FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1375139-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 130
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Page 69 ~ Duplicate;
Page 72 ~ OTHER - Sealed Pursuant to US Court Order;
Page 73 ~ OTHER - Sealed Pursuant to US Court Order;
Page 74 ~ OTHER - Sealed Pursuant to US Court Order;
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Page 148 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 150 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 157 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 158 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 159 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 160 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 161 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 162 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 164 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
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Page 246 ~ Duplicate;

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File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File _____ _____ _____ Date _____
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
12-997-71		
transferred to		
12-997 Sub B		

_____ _____
Employee

RECHARGE Date _____

To _____ From _____

Initials of Clerk { _____ _____ _____ } Date { _____ _____ _____ }

_____
Date charged

_____
Employee

_____
Location

126-997-72

DEC 24 1987

b6
b7C

File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File _____ _____ _____ Date _____
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
12-991-13		
transferred to		
12-997 Sub B		

_____ _____
Employee

RECHARGE Date _____

To _____ From _____

Initials of Clerk { _____ _____ _____ } Date { _____ _____ _____ }

_____
Date charged

_____
Employee

_____
Location

----------END OF DOCUMENT----------

88 JAN -7 PM 11:43

INBOX.16 (#1342)

TO: HQ1 @ EMH1, BA @ EMH2, LV @ EMH2,
BS @ EMH1, LA @ EMH1, MM @ EMH2,
NH @ EMH1, NY @ EMH1, SF @ EMH1,
TP @ EMH2

FROM: WFO @ EMH1

SUBJECT: 008/0001 PRIORITY

DATE: 8 JAN 88 01:38:54 GMT

CC:

TEXT:

VZCZCWF0001

PP HQ BA BS LV LA MM NH NY SF TP

DE WF #0001 0070041

ZNR UUUUU

P 080041Z JAN 88

FM FBI WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (12B-654) (P) (C-6)

TO DIRECTOR FBI ROUTINE

BALTIMORE ROUTINE

BOSTON PRIORITY

LAS VEGAS (INFO) ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES (INFO) ROUTINE

MIAMI (12B-1973 SUB I) PRIORITY

NEW HAVEN (INFO) ROUTINE

NEW YORK PRIORITY

SAN FRANCISCO PRIORITY

TAMPA PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

ATTENTION: SSA [redacted] SSA [redacted] CID, ROOM 3075,

FBIHQ (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] ANNAPOLIS RA (TO BE

p/s search
Section 1 - p. 2, 1
Section 2 - p. 4, 5, 6
Section 3 - p. 3, 4, 5

2 p. 6

index

Closed

12B-997-74

#5

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____

JAN 07 1988

AUTOMATED INDEX SEARCH ____

MANUAL SEARCH ____

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Index please thru tel out

see last page!

HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] HYATTSVILLE RA (TO BE

HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] AND SA [redacted] MIAMI DIVISION b6 b7C

(TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: HARTFORD RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED

ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SSA [redacted] BROOKLYN-QUEENS RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED

IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] TAMPA DIVISION (TO BE HANDCARRIED

IN SEALED ENVELOPE) 12B-RC-84* 12-R-116

"CHANGED;" [redacted] (Andrews)

12B-977*

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] NARCOTICS - ITAR - MURDER (B);

OO:WASHINGTON FIELD.

RE TELEPHONE CALL OF SA [redacted]

[redacted] BROOKLYN-QUEENS RA, JANUARY 5, 1988; AND WASHINGTON FIELD TELETYPE TO RECEIVING OFFICES, DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1987 (NO COPY TO BOSTON OR SAN FRANCISCO); AND MIAMI TELETYPE TO RECEIVING OFFICES, DATED OCTOBE 19, 1987 (NO COPY TO BOSTON OR SAN FRANCISCO).

WASHINGTON FIELD TITLE MARKED "CHANGED" TO REFLECT DELETION OF [redacted] AND ADDITION OF [redacted] [redacted] WASHINGTON FIELD TITLE PREVIOUSLY CARRIED AS, [redacted] [redacted] NARCOTICS - ITAR - MURDER (B); OO:WASHINGTON FIELD.

b6
b7C
b7D
b7F

FOR INFORMATION OF RECEIVING OFFICES, THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM [redacted] [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7F

INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY BALTIMORE AND WASHINGTON FIELD TO

DATE:

[redacted] WASHINGTON,

D. C., BALTIMORE, LAS VEGAS, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI, NEW YORK, AND

TAMPA. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7F

[redacted] IDENTIFIED IN SIGNIFICANT DETAIL BY [redacted]

