully loaded with dogs."

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Bombing of Cuban Jetliner 30 Years Later

New Documents on Luis Posada Posted as Texas Court Weighs Release from Custody

Colgate Toothpaste Disguised Plastic Explosives in 1976 Terrorist Attack


Confessions, Kissinger Reports, and Overview of Posada Career Posted

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 202

Edited by Peter Kornbluh and Yvette White

For more information contact Peter Kornbluh - 202/994-7116 - peter.kornbluh@gmail.com

Posted - October 5, 2006



FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. E. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. N. K. McElrgue
1 - Mr. J. P. Graham

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In connection with the loss of Cubana Airlines Flight Number 455 in the Caribbean Sea on October 6, 1976, a confidential source of our Miami Office who has provided reliable information in the past, reported on November 1, 1976, the following significant information which is summarized below:

On October 22 and 24, 1976, our confidential source ascertained from Ricardo Morales Navarrete, an official of the Venezuelan Intelligence Service (DISIP), that the bombing of the Cubana Airlines DC-8 was planned, in part, in Caracas, Venezuela, at two meetings attended by Morales Navarrete, Luis Posada Carriles and Frank Castro. On one occasion, Gustavo Castillo was present. One of the meetings took place

This November 5, 1976, report from FBI director Clarence Kelly to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger suggested that Posada had attended meetings in Caracas where the plane bombing was planned.

Washington D.C., October 5, 2006 - On the 30th anniversary of the first and only mid-air bombing of a civilian airliner in the Western Hemisphere, the National Security Archive today posted on the Web new investigative records that further implicate Luis Posada Carriles in that crime of international terrorism. Among the documents posted is an ***annotated list*** of four volumes of still-secret records on Posada's career with the CIA, his acts of

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Related postings

June 9, 2005
The Posada File, Part II
Posada Boasted of Plans

b3
b7E

10/11/2006

to "Hit" Cuban Plane

May 10, 2005
Luis Posada Carriles: The Declassified Record
CIA and FBI Documents Detail Career in International Terrorism; Connection to U.S.

In the news

"Castro Foe Puts U.S. in an Awkward Spot"
By Marc Lacey
The New York Times
October 8, 2006

"U.S. to extend Posada detention"
By Frances Robles
The Miami Herald
October 7, 2006

"Documentos incriminan a Posada Carriles"
By Rui Ferreira
El Nuevo Herald
October 7, 2006

"Cuba: 30 años después de ataque a avión piden justicia"
By Andrea Rodriguez
El Nuevo Herald
October 7, 2006

"Test on Terrorism"
By Peter Kornbluh
The Nation
October 2, 2006

"Twilight of the Assassins"
By Ann Louise Bardach
The Atlantic Monthly
November 2006

"In 30-Year-Old Terror

violence, and his suspected involvement in the bombing of Cubana flight 455 on October 6, 1976, which took the lives of all 73 people on board, many of them teenagers.

The National Security Archive, which has sought the declassification of the Posada files through the Freedom of Information Act, today called on the U.S. government to release all intelligence files on Posada. "Now is the time for the government to come clean on Posada's covert past and his involvement in international terrorism," said Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive's Cuba Documentation Project. "His victims, the public, and the courts have a right to know."

Posada has been in detention in El Paso, Texas, for illegal entry into the United States, but a magistrate has recommended that he be released this week because the Bush administration has not certified that he is a terrorist.

Among the documents posted today are **four sworn affidavits** by police officials in Trinidad and Tobago, who were the first to interrogate the two Venezuelans--Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo--who were arrested for placing the bomb on flight 455. (Their statements were turned over as evidence to a special investigative commission in Barbados after the crime.) Information derived from the interrogations suggested that the first call the bombers placed after the attack was to the office of Luis Posada's security company ICI, which employed Ricardo. Ricardo claimed to have been a CIA agent (but later retracted that claim). He said that he had been paid $16,000 to sabotage the plane and that Lugo was paid $8,000.

The interrogations revealed that a tube of Colgate toothpaste had been used to disguise plastic explosives that were set off

Case, a Test for the U.S."
By Manuel Roig-Franzia
The Washington Post
October 5, 2006

"Case of Cuban Exile Could Test the U.S. Definition of Terrorist"
by Tim Weiner
The New York Times
May 9, 2005

"Papers connect exile to bomb plot"
by Oscar Corral
Miami Herald
May 10, 2005

"Documentos vinculan a Posada con ataque"
por Oscar Corral
Miami Herald via
elnuevoherald.com
May 10, 2005

with a "pencil-type" detonator on a timer after Ricardo and Lugo got off the plane during a stopover in Barbados. Ricardo "in his own handwriting recorded the steps to be taken before a bomb was placed in an aircraft and how a plastic bomb is detonated," deputy commissioner of police Dennis Elliott Ramdwar testified in **his affidavit**.

The Archive also released three declassified FBI intelligence reports that were sent to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger after the bombing. The updates, classified "secret" and signed by director Clarence Kelly, focused on the relations between the FBI legal attaché in Caracas, Joseph Leo, Posada, and one of the Venezuelans who placed the bomb on the plane, to whom Leo had provided a visa. **One report from Kelly**, based on the word of an informant in Venezuela, suggested that Posada had attended meetings in Caracas where the plane bombing was planned. The document also quoted an informant as stating that after the plane went into the ocean one of the bombers placed a call to Orlando Bosch, the leading conspirator in the plot, and stated: "a bus with 73 dogs went off a cliff and all got killed."

Another State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research **report to Kissinger**, posted again today, noted that the CIA had a source in Venezuela who had overheard Posada saying "we are going to hit a Cuban airplane" and "Orlando has the details" only days before the plane was blown up off the coast of Barbados.

Both Bosch and Posada were arrested and imprisoned in Venezuela after the attack. Posada escaped from prison in September 1985; Bosch was released in 1987 and returned to the United States illegally. Like Posada, he was detained by immigration

Case, a Test for the U.S."

with a "pencil-type" detonator on a timer after Ricardo and Lugo got off the plane

authorities; over the objections of the Justice Department, which determined he was a threat to public security, the first President Bush's White House issued him an administrative pardon in 1990.

Still-secret intelligence documents cited in the file review released today suggest that the CIA assigned several cryptonyms to Posada when he was working for them, first as an operative and trainer in demolitions and later as an informant based in the Venezuelan secret police service DISIP. In 1965 he was assigned the codename "AMCLEVE-15." In 1972 he "was given a new crypt CIFENCE-4," according to a still-unreleased CIA document, and later referred to as "WKSCARLET-3."

Documents

Note: The following documents are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

House Select Committee on Assassinations, LUIS POSADA CARRILES, ca. 1978

In 1978, investigators for a special committee investigation into the death of President John F. Kennedy conducted a comprehensive review of CIA, FBI, DEA and State Department intelligence files relating to the life, operations and violent activities of Luis Posada Carriles. The committee examined four volumes containing dozens of secret memos, cables and reports, dating from 1963 to 1977, relating to Posada's employment by the CIA, his efforts to overthrow the Castro government, his transfer to Venezuela, and his involvement in the bombing of Cubana flight 455. Investigators for the committee were able to take notes on the documents and compile this list, which was declassified by the CIA as part of the Kennedy Assassination Records Review

Board work in the late 1990s. The annotated list of documents represents a rare but comprehensive overview of Posada's relations with U.S. intelligence agencies and his career in violence. The National Security Archive is seeking the full declassification of documents through the Freedom of Information Act.

State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Memorandum, "Castro's Allegations," October 18, 1976

The first report to Secretary of State Kissinger from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research on the bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight 455 details Cuba's allegation that the CIA was involved in the bombing and provides an outline of the suspects' relationship to the U.S. The report notes that a CIA source had overheard Posada prior to the bombing in late September 1976 stating that, "We are going to hit a Cuban airliner." This information was apparently not passed to the CIA until after the plane went down. (This document was originally posted on May 18, 2005.)

FBI, Letter to Kissinger, [Regarding Special Agent Leo], October 20, 1976

This report to Secretary of State Kissinger from Clarence M. Kelly, director of the FBI, explains the association between Joseph S. Leo, Special Agent and Legal Attaché in Caracas, to the suspects of the Cubana Airlines Flight 455 bombing. Investigators found Leo's name among the possessions of Hernan Ricardo Lozano, one of the suspects implicated in the bombing. The report notes that there were at least two contacts between Lozano and Leo in the weeks leading up to the bombing.

FBI, Letter to Kissinger, [Regarding

Contact with Bombing Suspects], October 29, 1976

The second report to Secretary of State Kissinger from Clarence M. Kelly, director of the FBI, provides additional information regarding the relationship between Special Agent Leo and the Cubana Airlines bombing suspects. The report details Leo's contacts with Lozano and Posada going back to the summer of 1975, and notes that Leo suspected Posada and Hernan Ricardo Lozano of acts of terrorism, but still granted Ricardo's request for a visa to the United States.