----------END OF DOCUMENT----------

INBOX.17 (#1343)

TO: HQ1 @ EMH1, BA @ EMH2, BS @ EMH1,
LV @ EMH2, LA @ EMH1, MM @ EMH2,
NH @ EMH1, NY @ EMH1, SF @ EMH1, TP @ EMH2

FROM: WFO @ EMH1

SUBJECT: 008/0002 PRIORITY

DATE: 8 JAN 88 01:49:46 GMT

CC:

TEXT:

VZCZCWF0002

PP HQ BA BS LV LA MM NH NY SF TP

DE WF #0002 0070043

ZNR UUUUU

P 080043Z JAN 88

FM FBI WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (12B-654) (P) (C-6)

TO DIRECTOR FBI ROUTINE

BALTIMORE ROUTINE

BOSTON PRIORITY

LAS VEGAS (INFO) ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES (INFO) ROUTINE

MIAMI (12B-1973 SUB I) PRIORITY

NEW HAVEN (INFO) ROUTINE

NEW YORK PRIORITY

SAN FRANCISCO PRIORITY

TAMPA PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS (SECTION TWO OF FOUR)

ATTENTION: SSA [redacted] SSA [redacted] CID, ROOM 3075,
FBIHQ (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

b6
b7C

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] ANNAPOLIS RA (TO BE

HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted], HYATTSVILLE RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

b6
b7C

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] AND SA [redacted], MIAMI DIVISION (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: HARTFORD RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SSA [redacted] BROOKLYN-QUEENS RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted], TAMPA DIVISION (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

"CHANGED;" [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] NARCOTICS - ITAR - MURDER (B);

OO:WASHINGTON FIELD.

DURING THE COURSEOF MIAMI UNDERCOVER OPERATION (UCO)

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[redacted] I think this should be

WASHINGTON FIELD DETERMINED THAT [redacted]

[redacted] 12B-977

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF SUBJECTS AND ASSOCIATES

RELEVANT TO THIS INVESTIGATION:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

----------END OF DOCUMENT----------

INBOX.18 (#1344)

TO: HQ1 @ EMH1, BA @ EMH2, BS @ EMH1,
LV @ EMH2, LA @ EMH1, MM @ EMH2,
NH @ EMH1, NY @ EMH1, SF @ EMH1,
TP @ EMH2

FROM: WFO @ EMH1

SUBJECT: 008/0003 PRIORITY

DATE: 8 JAN 88 01:55:17 GMT

CC:

TEXT:

VZCZCWF0003

PP HQ BA BS LV LA MM NH NY SF TP

DE WF #0003 0070044

ZNR UUUUU

P 080044Z JAN 88

FM FBI WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (12B-654) (P) (C-6)

TO DIRECTOR FBI ROUTINE

BALTIMORE ROUTINE

BOSTON PRIORITY

LAS VEGAS (INFO) ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES (INFO) ROUINE

MIAMI (12B-1973 SUB I) PRIORITY

NEW HAVEN (INFO) ROUTINE

NEW YORK PRIORITY

SAN FRANCISCO PRIORITY

TAMPA PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS (SECTION THREE OF FOUR)

ATTENTION: SSA [redacted] SSA [redacted] CID, ROOM 3075, b6 b7C

FBIHQ (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted], ANNAPOLIS RA (TO BE

HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] HYATTSVILLE RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

b6
b7C

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] AND SA [redacted] MIAMI DIVISION (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: HARTFORD RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SSA [redacted] BROOKLYN-QUEENS RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] TAMPA DIVISION (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

"CHANGED;" [redacted]

[redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] NARCOTICS - ITAR - MURDER (B);

OO:WASHINGTON FIELD.

[redacted]

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] GENERAL MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA, THE MILITARY DICTATOR OF PANAMA, WHO IS THE SUBJECT OF SEVERAL GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS FOR HIS ALLEGED TIES TO "THE MEDELLIN CARTEL."

ADDITIONALLY, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D b7F

LEADS: BOSTON DIVISION: AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS:

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D b7E b7F

MIAMI DIVISION: AT MIAMI, FLORIDA:

[redacted]

BT

#0003

NNNN

----------END OF DOCUMENT----------

INBOX.19 (#1345)

TO: HQ1 @ EMH1, BA @ EMH2, BS @ EMH1,
LV @ EMH2, LA @ EMH1, MM @ EMH2,
NH @ EMH1, NY @ EMH1, SF @ EMH1,
TP @ EMH2

FROM: WFO @ EMH1

SUBJECT: 008/0052 PRIORITY

DATE: 8 JAN 88 02:00:22 GMT

CC:

TEXT:

VZCZCWF0052

PP HQ BA BS LV LA MM NH NY SF TP

DE WF #0052 0070045

ZNR UUUUU

P 080045Z JAN 88

FM FBI WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (12B-654) (P) (C-6)

TO DIRECTOR FBI ROUTINE

BALTIMORE ROUTINE

BOSTON PRIORITY

LAS VEGA (INFO) ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES (INFO) ROUTINE

MIAMI (12B-1973 SUB I) PRIORITY

NEW HAVEN (INFO) ROUTINE

NEW YORK PRIORITY

SAN FRANCISCO PRIORITY

TAMPA PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR)

ATTENTION: SSA [redacted] SSA [redacted] CID, ROOM 3075, b6 b7C

FBIHQ (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] ANNAPOLIS RA (TO BE

HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] HYATTSVILLE RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

b6
b7C

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] MIAMI DIVISION (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: HARTFORD RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SSA [redacted] BROOKLYN-QUEENS RA (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

ATTENTION: SA [redacted] TAMPA DIVISION (TO BE HANDCARRIED IN SEALED ENVELOPE)

"CHANGED;" [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] NARCOTICS - ITAR - MURDER (B);

OO:WASHINGTON FIELD.

[redacted]

b7D

FD-302 (REV. 3-10-82)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 12/30/87

[redacted] was interviewed at the office of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), 500 Zack Street, Tampa, Florida. Present during the interview were Special Agent (SA) [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents, and that he was being questioned concerning [redacted]

[redacted] reiterated that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

As regards the individual [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

Investigation on 12/14/87 at Tampa, Florida File # Tampa 12B-997-75

by SA [redacted] b6 b7C

SA

Date dictated 12/18/87

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] General
MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA, but he was never told this directly.

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

TP 12B-997

 b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] NORIEGA. [redacted]

to talk to NORIEGA [redacted]

[redacted] NORIEGA, b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] General NORIEGA.

[redacted]

with NORIEGA, [redacted]

[redacted]

in NORIEGA's [redacted]

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File _____ _____ _____ Date _____
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
12-997-78		
transferred to		
12-997 Sub B		

_____
Employee

RECHARGE Date _____

To _____ From _____

Initials of Clerk { _____ _____ _____ } Date { _____ _____ _____ }

_____
Date charged

_____
Employee

_____
Location

FD-350 (Rev. 5-8-81)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Smuggler testifies of alliance with Noriega

WASHINGTON — A convicted drug smuggler testified Thursday that Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega arranged for him to receive a diplomatic passport, a nearly $2-million line of credit from a government bank and military protection after Noriega became a "full-scale co-conspirator in my drug operation."

Steven Michael Kalish, a key witness in a Justice Department investigation of Noriega, told a Senate subcommittee that he delivered at least $650,000 in payoffs to Noriega. He said one of the alleged payoffs — for $250,000 — was a downpayment on a $4-million bribe Noriega and two Panamanian associates agreed to accept to allow shipment of 400,000 pounds of marijuana through Panama to the United States.

Kalish, whose alleged involvement with Noriega took place between September 1983 and July 1984, testified that Noriega told him he planned to use some of the alleged payoffs to help finance the 1984 presidential campaign of Nicolas Ardito Barletta, who was narrowly elected president with Noriega's backing. Barletta was forced out of office in 1985 after Noriega became disenchanted with him.

Kalish said Noriega also arranged for him to handle a $1.7-million helicopter sale to the Panamanian Defense Forces. Kalish said Noriega, the commander-in-chief of the forces, asked for a kickback on the sale and instructed him to generate the money by inflating the price.

Allegations linking Noriega, Panama's de facto ruler, to the multibillion-dollar Latin American narcotics trade have existed for more than 15 years. Noriega has repeatedly denied the allegations and has said they are often the product of convicted criminals seeking leniency.

However, congressional officials said Thursday that Kalish's testimony, partly supported by documents, provided a rare public glimpse of the allegations against Noriega and illustrated how the general may be using his vast military and government powers to convert Panama into a safe haven for international drug traffickers.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

Date: January 29, 1988
Edition: ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA
PAGE 1-A
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: Tampa

Indexing:

128-997-79

SEARCHED ____
INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED mcc
FILED mcc

BRL

FBI/DOJ

Kalish, for example, testified that Noriega also assisted a group of notorious Colombian drug kings, known as the Medellin cartel, which U.S. officials believe is responsible for most of the cocaine smuggled into the United States.

Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs permanent subcommittee on investigations, said after Thursday's hearing, "I hope the Panamanian people take due notice of what happened here today. In the final analysis, what happens to Gen. Noriega is in the hands of the Panamanian people."

The Reagan administration has been pushing Noriega, who is facing increasing internal opposition, to resign. Nunn said Thursday's testimony on Noriega's alleged drug ties "compounds an already difficult relationship."

Kalish, a 35-year-old high-school dropout from the Houston area, said he frequently loaned a custom Lear Jet to Noriega and other Panamanian officials for trips to the United States and elsewhere.

Kalish said that, when he greeted Noriega after a November 1983 trip that Kalish said Noriega made to the United States in the jet, Noriega told him that he had visited President Reagan in Washington. Kalish said Noriega told him that Reagan urged him to liberalize Panama's bank-secrecy laws to help U.S. drug investigators and had asked the general to help the U.S.-backed Contras fighting Nicaragua's Sandinista government.

"Noriega assured me that he would never open up the banks in Panama," Kalish testified.

Kalish said he started selling marijuana to friends at age 15 and eventually helped direct a multi-million-dollar international drug ring. He has been serving an eight-year prison sentence since his arrest in July 1984, and is currently facing an added sentence of up to 20 years for a 1987 drug conviction in Tampa.

Kalish said that within a day of arriving in Panama in September 1983, intermediaries introduced him to Noriega. He said he made a $300,000 payment to Noriega in their first meeting.

He said that when he asked Noriega for a guarantee that he would be repaid for the helicopter he sold to the military, Noriega arranged for the National Bank of Panama to issue Kalish a nearly $2-million irrevocable line of credit. However, Kalish said, he has not found it necessary to convert the letter to cash because the military has kept up its payments.

Kalish, a fugitive from U.S. authorities when he moved to Panama, said Noriega arranged for him to receive three Panamanian passports, including a diplomatic one. Kalish claims he paid $60,000 for the diplomatic passport to a Noriega associate, Cesar Rodriguez Contreras, a suspected drug pilot murdered in Colombia in 1986.



Drug smuggler Kalish, left, says he received a diplomatic passport, protection and a line of credit from Noriega for at least $650,000 in payoffs.

File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File _____ _____ _____ Date _____
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
12-997-80	82	
	81	
transferred to		
12-997 Sub B		

_____ _____
Employee

RECHARGE Date _____

To _____ From _____

Initials of Clerk { _____ _____ _____ } Date { _____ _____ _____ }

_____
Date charged

_____
Employee

_____
Location

FD [illegible] (Rev. 8-29-85)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 12/29/87

TO: SAC, TAMPA

[redacted] b3 b7E

FROM: WFO SAC, MIAMI (12B-1973) (N-2)

245B-148-884

MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA
COLOMBIAN/SOUTH AMERICAN
DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS

12D-254 sub 1 385 p 2

12D-254 sub 1-371

On 11/25/87, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA, military strongman of Panama, in a money laundering scheme with [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] and currently lives in Panama as does [redacted] b6 b7C b7D travel to the United States [redacted]

[redacted] reportedly [redacted] Omar Torrijos airport in Panama. It may be, according to [redacted] connected in some way to the laundering activities of NORIEGA and [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

2 - Tampa (Info.)
2 - Miami
EP:jva
(4)

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) (Time) Per 12B-997-83

SEARCHED ..... INDEXED .....
SERIALIZED ..... FILED .....
JAN 15 1988
FBI — TAMPA

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] was unable to provide specific details regarding [redacted] NORIEGA and [redacted] Further, he was unable to elaborate on [redacted] NORIEGA's activities are directly or indirectly tied to any legal or illegal activities on the part of [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

ADMINISTRATIVE:

The above is being furnished for the information of Tampa in view of Tampa's ongoing interest in NORIEGA's links to narcotics trafficking activities.