FBI, Letter to Kissinger, [Regarding Ricardo Morales Navarette], November 5, 1976

A third report to Secretary of State Kissinger from Clarence M. Kelly, director of the FBI, relays information from a confidential FBI source that the bombing of the Cubana Airlines flight was planned in Caracas, Venezuela by Luis Posada Carriles, Frank Castro, and Ricardo Morales Navarrete. The source states that the group had made previous unsuccessful attempts to bomb Cuban aircraft in Jamaica and Panama. Shortly after the plane crashed, bombing suspect Hernan Ricardo Lozano telephoned Bosch stating, "a bus with 73 dogs went off a cliff and all got killed." The source also states that anti-Castro Cuban exiles working with the Chilean National Directorate for Intelligence (DINA) carried out the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC on September 21, 1976.

Statements to Police in Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, October 27, 1976, [Randolph Burroughs deposition regarding Hernan Ricardo Lozano

and Freddy Lugo]

Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, Randolph Burroughs' report notes that Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo checked into the Holiday Inn Hotel near the airport in Port-of-Spain under the names Jose Garcia and Freddy Perez on the day of the crash. Burroughs' report also states that Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo originally said that they knew nothing about the Cubana airlines plane crash when he approached them for questioning at their hotel on the morning of October 7, 1976.

Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, October 27, 1976, [Oscar King deposition regarding Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo]

Corporal Oscar King of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service attended the interviews with Freddy Lugo and Hernan Ricardo Lozano. His statement records Lozano saying that Freddy Lugo boarded the plane with two cameras and that on his arrival in Barbados he only had one camera. Lozano further states that he is sure that the bomb was inside of the other camera.

Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, October 26, 1976, [Gordon Waterman deposition regarding Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo]

Trinidad and Tobago Senior Superintendent of Police Gordon Waterman's written deposition attests to statements made by Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo while the two were detained by the Criminal Investigation Department in Port-of-Spain. According to Waterman's report, Lozano states that he and Lugo are paid members

of the CIA. (He later retracted that statement.) Prior to admitting that he and Lugo bombed the plane, Lozano tells Deputy Commissioner Ramdwar, "If you use your police brain, it would be clear to you who bombed the plane."

Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, October 26, 1976, [Dennis Elliott Ramdwar deposition regarding Hernan Ricardo Lozano and Freddy Lugo]

Trinidad and Tobago Deputy Commissioner of Police Dennis Ramdwar led the inquiries regarding the crash of Cubana Airline Flight 455. In his written statement he notes that Freddy Lugo initially denied knowledge of the crash. Eight days later, Lugo tells Ramdwar that he is convinced that Lozano placed the bomb on the aircraft. He states that Ricardo told him twice that he was going to blow up a Cubana aircraft as the two were headed to the airport prior to the bombing. In a separate interview, Lozano gives Ramdwar details of how a "certain chemical is filled in a tube of Colgate toothpaste after the toothpaste is extracted" to construct the bomb.

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It was the first act of airline terrorism in the Americas: thirty years ago, seventy-three people died in the bombing of a Cuban passenger plane. Now, one alleged mastermind lives freely in Miami, while another awaits trial on other charges in Texas. With Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez insisting the CIA was behind the bombing, why won't the Bush administration at last resolve enduring suspicions? A tale of thwarted dreams, frustrated justice, and murder in the sky

Twilight *of the* Assassins

BY ANN LOUISE BARDACH

On October 6, 1976, shortly after 11 a.m., two young Venezuelan men boarded a Cuban airliner in Port of Spain, the sleepy capital of Trinidad and Tobago. Though only twenty years old, Hernán Ricardo had been working on and off for five years for a Cuban exile based in Caracas named Luis Posada Carriles, doing all manner of odd jobs, including photography and surveillance. He had recently recruited his friend Freddy Lugo, twenty-seven, to assist him.

Ricardo was traveling on a Venezuelan passport in the name of José Vásquez García. Two other passports—a U.S. passport with a bogus name and his genuine Venezuelan passport—were in his shoulder bag. Lugo walked onto the plane carrying two cameras, one of which was stuffed with C-4 plastic explosive.

Twenty-four members of Cuba's national fencing team, many of them teenagers, also boarded Cubana Airlines Flight 455 in Port of Spain, wearing the gold and silver medals they had just won at a tournament in Venezuela. The plane was to stop briefly in Barbados and Jamaica before taking them home to Havana.

Ann Louise Bardach is the author of Cuba Confidential: Love and Vengeance in Miami and Havana *and the editor of* Cuba: A Traveler's Literary Companion. *View the full text of Luis Posada's notes to the author at www.theatlantic.com.*

Some twenty minutes after takeoff, Ricardo pushed the rigged camera under his seat and walked to the rear restroom, where he hid an explosives-packed toothpaste tube. He was nervous, sweating heavily, and somehow jammed the door, trapping himself inside. A stewardess tried to pry the door open. Unsuccessful, she recruited the plane's copilot, who kicked it loose, according to a passenger who disembarked with the two young men in Barbados.

Nine minutes after leaving Barbados, the pilot radioed distress. "We have an explosion on board," he told the control tower. "We're descending fast. We have a fire on board." He asked permission to return to the airport. Then came a second, deafening blast. "Hit the water, Felo! Hit the water!" the copilot cried, as the plane started plunging. "*We have a total emergency!*" the pilot shouted, and then the signal went dead. Sunbathers at Barbados's Paradise Hotel watched in horror as the DC-8 dived into the sea.

All seventy-three people on board were killed: fifty-seven Cubans, six exchange students and a young family from Guyana, and five North Koreans.

REUTERS/CLAUDIA DAUT

Ricardo hailed a taxi at the airport in Barbados, and he and Lugo took a meandering trip through Bridgetown, at one point asking the driver to pull over so they could watch a plane pass overhead. Around 1:15 p.m., they checked into the Bridgetown Holiday Inn, room 103, under false names. Ricardo immediately placed a call through the front desk and left a message with Luis Posada's secretary in Caracas. He then called his girlfriend, who worked at Posada's detective agency, and asked her to relay a message to her boss. "We're in a desperate situation and need help," he said. Then he added, using a predetermined code, "The bus was fully loaded with dogs." His next call was to a "Señor Paniagua," the nom de guerre of Orlando Bosch, the legendary anti-Castro militant, then living in Caracas. He didn't get through.

Ricardo was convinced a Cuban agent had seen him in the lobby; after a heated discussion, he and Lugo changed hotels. They took a walk by the sea to calm their nerves, but as word of the bombing buzzed among the locals, a panic-stricken Ricardo tossed a small package, which may have contained the detonator, into the sea and declared that they had to leave Barbados immediately.

On the short hop back to Trinidad, Ricardo alternated between euphoria and tears as he downed shots of whiskey. "*Seventy-three! More than the Jackal!*" he boasted, comparing himself to Carlos the Jackal, the Venezuelan terrorist then at the height of his fame. "Now I'm the one who has the record, because I'm the one who blew up that thing." Later he broke down, saying: "Damn it, Lugo, I'm desperate and feel like crying. I've never killed anyone before."

Back in Trinidad, they took a taxi to a Holiday Inn and checked in under assumed names. Ricardo continued to call Caracas and eventually reached Bosch. The taxi driver found the behavior of his high-strung passengers suspicious. So did the hotel's reception clerk. Both notified the police, who swooped in and arrested the two Venezuelans as suspects in the Cubana bombing.

Dennis Ramdwar, Trinidad's deputy police commissioner, quickly sized up the gravity of the situation and its political implications. Still, he told me recently, speaking with a faint Caribbean lilt, "I followed our normal procedures." Ramdwar zeroed in first on Ricardo, who was more talkative. The next day, he turned to Lugo. Both men denied any involvement in the crash.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, a statement was released in Miami by CORU, an association of anti-Castro paramilitary groups, taking responsibility for the bombing. A follow-up statement claimed that the craft was a "military plane camouflaged as a civilian DC-8 aircraft," and dismissed the passengers as "57 Cuban Communists [and] five North Korean Communists."

Intense wire traffic shot back and forth between Washington and the American embassy in Caracas. The day after the bombing, the CIA made what its records termed "unsuccessful attempts" to reach Luis Posada, who had worked for the agency and remained an active informer. A memo stamped SECRET clearly indicates immediate concerns. "Posada suspected of working with Orlando Bosch and others in plot," it reads. A flurry of internal memos followed, as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger demanded a clear account of America's relationship with these men and others suspected of involvement in the plot.

Four days after the attack, Ramdwar visited Ricardo in his cell and showed him plane tickets, a notebook, and a diary, found in his attaché. Ramdwar asked about several names and numbers in the notebook. One notation read, "Orlando Telephone No. 713916."