It should be noted that [redacted] in the upcoming months. His motives for coming forth to provide unsolicited information regarding a matter that he obviously has little knowledge of are suspect, to say the least.

b6
b7C
b7D

It was the opinion of the interviewing agents that [redacted] appeared to be seeking to ingratiate himself with the FBI for reasons unknown as yet but which may have to do with the fact that [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

No other action being taken by Miami other than to continue to accept whatever information [redacted] wishes to furnish in this matter.

b6
b7C
b7D

FD-515 (Rev. 6-6-85)
ACCOMPLISHMENT REPORT
(Effective 10/1/85)
(Submit within 30 days from date of accomplishment)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

Bureau File Number: 12B-997
Field Office File Number: 5
Squad or RA Number:
Agent's Social Security No.:

Date 2/5/88

FROM: SAC, Tampa
SUBJECT:
STARBANK;
GENERAL MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA;
[redacted] b6 b7C
NARCOTICS MATTER;
OO: TAMPA

Investigative Assistance or Technique Used
Were any of the investigative assistance or techniques listed below used in connection with accomplishment being claimed? ☒ No ☐ Yes - If Yes, rate each used as follows:
1 = Used, but did not help 2 = Helped, but only minimally 3 = Helped, substantially 4 = Absolutely essential

1. Acctg Tech Assistance Rating	8. Eng. Sect. Tape Exams Rating	15. Photographic Coverage Rating	22. Telephone Toll Recs Rating
2. Aircraft Assistance	9. Hypnosis Assistance	16. Polygraph Assistance	23. UCO Group I
3. Computer Assistance	10. Ident Div Assistance	17. Search Warrants Executed	24. UCO Group II b7E
4. Consensual Monitoring	11. Informant Information	18. Show Money Usage	25. UC Other
5. ELSUR - FISC	12. Lab Div Exams	19. Surveil. Sqd. (SOG) Asst	26. NCAVC/ VI-CAP
6. ELSUR - Title III	13. Lab Div Field Support	20. SWAT Team Action	27. Visual Invest - Analysis (VIA)
7. Eng. Sect. Field Support	14. Pen Registers	21. Tech. Agt. or Tech Equip	

A. Preliminary Judicial Process (Number of subjects)

Complaints	Informations	Indictments
		1

B. Arrests, Locates, Summonses or Subpoenas Served (No. of Subj.)

	Subject Priority* A	B	C
FBI Arrests -			
FBI Locates -			
Local Arrests -			

Subpoenas Served ____
Criminal Summons ____
Local Crim. Summons ____
FBI Subj. Resisted ____ ; Armed ____

C. Release of Hostages or Children Located: (Number of Hostages or Children Located)
Hostages Held By Terrorists ____ ; All Other Hostage Situations ____
Missing or Kidnaped Children Located ____

D. Recoveries, Restitutions, or Potential Economic Loss Prevented (PELP) (Explain valuation in remarks)

Property Type Code*	Recoveries	Restitutions	PELP Type Code*	Potential Economic Loss Prevented
	$	$		$
	$	$		$
	$	$		$
	$	$		$
	$	$		$

E. Civil Matters

	Government Defendant	Government Plaintiff
Amount of Suit	$	$
Settlement or Award	$	$ Enter AFA Payment Here

F. Final Judicial Process: Judicial District ____ District ____ State ____ Conviction or Pretrial Div. Date ____ Sentence Date ____ No. of Subjects ____ Acquitted ____ Dismissed

Subject 1 Subject Description Code* —

☐ Felony / ☐ Misdemeanor	Conviction: Title	Section	Counts	Combined Sentence: In-Jail Yrs	Mos	Suspended Yrs	Mos	Probation Yrs	Mos

☐ Plea ☐ Trial ☐ Pretrial Diversion
Total Fines $
Add consecutive sentences together.
Enter longest single concurrent sentence
Do not add concurrent sentences together.
Sentence 10 yrs.-8 yrs. susp. = 2 yrs. In-Jail

Subject 2 Subject Description Code* —

☐ Felony / ☐ Misdemeanor	Conviction: Title	Section	Counts	Combined Sentence: In-Jail Yrs	Mos	Suspended Yrs	Mos	Probation Yrs	Mos

☐ Plea ☐ Trial ☐ Pretrial Diversion
Total Fines $
Add consecutive sentences together.
Enter longest single concurrent sentence.
Do not add concurrent sentences together.
Sentence 10 yrs.-8 yrs. susp. = 2 yrs. In-Jail.

Subject 3 Subject Description Code* —

☐ Felony / ☐ Misdemeanor	Conviction: Title	Section	Counts	Combined Sentence: In-Jail Yrs	Mos	Suspended Yrs	Mos	Probation Yrs	Mos

☐ Plea ☐ Trial ☐ Pretrial Diversion
Total Fines $
Add consecutive sentences together.
Enter longest single concurrent sentence.
Do not add concurrent sentences together.
Sentence 10 yrs.-8 yrs. susp. = 2 yrs. In-Jail.