Ricardo later told Ramdwar that "Orlando" was Orlando Bosch, who headed an organization called "El CORU," which he also called "El Condor." He claimed that he himself was a member of the CIA (a charge he later recanted) and said he had been recruited "between 1970 and 1971" and trained in counterintelligence in Panama and Venezuela. Seeking to impress the police commissioner, he pointed out that his boss, Luis Posada, had been a powerful person in Venezuelan intelligence. Ricardo said he himself had been paid $25,000 for his services.

On October 13, Posada and Bosch were arrested in Caracas. A search of Posada's detective agency turned up surveillance equipment, weapons, and a schedule of Cubana flights. A week later, Ricardo signed a confession. Then he returned to his cell and slit his left wrist. The wound was not deep, and he recovered quickly.

Nine days after the bombing, a million Cubans massed in Havana's Plaza de la Revolución. Fidel Castro was brimming with fury. "We can say that the pain is not divided among us," he thundered. "It is multiplied." He accused the CIA of complicity. "At the beginning, we had doubts as to whether the CIA had directly organized the sabotage or had carefully elaborated it through its cover organizations made up of Cuban counterrevolutionaries," he told the crowd. "We are now decidedly inclined toward the first. The CIA participated directly in the destruction of the Cubana Airlines plane in Barbados."

Thirty years later, after six months of investigation, reviewing recently declassified documents and speaking to sources in Caracas, Washington, Miami, and Trinidad, I have found no evidence of direct U.S. involvement in the Cubana bombing. And yet to this day, the United States refuses to declassify hundreds of pages of documents pertaining to the attack. This refusal fuels conspiracy theories and leaves unanswered questions about an act that has come to stand as an iconic symbol of America's insidious meddling in Latin America. Why was no effort made, despite warnings by CIA and FBI informers, to alert Cuba to the plot to take down a Cuban plane? What *was* America's relation to the plotters? And why did the Reagan and Bush administrations hire Posada and grant Bosch U.S. residency, when the CIA believed they'd had a hand in blowing up the plane?

Every year since 1976, Castro has marked the October 6 anniversary of the Cubana bombing with a fiery speech. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the tragedy, four weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Castro noted that Cuba had been



Outside the U.S. mission in Havana in February, protesters memorialize those who died in the Cubana bombing and the Bay of Pigs.

EPA/CORBIS

a victim of airline terrorism long before the United States. "On a day like today, we have the right to ask, What will be done about Posada Carriles and Orlando Bosch," he railed, "the perpetrators of that monstrous, terrorist act?" Castro is fading from the scene, but he has passed the torch to his disciple, Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez, who has vowed to bring Posada to justice, even if it means taking on the United States.

UNREPENTANT WARRIORS

Standing at the front door of his home this past April, Orlando Bosch offered me his hand and smiled weakly. On August 18, Bosch would turn eighty, following in the footsteps of his former college classmate. "Fidel is only five days older than me," he said glumly, holding up the fingers of his right hand. Bosch's body is failing him. His lower lip appears bruised and droopy, the consequence of a series of strokes in the last year.

Bosch lives in a tract house in a lower-middle-class suburb on the western outskirts of Miami. His paintings line nearly every wall, most simple pastorals of Las Villas, the verdant province in Cuba where he was born. Many were done behind bars. "Nineteen years in prison, all told," he says, speaking slowly, "here and there," meaning Caracas, Atlanta, and Miami, for the most part.

Once upon a time, Bosch says, he spoke pretty good English, but those days are gone. He is foggy about some details of his life. In 1953, he did a medical internship in Toledo, Ohio, and the following year he completed his residency "in the hospital where Martin Luther King died, but I can't remember the name." That was a long time ago—before he gave up pediatrics for "terrorism," as the FBI has described his forty-five years as a paramilitary commando.

Bosch has another view of his career. "*Soy luchador y patriota*," he says. "I am a fighter and a patriot." Asked about the young fencers who died on the Cubana plane, he says, impatiently, "We were at war with Castro, and in war, everything is valid." Soon after our first meeting, Bosch was asked about the bombing on a Miami television program. "The war we wage against the tyrant, you have to down planes, you have to sink ships. You have to be prepared to attack anything that is within reach," he told the host. "Who was on board that plane? Members of the Communist Party, *chico*! Our enemies."

At our next meeting, I asked Bosch if he was responsible for the Cubana bombing. "I have to tell you no," he said. "If I tell you I did it, I'm incriminating myself. If I tell you I didn't ... you won't believe me."

Two thousand miles away, Bosch's former comrade in arms, Luis Posada Carriles, paces in a small cell at an immigration facility in El Paso, Texas, waiting for the Justice Department to decide whether to release, deport, or prosecute him. Posada was arrested and charged with illegal entry in May 2005. He had slipped into the United States six weeks earlier and was visiting supporters and family in Miami. He had even filed an application for political asylum, but then he held a press conference, embarrassing authorities sufficiently to provoke his arrest. Last year, the Justice Department issued an "order of removal," but it has yet to find an acceptable country willing to take him.

Posada and Bosch, co-conspirators for almost fifty years, are a study in opposites: where Bosch has goaded law-enforcement agents with his raw fervor and guileless boasts, Posada is more subtle, a man of multiple agendas and multiple employers. At seventy-eight, he has speckled white hair, but he is sturdier than Bosch, notwithstanding an assassination attempt in 1990 that shattered his jaw and nearly severed his tongue, leaving him with a crushed, gravelly voice. (Posada insists his assailants were Cuban agents, though he acknowledges he has many enemies.)

I first met Posada in June 1998, when I was writing an investigative series on exile militants for *The New York Times*. He left a message on my answering machine, suggesting we

meet, I flew on his instruction to Aruba, where he picked me up at the airport wearing Bermuda shorts and sandals. He carried my bags outside to a waiting van, and off we went to his gated safe house, the home of a supporter, hidden from view by a high stucco wall. Posada explained that he had granted the unprecedented interview because he needed publicity for a bombing campaign he had launched in 1997 against Cuba's tourist industry, which killed one Italian tourist. (The attacks, he told me, were designed to damage property, not people.) Otherwise, investors and tourists would continue flocking to Cuba, handing Castro an economic lifeline. "It's a war," Posada said. "A bad war."

On my last day in Aruba, Posada handed me three pages of notes. "Ideology," he had written at the top in Spanish:

> The absence of freedom of expression, of freedom of movement for a hungry people oppressed and terrorized by communist repression ... This gives all free Cubans a right to take up arms against the tyrant, using violence or whatever means at our disposal to derail this terrible system and bring freedom to our country.

At the bottom he had written, in English: "He does not admit the bombs in the hotels but he does not deny either."

In the end, the attention Posada garnered from the *Times* series was more than he had bargained for. His boasts of masterminding the bombings compromised his supporters in South Florida and New Jersey, some of whom he named as providing him with money. If the attorney general decides to try Posada for acts of terrorism, Exhibit A will be Posada's own admissions. Two grand juries, one in El Paso and another in Union City, New Jersey, empaneled intermittently to investigate Posada's activities, have subpoenaed several exile militants and detained one who refused to testify. What's clear from the meandering investigation, however, is that the Bush Justice Department has been reluctant so far to prosecute this case.

OPERATIONS IN MIAMI

In the 1940s Posada and Bosch were schoolmates of Castro's at the University of Havana. "I knew him very well," Bosch recalled, sitting in a rocking chair, next to a photograph from his university years. "We lived across the street from each other. He was intelligent, it's true. He studied law, and I studied medicine. I was the president of the medical school, and Fidel was a delegate for the law school. He could never win an election. I was also secretary-general of FEU [the student union], and he wanted to be president of that as well, but he could never win."

Bosch strongly opposed the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, and after university he commanded rebel forces in the province of Las Villas. When Castro declared victory in early 1959, he rewarded Bosch with the governorship of the province. But it wasn't long before Bosch accused Castro of betraying the revolution, abandoned his post, and led a deadly and effective guerrilla insurgency against Castro's new government. In July 1960, he fled to Miami.

Posada says he too remembers the intense law student from Birán, whom he describes as handsome but with a weak chin, adding that the beard improved his looks. Unlike Bosch, Posada was not politically engaged during his student years. His family ran a small publishing house in Cienfuegos, on Cuba's southern coast. In the mid-1950s, he secured a job with the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company and commuted between its headquarters in Akron, Ohio, and Havana. Posada says it was in the first months of Castro's reign, when revenge and retribution ran riot, that he became politicized.

At some point, Posada made the acquaintance of David Atlee Phillips, the CIA's man in Havana, who was busy recruiting operatives to overthrow Castro. He would also undoubtedly have rubbed shoulders with Phillips's colleague E. Howard Hunt, if not in Havana, then in Miami, where the CIA set up a secret substation to run covert operations in Cuba called JMWave.

Headquartered in a nondescript office building on a secluded, woodsy 1,500-acre tract on the University of Miami's southern campus (once a Navy blimp base), JMWave would become one of the biggest employers in South Florida. Some 400 full-time CIA staffers, with a $50 million annual budget, would over time employ an estimated 15,000 Cuban exiles. According to Ted Shackley, the spymaster who oversaw the station, 300 to 400 "front" corporations hired thousands more. JMWave boasted its own armory of cutting-edge weaponry, a fleet of airplanes, and hundreds of boats. (One distinguished alumnus of Miami operations was Porter Goss, who was appointed CIA chief in 2004.)

By 1959, Posada was carrying out operations in Cuba, for which, he told me, the CIA provided him with "time-bomb pencils, fuses, detonator cords, and everything necessary for acts of sabotage." He would slip into Miami and return to Cuba with "war materials." In January 1961, his luck in Havana finally ran out, when a sabotage operation went awry. He arrived in Miami in time to sign up for the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation. Its failure, after President Kennedy refused to authorize air cover, deeply embittered Cuban exiles. Kennedy's subsequent deal with the Russians to end the Cuban missile crisis—with a promise not to invade Cuba—further angered anti-Castro exiles and many veterans of JMWave.

Posada was one of 212 exiles chosen by the CIA to attend officer-training school at Fort Benning, Georgia, after the Bay of Pigs. He graduated as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army in August 1963. At Fort Benning, he formed two crucial relationships: with Jorge Mas Canosa, who would become the exiles' most powerful lobbyist as chairman of the Cuban American National Foundation; and with Félix Rodríguez, later notorious for his roles in the death of Che Guevara and the Iran-Contra affair.

Posada was a charmer, fluent in English, a dashing ladies' man who could knock back half a bottle of Johnnie Walker Black Label and not make a fool of himself. He was a world-class marksman, an expert at demolition, and a master of black propaganda. He delighted in confecting noms de guerre for himself: Comisario Basilio, Bambi, and Solo (after the spy



Luis Posada in 1985, shortly after escaping from a Venezuelan jail

in the TV series *The Man From U.N.C.L.E.*). In time, he would have dozens of bogus passports from a host of countries, including the United States. Unlike Bosch, Posada was not garrulous; his only ideology was anti-communism. "There are no good communists," he told me. "All are bad." In short, he was the perfect Cold War spook.

In 1968, JMWave was decommissioned. "It made sense to have a base in Miami," CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton would later confide to the author Dick Russell. "It was a novel idea. But it got out of hand; it became a power unto itself." The CIA had spawned a monster, a semi-rogue agency with some staffers openly contemptuous of the White House and Congress. The agency would have its first experience with a phenomenon called *blowback*. It had trained an army of saboteurs and assassins, then changed its mind. But for the Cuban exiles, and some of the station's officers, the war against Castro would continue.

THE CASABLANCA OF THE CARIBBEAN

Posada writes in his memoir that in the late 1960s, while having his usual pre-lunch daiquiri at Centro Vasco, a popular Miami restaurant, he was approached by "an elegantly dressed man" and offered a lucrative position in Venezuelan intelligence. With a recommendation from the CIA, he was made Venezuela's chief of security and, in 1971, chief of operations at DISIP, Venezuela's counterintelligence agency. Caracas had become a front line in the war against communism, with Venezuelan intelligence functioning almost as a satellite station of Langley. In an earlier variant of "rendition," some of the CIA's dirtier chores were farmed out to DISIP. Roiling with guerrilla groups, wildcatters, spies, and drug lords, Caracas was the Casablanca of the Caribbean—and, as such, the perfect home for Luis Posada.

Posada's move from Miami to Caracas suited the CIA. In 1972, four Bay of Pigs veterans were indicted along with Howard Hunt for trying to burglarize the Democratic Party's headquarters at the Watergate. The CIA awkwardly sought to distance itself from the burglars, and from other former employees. Caracas was a hospitable refuge: the CIA station chief from July 1972 to May 1973 was none other than David Atlee Phillips, who would later tell congressional investigators that Posada had worked with him on Track II, an operation to "thwart by whatever means" the inauguration of President Salvador Allende in Chile.

Throughout the 1960s, much of the '70s, and again in the mid-'80s during Iran-Contra, Posada was a paid asset of the CIA, a detail his defense attorneys hammer home at every opportunity. But his relationship with the agency was not entirely smooth. CIA memos published by the National Security Archive questioned his coziness with drug dealers and mobsters and a "tendency" to become involved with "gangster elements" and in "clandestine sabotage activities." A 1973 memo reported that "Posada may be involved in smuggling cocaine from Colombia through Venezuela to Miami, also in counterfeit US money in Venezuela." Another noted that Posada was "seen with known big time drug trafficker," and a third referred to him as a "seriou[s] potential liability." The CIA severed formal relations with Posada in February 1976, but even after that he continued as a paid informer, according to former agency officers.

With or without the CIA, Posada would always have a paycheck, even when pursuing his personal passion of eliminating Castro. ("I'm the only one who didn't make money," Bosch told me with dismay.) In his closest miss, Posada partnered with Antonio Veciana, a former banker who founded the paramilitary group Alpha 66 with the backing of the CIA. The plan, conceived by Veciana's CIA handler, was to take out Castro at a summit in Santiago, Chile, in November 1971. Veciana hired two hit men, both cohorts of Orlando Bosch, to pose as news reporters, equipped with a 16 mm camera that doubled as a machine gun.

According to Veciana, the assassins fixed the lethal camera on Castro but got cold feet after spotting Cuban security agents guarding the exits. Posada was furious. The men regrouped to plot another attempt, in Ecuador. This time, Posada was taking no chances: he would fire the weapon himself, using a state-of-the-art sniper rifle with a silencer. Knowing Castro would fly into Quito's airport, Posada positioned himself in an elevated alcove several hundred feet away. But at the last moment, the wily Castro changed his arrival to a military base. Posada dispatched another set of assassins with the killer camera to Caracas, but when Castro appeared, Posada's men were nowhere to be found.

From his perch in Venezuelan intelligence, Posada ran a campaign to hunt Castro-backed leftist guerrillas. "I persecuted them very hard," he told me. "Many, many people got killed." He saw to it that all Cuban offices and businesses in Venezuela were under continuous surveillance and also poked into the private business of some of Venezuela's politicians—including Carlos Andrés Pérez, who didn't appreciate having Posada listen to secret wiretaps of his conversations with his mistress. When Pérez was elected president in 1974, he promptly fired his operations chief. Posada quickly rebounded, recycling his high-powered contacts into an even more profitable venture: a security and detective agency.

PEDIATRICIAN, PATRIOT, MILITANT

Orlando Bosch arrived in Miami in July 1960 with his wife and four young children, and soon found work as a pediatrician. While his day job was saving babies, his free time was devoted to eliminating his political enemies. The CIA financed a training camp for him not far from the Everglades, but Bosch didn't have the temperament to work with the agency. Once he realized there would be no second

AP PHOTO/EL UNIVERSAL

Bay of Pigs, he wrote President Kennedy a rambling screed, shut down his camp, and went out on his own. Bosch's new group, Cuban Power, took responsibility for dozens of bombings and assassination attempts, which Bosch referred to as "justice actions." By the mid-'60s, Bosch had been arrested half a dozen times in Miami for various bombings and attacks. In September 1968, he was arrested again, for firing a 57 mm bazooka into a Polish ship docked at the Port of Miami. This time, he was sentenced to ten years in federal prison.

Some of Bosch's collaborators questioned his tactics. Friends in Miami often whispered that he was "mad" or "crazy," sometimes affectionately, but also fearfully. Bosch had developed a cultlike following, and attracted powerful supporters. The governor of Florida, Claude Kirk, was among those who lobbied for his early parole, and in 1972 Bosch walked out of prison. Two years later, he violated his parole and left the country "to make sabotage against Castro," as he put it, with Posada in Venezuela. One casualty of his crusade was his marriage.

On October 10, 1974, Cuba's Independence Day, Bosch set off bombs at Panama's embassy and at a cultural center in Caracas shortly before Cuban officials were due to arrive. True to form, he boasted about his handiwork, necessitating his arrest. Venezuela offered to extradite him to the United States and was surprised to learn that the Justice Department did not want him back. Bosch was soon released, and he headed south to Chile, where he found an accommodating host in General Augusto Pinochet. In Santiago, he fell in love with a beautiful *chilena*, Adriana Delgado, twenty years his junior. The two married in February 1975 and had a daughter soon after.

George H. W. Bush became director of the CIA in January 1976 and served through January 1977. Bush succeeded William Colby, whose cooperation with the Church Committee hearings, and testimony about the CIA's role in destabilizing Chile, had infuriated many in the agency. Colby had implemented major reforms, including a prohibition on political assassinations, and was the first director to give major public briefings to Congress on agency operations. These actions deeply alienated some of the CIA's more committed Cold Warriors, many of whom backed the appointment of Bush.