Subject 4 Subject Description Code* —

☐ Felony / ☐ Misdemeanor	Conviction: Title	Section	Counts	Combined Sentence: In-Jail Yrs	Mos	Suspended Yrs	Mos	Probation Yrs	Mos

☐ Plea ☐ Tnal ☐ Pretrial Diversion
Total Fines $
Add consecutive sentences together.
Enter longest single concurrent sentence
Do not add concurrent sentences together.
Sentence 10 yrs.-8 yrs. susp = 2 yrs In-Jail.

Attach additional forms if reporting final judicial process on more than four subjects, and submit a final disposition for (R-84) for each subject.

Remarks: (For **every** subject reported in Sections A, B or F above, provide name, DOB, race*, sex, and POB and SSAN if available.)

GENERAL MANUEL NORIEGA; 2/11/38, white male, Panamanian citizen; presently commanding officer of Panamanian Defense Forces.

CREDIT SA [redacted] WITH ONE INDICTMENT. b6 b7C

12B-997-85
SEARCHED ____
INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____
FILED ____

2 - Bureau
2 - Field Office (1 - 66-3 SUb 1) (COMPUTER ASSISTANT)
* See codes on reverse side.

VLJ:cr*
(4)

File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File _____ _____ _____ Date _____
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
	12B- 997 - 87-93	
	serialized into	
	12B- 997 Sub A-18- 18-24	

_____
Employee

RECHARGE Date _____

To _____ From _____

Initials of Clerk _____ _____ _____

Date _____ _____ _____

12B-997-94



FD-448 (Rev. 9-18-78)

Transmit attached by Facsimile - UNCLAS

Precedence DEFERRED

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (245B-364)

Date: 2/5/88

From: SAC, TAMPA (12B-997)

Time: Transmitted - 1330Z

Subject: STANBAK;
GENERAL MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA;
[redacted]

Initials - ELJ/VG

b6
b7C

☐ Fingerprint Photo ☐ Fingerprint Record ☐ Map ☐ Newspaper clipping ☐ Photograph

☐ Artists Conception ☒ Other PRESS RELEASE

Special handling instructions:

CONTACT SSA [redacted] OR UNIT CHIEF [redacted], COLOMBIAN/SA TRAFFICKING UNIT X3730 ROOM 3075 IMMEDIATELY

b6
b7C

Approved: [signature]

12B - 997

FBI/DOJ

FD-448 (Rev. 9-18-78)

Transmit attached by Facsimile - UNCLAS

Precedence FLASH

To: FBIHQ

From: FBI-TP (128-997)

Subject: STARBANK
00;TP

Date: 2/5/88

Time: Transmitted - 1620Z

Initials - ELJ/

☐ Fingerprint Photo ☐ Fingerprint Record ☐ Map ☐ Newspaper clipping ☐ Photograph

☐ Artists Conception ☒ Other TP-Indictment of General Manuel Antonio Noriega; [redacted]

Special handling instructions:

Attention: [redacted] 1. Colombian South American Drug Trafficking Unit,

b6
b7C

RELAY TO USCOAT; PANAMA CITY

Approved: ZWB/BAL

FBI/DOJ

File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File _____ _____ _____ Date _____
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
12-991-96	98	
97		
transferred to		
12-997 Sub B		

_____ _____
Employee

RECHARGE Date _____

To _____ From _____

Initials of Clerk { _____ _____ _____ } Date { _____ _____ _____ }

_____
Date charged

_____
Employee

_____
Location



12B-997-99
SEARCHED _____
INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED M
FILED M

BRL

QH.NAM/NORIEGA,MANUEL ANTONIO.SEX/M.RAC/W.DOB/021138.PUR/C.ATN [redacted] b6 b7C

0020 0218 1259
NCIC REPLY1
NO IDENTIFIABLE RECORD IN THE NCIC INTERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX
(III) FOR NAM/NORIEGA,MANUEL ANTONIO.SEX/M.RAC/W.DOB/021138.
NOTICE -- THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE OF MATCHING
RECORDS IN LOCAL, STATE, OR FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION FILES THAT ARE
NOT INDEXED IN THE NCIC III. IF YOU DESIRE A SEARCH OF THE FBI
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION FILES, A FINGERPRINT CARD SHOULD BE SUBMITTED.
END
ZI.NAM/NORIEGA,MANUEL ANTONIO.SEX/M.RAC/W.DOB/021138
QP.NAM/NORIEGA,MANUEL ANTONIO.SEX/M.RAC/W.DOB/021138