When Bush took up his post, he offered Ted Shackley, the former head of JMWave, the CIA's third most powerful job: associate deputy director. Bush appears to have had contacts with Cuban exiles as far back as the 1960s, when, according to a declassified memo by J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI briefed him on their response to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. A Bush spokesman has previously said that the memo referred to a different George Bush, and Bush did not respond to my requests for comment.

Shackley was a divisive figure, and relations between Henry Kissinger's State Department and George Bush's CIA were painfully strained—so much so, according to William Rogers, the assistant secretary of state for Latin America, that the State Department rarely relied on CIA intelligence. "The agency was controlled by hard-liners," he said. "They had an agenda, and the intelligence was lousy." Shackley later played a role in the Iran-Contra affair.



Orlando Bosch in FBI custody in 1965

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL TELEPHOTO/CORBIS

Bush's tenure at the CIA coincided with the worst spate of bombings and assassinations by Cuban exile militants in Latin America and in the United States. At that time, bombs went off regularly in Miami; sometimes there were several explosions in one day. In December 1975, thirteen bombs went off in forty-eight hours, striking at the very heart of the city: the airport, the police department, the state attorney's office, the Social Security building, the post office, and the FBI's main office. Miraculously, no one was seriously wounded: the goal was not to kill civilians, but to warn Kissinger and Rogers not to pursue détente with Cuba.

Before the blasts, the target or the news media would often get a phone call. The caller would play the first haunting strains of Simon and Garfunkel's 1970 hit, "If I Could"—also called "El Cóndor Pasa," after a Peruvian folk song: "I'd rather be a hammer than a nail. Yes I would, if I could ..." It was not lost on investigators that Condor was also the code name of the "Dirty War" against leftist opponents being conducted by the military regimes of Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, who sometimes employed Cuban militants to do their bidding.

THE BOMBING, AND AFTER

Bosch was a fugitive from U.S. justice when he founded the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations, an act that established him as the godfather of the Cuban exiles. At CORU's initial meeting, on June 11, 1976, at a mountaintop retreat in the Dominican Republic, twenty exiles, including Bosch and Posada, devised a master plan to bring down Castro and intimidate his allies. "Our war strategy was created there—everything," Bosch told me. "All the top leaders of the paramilitaries in Miami were there." Subsequently, CORU took responsibility for scores of bombings, kidnappings, and murders in Latin America and the United States. One of its highest priorities, according to an FBI informer, was to bring down a Cuban airliner. The group reasoned that such an audacious act would demonstrate its might, terrify the Cuban government, and focus the world's attention on its cause.

"Several informers infiltrated, of course," Bosch's wife, Adriana, told me with a roll of her eyes. "It never fails." One informer warned the CIA that militants led by Bosch had "plans to place a bomb on a Cubana airline flight traveling between Panama and Havana," specifically naming Cubana Airlines Flight 476 on June 21. The resulting CIA memo, titled "Possible Plans of Cuban Exile Extremists

to Blow up a Cubana Airliner," described its source as a "businessman with close ties to the Cuban exile community" and a "usually reliable reporter."

On September 8, 1976, Bosch returned to Venezuela at the invitation of Orlando García, President Carlos Andrés Pérez's chief of security. This time, a pact was agreed upon: Bosch was told that he could base himself in Venezuela so long as his targets remained outside its borders. In return, he was given a Venezuelan passport, a DISIP identity card in the name of Carlos Sucre, and a suite at the chic Anauco Hilton, where García and his deputy, Ricardo "El Mono" Morales, also had apartments. Morales, a Cuban exile like his boss, was a frequent informer for the FBI, the DEA, the CIA, and assorted Latin American intelligence agencies; he even testified against Bosch in the Polish ship case of 1968.

Not long after Bosch's arrival in Caracas, a fund-raising dinner was held in his honor at the home of a wealthy Cuban doctor. Posada, Mono Morales, and Orlando García were among the attendees. During dinner, according to a CIA memo sent after the Cubana bombing, Bosch sought to extort "a substantial cash contribution to his organization" from the Venezuelan government in exchange for a promise to abstain from attacks in the United States during President Pérez's upcoming trip to the United Nations. He received $500.

It appears this was not sufficient. On September 21, Orlando Letelier, Chile's former ambassador to the United States and an outspoken critic of General Pinochet's military regime, was assassinated with his American assistant in Washington when a bomb placed under his car blew up just as he was approaching his office on Massachusetts Avenue. The FBI immediately suspected—correctly—that Cuban militants had killed Letelier with help from the Chilean secret police. "Pinochet's people were always telling us that they wanted Letelier killed," Bosch told me. A map of Letelier's route to work was later found in Posada's office.

The murders, six weeks before the presidential election, stunned Washington, from the White House to the CIA to the international diplomatic corps. Another CIA memo written after the Cubana bombing stated that its informer had overheard Bosch asserting, "Now that our organization has come out of the Letelier job looking good, we are going to try something else." Posada is quoted as saying, "We are going to hit a Cuban airliner" and "Orlando (Bosch) has the details." The memo concluded that specific plans for the Cubana bombing were solidified soon after.

The plan had been for Hernán Ricardo to stop in the United States after the Cubana bombing. To do this, he would need a visa. Joseph Leo, the FBI's legal attaché in Caracas, turned Ricardo away on his first application, telling him he had to have a letter of employment. On October 1, 1976, five days before the bombing, Ricardo returned to Leo's office with a letter signed by Luis Posada on business stationery, attesting that Ricardo was Posada's employee.

A few things about the smooth-talking Ricardo troubled Leo, whose name and number were found by investigators in Lugo's address book. In a seven-page memo to the FBI sent two days after the bombing, Leo wrote that he had met Ricardo on several occasions; he described Ricardo as a photojournalist "in the personal service of Luis Posada" and explained that Ricardo had sought his help, asking if he had "some suggestions regarding courses of action that might be taken against the Cuban embassy in Caracas by an anti-Castro group." (Leo reported that he discouraged Ricardo, telling him he "abhorred terrorist activities.") When Ricardo returned to the embassy with Posada's letter on September 30, Leo studied his passport and noted that he had been in Trinidad on September 1, the very day the Guyanese consulate there had been bombed. Guyana's cordial relations with Cuba infuriated militant exiles, and Leo wrote in his memo that he wondered, "in view of Ricardo's association with Luis Posada, if his presence there during that period was coincidence."

Peter Kornbluh, of the National Security Archive, which published the declassified CIA and FBI memos concerning the Cubana bombing, has questioned why Leo never raised any alarms about Ricardo, despite his suspicions. (Leo has consistently refused to speak to the press.) The archive, says Kornbluh, has pressed the Bush administration to release hundreds of pages of known CIA and FBI memos and reports on Posada, Bosch, and the Cubana case. So far, the requests have been denied.

When Venezuelan police arrested Bosch and Posada on October 13, Posada was told he was being held at DISIP headquarters "for a few days" for his own protection. He and Bosch were allowed to order dinner from their favorite restaurants, along with the finest whiskeys. Bosch told me he was led into Morales's office two days after his arrest for a secret meeting with García and Morales. At the end of the meeting, Morales handed him an envelope full of cash, saying, "Here's some money for you to get out of the country." Bosch wanted to know what would happen to his comrade. "Posada is staying," he recalled being told. "There is no alternative." Morales urged him to leave: "Better you get out first, and later we'll see what we can do for Posada." Bosch told me he replied without hesitation: "Either we both leave, or I stay with him."

I asked Bosch why he did not leap at the offer of freedom. "Because he was my friend," he said, "and I could not go and leave him in prison." Then he added, cryptically, "And I was responsible for all of that."

VENEZUELAN JUSTICE

Several countries initiated investigations into the Cubana bombing, and a tussle ensued over who would try the case. In the end, jurisdiction was awarded to Venezuela, in part because Ricardo and Lugo were Venezuelan, but also because the putative masterminds—Posada and Bosch—had planned the attack in Caracas. A month after the bombing, Morales told the FBI that the plan was conceived at two meetings at the Anauco Hilton in Caracas. According to a declassified FBI memo, Morales reported that "some people in the Venezuelan government are involved in this airplane bombing, and that if Posada Carriles talks, then [Morales] and others in the Venezuelan government

will 'go down the tube.'" He warned his FBI handler, "We'll have our own Watergate."

Posada and Bosch were transferred to a Venezuelan prison, and held together with Ricardo and Lugo, who were deported to Caracas twenty days after their arrest. Their supporters responded with deadly fury. In the fourteen months following their arrest, CORU bombed Venezuelan airline ticket offices in San Juan and Miami and the Venezuelan consulate in San Juan. Bosch referred to the bombings as "messages." The Cubana case became a cause célèbre for Miami's political leaders, who lobbied Washington to press for their release. Miami's mayor, Maurice Ferré, visited Bosch in prison; the city commissioners declared an official "Orlando Bosch Day."