0021 0218 1301
X02016
NCIC REPLY1

MKE/WANTED PERSON - CAUTION
ORI/FLFBITP00 NAM/NORIEGA,MANUEL ANTONIO SEX/M RAC/W POB/PM DOB/021138
HGT/509 WGT/180 EYE/BRO HAI/BLK
SMT/SC FACE OFF/MARIJUANA - SMUGGL DOW/020588 OCA/12B-997
MIS/COM OF DEF FORCES CASE88-28-CR-T-13B
ORI IS FBI TAMPA FL
AKA/TONY,THE GENERAL
NIC/W472930969

0022 0218 1301
FCIC REPLY

** WANTED PERSON **

QD.NAM/MANUEL,ANTONIO,NORIEGA,021138,M.

0025 0218 1303

NO RECORD FOUND FOR DL NUMBER
NAM/MANUEL,ANTONIO,NORIEGA,021138,M
END OF DDL/DHSMV RESPONSE
PAGE: 01

FD-65 (Rev. 1-13-86)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

AIRTEL

To: Director, FBI
Att: Criminal Investigative Division
Fugitive Unit

Date: 2/[illegible]/88

INSTRUCTIONS - Reverse Side

NOTE: Priority "A" and "B" Fugitives - With initial submission, set forth a synopsis of crime on reverse side.

From: SAC, Tampa (12B-997) (P)

Subject:
STARBANK;
GENERAL MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA;
ET AL;
DRUG MATTER;
OO: TAMPA

- ☐ III Inquiry
- ☒ Initial Submission
- ☐ Initial Submission - Parental Kidnaping
- ☐ Supplements FD-65 dated

Indicate Fugitive Priority
- ☐ A
- ☐ B
- ☐ C
- ☐ D (Parental Kidnaping)

[illegible]	✓		[illegible]	
III	☐			
MODIFY	☐			
CLEAR	☐			
CANCEL	☐			
LOCATE	☐			
DATE		NCIC #		

Caution MKE	Name NAM	Sex SEX	Race RAC
	MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA	M	W

Place of Birth POB	Birth Date DOB	Date of Emancipation DOE	Height HGT	Weight WGT
PANAMA	2/11/38		5'9"	180

Eye Color EYE	Hair Color HAI	FBI No. FBI	Skin Tone SKN
BROWN	BLACK		

Scars, Marks, Tattoos, and Other Characteristics SMT
POT MARKS FACE

NCIC Fingerprint Classification FPC	Other Identifying Number MNU	Social Security # SOC

Operator's License Number OLN	Operator's License State OLS	Year Expires OLY

Offense Charged OFF
Conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana and attempted importation of in excess of $1,000,000 pounds of marijuana.

U. S. Code, Title and Section 3 count indictment - Title 21, UCS, Sections 952 & 841(a)(1); Title 21, UCS, Sections 952 & 963, Title 18 UCS, Section 2.*

Warrant Issued By DOW
FBI, Case# 8818-0140T

F.O. File # OCA
12B-997

Miscellaneous Including Bond Recommended (MIS)
Case # 88-28-CR-T-13(B)

*Date of Warrant 2/5/88

LICENSE PLATE AND VEHICLE INFORMATION

License Plate Number LIC	State LIS	Year Expires LIY	License Plate Type LIT

Vehicle Identification # VIN	Year VYR	Make VMA	Model VMO	Style VST	Color VCO

Aliases	Additional Identifiers
The General Tony	Commander in Chief of Panamanian Defense Forces

12B-997-100

NCIC # NIC
W472930969

SEARCHED ____
INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED [illegible]
FILED [illegible]

2 - FBIHQ (1 - Fugitive Unit)
2 - Tampa
MV:cr*

EW-C.FLFBITP00.NORIEGA, ANTONIO MANUEL.M.W.PM.021138..
509.180.BRO.BRO...SC FACE.....3561.021788.12B-997.
COM OF DEF FORCES CASE#88-28-CR-T-13B
FLFBITP00
NAM/NORIEGA, ANTONIO MANUEL NIC/W472930969

EN.FLFBITP00.NAM/NORIEGA, ANTONIO MANUEL.OCA/12B-997.
AKA/TONY,THE GENERAL
FLFBITP00
SUPP NAM/NORIEGA, ANTONIO MANUEL OCA/ 12B-997