The case was fraught with peril for its prosecutors, witnesses, and judges, several of whom received death threats. "It would be inconceivable to allow them to go free," one judge told a Venezuelan reporter, "but we are being strongly pressured ... Whatever the government wants is what will get done." The Venezuelan government had two conflicting goals: to avoid a showdown with Cuban militants, and to demonstrate to the world—and to Castro—that it was serious about prosecuting the case.

Venezuela also had a third goal: to divert attention from the involvement of its own intelligence agency. Recently declassified State Department cables reveal that the United States asked Venezuela to extradite Bosch immediately after the attack. The Venezuelan government tried, instead, to smuggle him out of the country. It was far more expedient to focus attention on Posada, a former CIA agent, than on Bosch, who had so recently been welcomed into the country by the Venezuelan president's chief of security.

In 1982, Mono Morales turned state's evidence in a major narcotics investigation in Miami, an operation called Tick Tock. He had worn out his welcome in Caracas and had plans to settle in Miami, and was eager to ease relations with Cuban exile militant leaders, who no longer trusted him. In a confession videotaped by Posada's attorney in Miami, Morales took responsibility for the bombing and asserted that Bosch and Posada were innocent. He railed against the Venezuelan president and insisted that Ricardo and Lugo had been working for him at DISIP.

Not long after he confessed, Morales was shot dead in a Key Biscayne bar by a drug thug. "It was a hit," said D. C. Diaz, a Miami detective who knew both Morales and his assassin. Posada's attorney was murdered a year later.

George Kiszynski, a thirty-four-year veteran of the FBI who interviewed Posada, Morales, and García, described Morales as "decadent, devious, with an astonishing photographic memory." Bosch's verdict was more terse: "El Mono was a drunk and a lost soul."

"Mono was crazy," Posada told me. "He was not *immoral*, he was *amoral*." But in the case of his Cubana confession, Posada insists that Morales was telling the truth. Posada has expressed feeling for the victims of the Cubana bombings, and denies involvement in the attack. When I pressed and asked him who did it, he said, "I think it was Morales."

Bosch resigned himself to prison life, painting, writing, and plotting against Castro. Posada was less sanguine. In 1985, following two failed attempts, he escaped, after bribing the warden with $50,000 raised by Jorge Mas Canosa, the chairman of the Cuban American National Foundation. He was ferried to El Salvador on a shrimp boat owned by a Miami-based Cuban exile, and met by Félix Rodríguez, his former comrade from Fort Benning and the Bay of Pigs. Rodríguez had a special offer: he invited Posada to be his deputy in a covert operation to help the Contras dislodge the Nicaraguan government. Posada was given a Salvadoran passport and driver's license in the name of Ramón Medina Rodríguez. Among his duties was coordinating the flights ferrying supplies from El Salvador to the battlefront in Nicaragua and setting up safe houses where American personnel kept their surveillance and encryption systems. Posada was delighted. Not only was he back in favor, he was back on the payroll.

Posada told me that when the Iran-Contra scandal burst onto the front pages in 1986, he earned every penny of his taxpayer-paid salary—by his account roughly $10,000 a month. In a matter of hours, he cleaned out the U.S. safe houses in El Salvador, ferrying American personnel out of the country and disposing of paperwork that would have proved troublesome to many in Washington.

Meanwhile, with Posada safely out of the picture, the Venezuelan judiciary moved forward with the trials of his co-defendants in the Cubana bombing case. The court inexplicably barred the confessions of Lugo and Ricardo, along with the entire case file of the Trinidad and Barbados police investigators, ruling that the material was inadmissible because it was in English. Nevertheless, in July 1986, Ricardo and Lugo were convicted of treason and aggravated homicide. They were sentenced to twenty years each, the minimum allowed under the law. Bosch was acquitted—perhaps not surprisingly, since almost none of the evidence against him was allowed at his trial.

On February 16, 1988, a supremely confident Orlando Bosch flew to Miami, despite not having a U.S. visa. He was promptly detained for his prior parole violation, and for illegal entry. Jorge Mas Canosa instructed his powerful lawyers to represent Bosch, whose arrival was celebrated by hard-liners.

And yet not everyone was pleased to see Bosch return. "My colleagues and I in Miami conducted exhaustive investigations of Bosch," the FBI agent George Davis had written in a memo to Secretary of State George Shultz. "He was regarded by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies as Miami's number one terrorist." The attorney general's office recommended that he be immediately deported. "The October 6, 1976, Cuban airline bombing was a CORU operation under the direction of Bosch," Joe Whitley, the associate attorney general, wrote in his decision recommending Bosch's deportation. "CORU is the name of Bosch's terrorist outfit."

While the Justice Department reviewed the case, bomb threats were made against the Miami INS office, which classified Bosch as an "excludable alien."

Now electoral politics would come into play. In 1989, securing Bosch's release was one of the cornerstones of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen's congressional campaign in Miami. She praised Bosch as a hero and a patriot on exile radio stations and raised $265,000 for his legal defense fund. Her campaign manager was a political neophyte, but one who had the ear of the White House. His name was Jeb Bush.

On August 17, 1989, Jeb Bush attended a meeting he had arranged for Ros-Lehtinen with his father to discuss the matter. The following July, President Bush rejected his own Justice Department's recommendation and authorized Bosch's release. Not long after that, Bosch announced that he was ready to "rejoin the struggle" and called the agreement he had signed forswearing violence "a farce." Two years later, the Bush administration granted Bosch U.S. residency.

Bosch's defiance has been an ongoing source of embarrassment for the Bush family. "They purchased the chain," Bosch is fond of saying, citing a Cuban adage, "but they don't have the monkey."

A CASE OF MISSING FBI FILES?

In the wake of Iran-Contra, Posada lay low, careful to avoid a subpoena to the Senate hearings on the scandal. He settled down in San Salvador with his longtime mistress and continued to devise schemes to eliminate Fidel Castro. In 1997, Posada began bombing tourist targets in Cuba. In June 1998, I showed him a fax he had sent a collaborator instructing him to collect funds from supporters in Union City, New Jersey. "If there is no publicity, the job is useless," he had written. "The American newspapers will publish nothing that has not been confirmed. I need all the data from the discotheque in order to try to confirm it. If there is no publicity, there is no payment." At the bottom of the fax was his distinctive handwriting and signature, "Solo." I had received a copy of the fax from an informer working in Posada's office, who had given the original to the FBI. When I showed Posada the fax, he fretted that it could cause him problems with the FBI. He need not have worried.

The FBI sent agents to Guatemala to interview the informer, who related precisely how Posada's operation worked and identified its intended targets. "We found him entirely credible," said an agent who worked on the case. "We thought it would be a slam dunk: we'd charge and arrest Posada."

"But then," he said, his voice trailing off, "we had a meeting one day and the chief said, 'Hey, wait a minute. Lots of folks around here think Posada is a freedom fighter.' We were in shock. And they closed down the whole Posada investigation. When we asked for a wiretap on Bosch, who we knew was working on bombing runs, we were turned down."

Soon after Posada's arrest for illegal entry in May 2005, I was subpoenaed along with *The New York Times* and asked to turn over materials relating to Posada. The *Times* lawyers successfully moved to quash the subpoena, but in July of this year, and then again in September, the Justice Department said it would seek another subpoena if we refused to cooperate with their investigation. An FBI agent phoned me and asked if I would share my copies of FBI and CIA files. When I asked why, he said, "Do us a favor. We can't find ours."

Evidently, he wasn't kidding. In 2005, agents learned that the evidence, including original Western Union cables and money transfers sent between Posada and his co-conspirators in Union City, had vanished from the evidence room in Miami. Without them, a criminal prosecution of the case is severely hobbled. "I don't know whether or not it was an accident," said one FBI investigator, who asked that his name not be used. "Who knows?"


An FBI spokeswoman, Judy Orihuela, said she could not confirm the fate of Posada's evidence files. "There is a destruction procedure when a case is closed, as our space in the evidence room is so limited. This would be more of a clerical action," she said. Then she conceded, "the supervisory agent in charge and someone from the U.S. Attorney's Office would have to sign off." She added that Posada's case has been reopened "and is now a pending case."

DOUBLE STANDARDS

Miami's Cuban exile leaders rejoiced in the election of George W. Bush in 2000. Almost immediately, they saw a sea change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. The Bush administration significantly strengthened Cuba's embargo and placed onerous new restrictions on family visits. In summer 2001, two Cuban exiles who had been jailed for their roles in the murder of Orlando Letelier were

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freed from detention and settled in Miami. Investigators in the FBI's Miami office say they were told by their superiors to shutter outstanding cases on exile plots and concentrate on finding Cuban spies.

Posada made his last attempt to eliminate Castro in 2000, at a summit in Panama. This time, he was outwitted by Cuban intelligence and captured with his co-conspirators. All four men were charged with attempted assassination and convicted of lesser charges. Miami's exile leadership led a spirited campaign to have them freed. South Florida's three Cuban American members of Congress—Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen—lobbied and wrote letters on official congressional stationery to Panama's president, Mireya Moscoso, seeking their release.

Then came September 11, 2001. President Bush famously told the world that the choices were stark. "We've got to say to people who are willing to harbor a terrorist or feed a terrorist: 'You're just as guilty as the terrorist,'" he intoned gravely. Nevertheless, weeks before the 2004 election, Posada and his cohorts received last-minute pardons from the outgoing Panamanian president, who maintains a home in Key Biscayne, Miami.

While his comrades flew directly to Miami, Posada went back underground. He was, after all, a fugitive from Venezuelan justice. But over time, he was given reasonable assurances that he too would be welcomed in Miami. His supporters pointed out that Bosch, who had been openly boastful about his operations against Castro, led a comfortable and public life in Miami. When Posada surfaced in Miami in the spring of 2005, the administration cringed. The double standard was no longer sustainable. Following his ill-considered press conference, Posada was arrested and hustled to El Paso.

Posada's arrest has infuriated hard-liners in Miami, who argue that the CIA bred and nurtured their militias. "Not only is Luis not a threat to national security," said David Sebastian, the paralegal who is preparing Posada's briefs, "he *was* national security. He was part of Operation Southern Front, which is what they called it before Iran-Contra, and he worked for the Hammer," he said, referring to Oliver North by his code name. "From 1967 to 1986, Luis was a compensated agent of the CIA. And George Bush, the vice president, knew what he was doing."

Posada's lawyers are blurring some important distinctions. Certainly, Posada was on the payroll through most of the 1960s and again during Iran-Contra, but CIA memos indicate that by the mid-'70s the agency used him only as an asset or informer. On February 13, 1976, the agency formally broke ties over what documents cryptically described as concerns about "outstanding tax matters."

In 1999, when Hugo Chávez swept into the Venezuelan presidency on a wave of populist nationalism, seven years after his failed coup against Pérez, he immediately forged a partnership with Castro. Their relationship was based on common interests, and common enemies. Last year, on his weekly radio and television program, *Aló Presidente*, Chávez played the audiotape of the desperate pilot of the Cubana plane radioing for help, followed by an excerpt of Castro's famous speech. "If the United States does not extradite Luis Posada Carriles, we will be forced to reconsider our diplomatic ties," Chávez warned. (At other times, he has threatened to cut off oil shipments.) Then he offered his own conspiracy theory. At the time of the bombing, he intoned ominously, "George Bush, the father, was director of the CIA. That's the truth. So maybe now they fear that [Posada] will talk, and that's why they protect him."

Last fall, at Posada's immigration arraignment, Joaquín Chaffardet, Posada's partner in his detective agency and the former secretary-general of DISIP, testified that if the United States deported Posada to Venezuela, he would likely be tortured. The U.S. government offered no rebuttal, questions, or witnesses, so the judge ruled in Posada's favor and denied Venezuela's request for deportation. Chaffardet, who was Posada's attorney in Caracas, believes that Orlando García "manipulated" facts to pin the blame on Posada. He told me that although Posada would never say so publicly, he had always had misgivings about Bosch. "You know that Bosch is crazy, don't you?" he said, arching one eyebrow. "He's always been crazy. Luis never trusted Bosch, due to his schizophrenic personality. He said there was nothing he wouldn't do."

In September 1976, Posada took Chaffardet with him to see the chief of investigations for Venezuelan intelligence. In their hour-long meeting, Posada confided that Bosch was out of control, drinking heavily, and plotting attacks. Chaffardet says he has "no doubt" that Posada was the source of the June 1976 CIA memo titled "Possible Plans Warning the Agency of Bosch's Plans to Blow Up a Cubana Plane."

When I asked Posada recently about his feelings toward Bosch, he said only that he was "*un patriota*, who has given everything for the cause of liberty." But in several CIA memos, he warned that Bosch was capable of unimaginable violence. In February 1976, he alerted the CIA that Bosch and another exile were plotting to kill Salvador Allende's nephew in Venezuela. He also informed on a plot by Bosch to assassinate Henry Kissinger. "Posada informing agency that he must go through with attempt to contact Bosch as though he did not know that Bosch had been arrested," reads an internal memo. Bosch had been arrested for trying to kill Allende's nephew. "Posada concerned that Bosch will blame Posada for leak of plans."

I am an optimist," Posada wrote me the day after his immigration arraignment, last September. "I continue to be and always will be. I believe in God." Posada is kept segregated from the general inmate population in El Paso. When he leaves his cell, he wears a bulky bulletproof vest. Although he has few visitors, he is often on the phone with his long-suffering wife, Nieves, and supporters in Miami, 5,000 of whom have signed petitions asking for his release.

The Justice Department is slowly amassing a case against Posada for masterminding attacks against Cuban targets, using U.S. sources of financing. In June, Antonio Llama, a former director of the Cuban American National Foundation,

made the stunning admission that he had helped CANF collect more than $1.4 million to finance paramilitary strikes against Castro—including one in 1997 that the FBI believes was masterminded by Posada. Since then, FBI agents have been questioning Posada's alleged collaborators in Union City, who were subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury in Newark, New Jersey, on September 15.

Posada's attorney has pressed for his client's release, citing a Supreme Court ruling barring indefinite detention. The government disclosed at a hearing in August that seven countries—Canada, Mexico, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, and El Salvador—had so far refused him. The federal magistrate, Judge Norbert Garney, expressed annoyance that the Justice Department had made no new inquiries to prospective countries since last November. On September 11, Judge Garney recommended that Posada be released. Should the federal judge concur with this recommendation, Posada will leave prison, but he could very well face more serious charges.

In May, I asked Bosch how he felt about the fact that Posada had informed on him. Bosch was having none of it. Waving his hand dismissively, he said the memos were the work of "Castro's people." He added that Posada calls him often from his cell. "Every week, I speak with him," he said. Then he added, "He's not my friend. He's my brother in the struggle."

Bosch is a man who needs a crusade and an enemy. "I would kill him," he says, referring to Castro. "Who wants to more than me? But I can't do any more. I have given it 100 percent." Always uncompromising, he has grown more mercurial and moody in the last year. "After his stroke in November, we learned he had had ten smaller strokes before," his daughter Karen told me. Then she confided that her half brother has schizophrenia. "It gets passed on in a family." Bosch's wife, Adriana, seemed exhausted and teary-eyed on my last visit. "He was better before because his activities fulfilled him," she said. "*Fue su obsesión*—it was his obsession—so he was okay. Now is very difficult." Although he is heartened to know that Castro has been seriously ill, Bosch begrudges him a natural death. "It's a competition to see who dies first," his wife said wearily.

Last year, Orlando García died in Miami, at seventy-eight. He had said he intended to take his secrets to the grave—and he did. Although he dodged the press, García confided to friends that Posada was responsible for the Cubana bombing. "I am going to die in three or four months," he told Veciana. "Why say anything now and damage him?" García's son Rolando tells another story: "My father believed they were all guilty."


Former Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez, who moved to Miami Beach in 2000, turned eighty-four in October and is disabled by a stroke. At García's funeral, he blamed Castro for the Cubana bombing.

Freddy Lugo drives a cab in Caracas and maintains he was duped into going along on the Cubana flight by Hernán Ricardo, who promised him a new camera. Ricardo has evidently landed on his feet: according to *The Miami Herald*, he is working for the DEA, though the agency won't confirm it. Venezuelans claim that he fell out with the DEA and is now at large, "somewhere in the Caribbean," some say, or in Thailand or Malaysia.

In 2002, Governor Jeb Bush appointed Raoul Cantero, Orlando Bosch's attorney, to the Florida Supreme Court. Cantero is the grandson of Fulgencio Batista.

At eighty, Fidel Castro has lived to see a significant lurch to the left in Latin America. He has sidelined himself from power, but his political agenda is shared by his brother Raúl and National Assembly chief Ricardo Alarcón, who said in early September that Cuba will continue its campaign to bring the masterminds of the Cubana bombing to justice.

In the summer of 1998, a small group of U.S. government investigators visited their counterparts at the Ministry of the Interior in Havana. The purpose was to gather information on the 1997 bombings in Cuba, which violated the U.S. Neutrality Act. The Cubans were hospitable hosts and screened a surveillance video of Luis Posada and two comrades coming and going from the Camino Real Hotel in San Salvador. Upon their return to the United States, FBI investigators discussed the video, and it occurred to them that the Cubans could easily have rid themselves of Posada forever; instead, they had opted to film him. "They'll never get better propaganda than Luis Posada," said one FBI veteran. "He's as good as it gets."



ASIL Insight

A Conundrum Posed by U.S. Anti-Terrorism Policy

By Luc Reydams

October 16, 2006
Volume 10, Issue 26



Thirty years ago this month, a Cuban airliner blew up in mid-air, killing all 73 people aboard. Declassified CIA and FBI records posted on the website of the National Security Archive at George Washington University identify a violently anti-Castro Cuban exile named Luis Posada Carriles as one of the "engineer[s]" of the bombing of Cubana Airlines flight 455. But on 5 October 2006 the Justice Department declined to classify Mr Posada, who is in a Texas jail for immigration violations, as a terrorist. And in September a federal judge ruled that Mr. Posada, a naturalized Venezuelan citizen, may not be extradited to Venezuela where he escaped from a jail in 1985 while awaiting trial for his role in the plane bombing. The decisions not to treat Mr. Posada as a terrorism suspect and not to extradite him pose a conundrum for U.S. anti-terrorism policy.

The judge in the extradition case held that Mr. Posada faced the threat of torture in Venezuela and therefore could not be returned under the United Nations Convention against Torture. For years, however, the Bush White House in the "war on terror" has sought to interpret very narrowly the international legal norms governing the treatment of detainees, such as the United Nations Convention against Torture. The program of "rendition," wherein terror suspects are transferred for purpose of interrogation from U.S. control into the control of foreign governments that might not shun "alternative" interrogation techniques, has been criticized as an attempt to get around such norms. It is ironic that the Convention against Torture now stands in the way of extraditing a terror suspect, and shields him from trial in a country with whom the United States since 1923 has an extradition treaty.

Aviation security too is governed by some international treaties. The Hague (1970) and Montreal Conventions (1971) deal respectively with aircraft hijacking and aircraft sabotage. More generally there is the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997). The object and purpose of these conventions, to which the U.S. is a party, is the punishment of offenders under all circumstances. To achieve that goal, States parties are obliged to enact the necessary criminal statutes and to establish broad jurisdiction. The cornerstone is the obligation for a State party "in whose territory an alleged offender is found" (or "is present" under the terms of the Terrorist Bombings Convention) to submit the case to its competent authorities for prosecution if it does not extradite him, "without exception whatsoever." In other words, there should be no safe havens for those who interfere with the safety of civil aviation.

In addition to this multilateral treaty framework, the United Nations Security Council, over the past fifteen years, has issued general directives as well as specific orders regarding terrorist acts. Resolution 1269 (1999), for instance, calls upon all States to take appropriate steps to "deny those who plan, finance or commit terrorist acts safe havens by ensuring their apprehension and prosecution or extradition." In the early 1990s, Libya's refusal to extradite the suspects of the bombing of Pan Am flight 101 above Lockerbie (Scotland) to either the U.S. or the U.K. lead to a decade of damaging U.N. sanctions.

The choices available to the Bush administration in the Posada case seem limited further by U.S. policy in other cases of terrorism against civil aviation. On 11 June 1985, five heavily armed men seized Royal Jordanian Airlines flight 402 in Beirut. The action was not directed against the U.S. – their ultimate goal was the removal of all Palestinians from Lebanon – but there happened to be U.S. citizens among the passengers. The plane was turned away by several countries and flew back to Beirut. Upon arrival, the hijackers released the passengers unharmed, held a press conference, blew up the plane, and fled. Two years later, undercover U.S. law enforcement agents lured one of the hijackers, Fawaz Yunis, onto a yacht moored in international waters off the coast of Cyprus, arrested him, and brought him to the U.S. for trial. The district court dismissed Yunis' argument that because he had been abducted he was not "found" on U.S. territory within the meaning of the above mentioned conventions. The court added, and this is highly relevant for Posada case, that "once he was within the boundaries of the United States, the

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African Union
APEC Counter Terror Force
US Department of S Counterterrorism O

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/21/2007

To: Caracas Attn: Legat [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

From: Miami
T-6
Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]:ov

Case ID #: [redacted] (Pending)

Title: LUIS POSADA CARRILES;
ET AL;
[redacted]

Synopsis: To request assistance of Legat Caracas in determining if the [redacted] b7D

Enclosure(s): One (1) eight page English copy of the May 17, 2007 Granma article.

Details: On May 12, 2007, [redacted] reported that Cuban newspapers were publicly disclosing the existence of transcripts of 14 telephone calls between LUIS POSADA CARRILES and individuals in Venezuela. These calls purportedly took place between February 21 and September 9, 1997. On or about May 17, 2007, GRANMA published the transcripts which were reportedly derived from the aforementioned intercepts. b6 b7C

Several of these calls reportedly contained references to the Havana area hotel and tourist bombings which took place in 1997. In addition, it has been reported that many of these calls included references by POSADA concerning his use of facsimile number (503) 229-9849 and the potential involvement of [redacted] b6 b7C

Given the above, it is requested that Legat Caracas conduct logical investigation and determine if the [redacted] between LUIS POSADA CARRILES, [redacted] and other [redacted] of the contemporaneous Havana hotel bombings. b6 b7C b7D

LEAD(s): b3 b6 b7C b7E

Set Lead 1: (Discretionary)

CARACAS

Case ID : [redacted] Serial : [redacted]

CC: [redacted]

6/23/07

AT CARACAS, VENEZUELA

It is requested that Legat Caracas conduct logical investigation and determi'ne if the [redacted] has [redacted] LUIS POSADA CARRILES and [redacted] discussed details of the [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2010 3:57 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Luis Posada Carriles

Greetings [redacted] from lovely Caracas, Venezuela. I was wondering if you could help me close the loop at all on this old case. If you recall Posada Carriles is the Cuban who blew up the Cuban airliner in 1976 killing 73 people. He escaped from prison in Venezuela in the 1980's and he later plotted to kill Castro in Panama in 2000. He showed up in Miami in 2005 and was detained. A series of hearings was conducted and it is my understanding he was placed under house arrest pending an asylum hearing, and that due to his age (he is currently 82 years old) that he was not going to be deported either to Venezuela or to Cuba. Do you have any insight into this case [redacted] because it looks like it's going nowhere and I'd really like to close it out if at all possible. Thanks.

[redacted]
Caracas, Venezuela

[redacted]
[illegible] May 25, 2010 [illegible]
[redacted]
[illegible]s Posada Carriles

b6 b7C

[illegible] prison in Venezuela in the 1980's and he later plotted to kill Castro in Panama in 2000. He showed up in Miami in [illegible]ed. A series of hearings was conducted and it is my understanding he was pl[illegible] [illegible]earing, and that due to hi[illegible] the [illegible]current, 82 years old) that he w[illegible] [illegible]ted either to Venezuela or to Cuba. Do you have an[illegible] insight into this case [redacted] because it look[illegible] [illegible] I d really like to close it out if at all possib[illegible]nk

[illegible]aracas, Venezuela

[redacted] b3 b7E

MMD/20

 b3 b7E

Case ID (with new class)	Documents	Old Class :
[redacted]	7	

Total Documents Reclassified : 7

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
ON 05-03-2022

b6
b7C

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THIS REPORT IS CLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IN ITS ENTIRETY

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Case Reclassification

06/15/2006

RUN BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted] b6 b7C
ON 05-03-2022

****** Statistical Information from Universal Index *****

Old Case ID	:	[redacted] b3 b7E
New Case ID	:	
Mains	:	1
References	:	0
Total records processed:		1

b3
b7E

STATISTICS OF RECLASSIFICATION

NUMBER OF CALLS CHANGED:	0
NUMBER OF SUBSCRIBERS CHANGED:	0
NUMBER OF TARGET SOURCE RECORDS CHANGED:	0
TOTAL NUMBER OF RECORDS CHANGED:	0

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

UNCLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE **Date:** 06/01/2010

To: Caracas

From: Caracas
Contact: ALAT [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]:dao

Case ID #: [redacted] Pending)

Title: LUIS POSADA CARRILES;
INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION;
VENEZUELA

Synopsis: To change case status to Pending Inactive.

Details: On 6/1/2010 ALAT [redacted] spoke with DOJ Attorney [redacted] regarding the current status of captioned case, vis-á-vis, the ongoing request for extradition of captioned subject from the U.S. to Venezuela. b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 b6 b7C

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] b6 b7C

PLEASE PLACE PENDING INACTIVE
MAJ 6/1/10

To: Caracas From: Caracas
Re: [redacted], 06/01/2010 b3 b7E

[redacted] b5 b6 b7C

[redacted] b5 b6 b7C

It is hereby requested that captioned case be put in Pending Inactive status due to the fact captioned subject will not be extradited, and that several hearings are still pending which will determine the ultimate fate of captioned subject. This case will be readdressed at such time when any information is made available with regard to captioned subject's trial outcome and/or political asylum request.

♦♦