MW.FLFBITP00.NAM/NORIEGA, ANTONIO MANUEL.NIC/W472930969.NAM/NORIEGA,MANUEL ANTONIO.
HAI/BLK.DOW/020588
FLFBITP00
MODIFY NAM/NORIEGA, ANTONIO MANUEL NIC/W472930969

SEARCHED
INDEXED
SERIALIZED
FILED
b6
b7C

Entered By

12B-997-102

----------END OF DOCUMENT----------

INBOX.8 (#603) 88 FEB 17 PM 11:47

TO: TP @ EMH2

FROM: NY @ EMH1

SUBJECT: 048/307 PP

DATE: 17 FEB 88 22:07:53 GMT

C:

TEXT: VZCZCNY0307

PP TP

DE NY #0307 0482151

ZNY UUUUU

R 172142Z FEB 88

FM FBI NEW YORK (12-63)

TO FBI TAMPA () PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

STARBANK; GENERAL MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA; NARCOTICS; OO:TP.

RE NYO TELCALL TO TAMPA FEBRUARY 16, 1988, AND TAMPA FILE STARBANK.

FOR THE INFORMATION OF TAMPA OFFICE, NYO WAS CONTACTED ON FEBRUARY 13, 1988 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

mailed

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

ACCORDINGLY, ON [redacted] AN INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED

[redacted]

NYO, FBI.

[redacted]

[redacted] TAMPA'S AND MIAMI'S ATTENTION ARE BEING BROUGHT TO THIS INCIDENT ONLY AS A MATTER OF CAUTION BASED ON THE NOTARIETY AND IMPORT OF THE NORIEGA MATTER. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

TAMPA AND MIAMI SHOULD BE AWARE OF [redacted]

[redacted]

A. [redacted]

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

[redacted]

D. [redacted]

E. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

F.

G.

H.

THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED REGARDING SOURCE AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED PROTECTED INFORMATION:

NAME:

DATE OF BIRTH (DOB):

PLACE OF BIRTH (POB):

SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER (SSAN): [redacted]

INS NUMBER: [redacted]

[redacted] PASSPORT NUMBER: [redacted]

CURRENT ADDRESS: [redacted]

EMPLOYMENT: [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

NYO OCIS, INDICES AND NCIC NEGATIVE.

BT

#0307

NNNN

FILE 80-1 2/10/88

SA [redacted] b6 b7C

STARBANK

On 2/5/88, SAC ROBERT W. BUTLER and ASAC [redacted] participated in a press conference regarding captioned matter in the office of the U.S. Attorney, ROBERT W. MERKLE at 11 AM.

Participation in this press conference was previously approved on 2/3/88 by [redacted] Press Office, FBIHQ.

2 - Tampa (12B-997)
LBC/sjm
(2)

1*

12B-997-105
SEARCHED [redacted] INDEXED [redacted]
SERIALIZED [redacted] FILED [redacted]
FEB - 9 1988
FBI - TAMPA

File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File _____ _____ _____ Date _____
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
12-997-	108	
	109	
transferred to		
12-997 Sub B		

_____ _____
Employee

RECHARGE Date _____

To _____ From _____

Initials of Clerk { _____ _____ _____ } Date { _____ _____ _____ }

_____
Date charged

_____
Employee

_____
Location

INBOX.3 (#511)

TEXT:

VZCZCMM0006

PP HQ BA DL LV LA NY TP WF

DE MM #0006 0682004

ZNY EEEEE

P 0682004Z MAR88

FM MIAMI (12B-1973 SUB I) (N-7) (P)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI PRIORITY

BALTIMORE PRIORITY

DALLAS (INFO) PRIORITY

LAS VEGAS (INFO) PRIORITY

LOS ANGELES (INFO) PRIORITY

NEW YORK PRIORITY

TAMPA (INFO) PRIORITY

WFO PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION ONE OF THREE

ATTENTION BUREAU/SSA [redacted] CHIEF, COLOMBIAN/SOUTH

AMERICAN DRUG TRAFFICKERS UNIT, CID, ROOM 3075; ATTENTION

BALTIMORE/SA [redacted] ANAPOLIS RA; ATTENTION TAMPA/SA

[redacted] ATTETION/SA [redacted]

[redacted] COLOMBIAN/SOUTH AMERICAN

b6
b7C

12B-997-110

~~12B-549~~



DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS (PANAMA/U.S.); REI; OO: MIAMI.

RE MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU AND RECEIVING OFFICES DATED OCTOBER 16, 1987, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE AND MIAMI TELCALL OF SA [redacted] TO WFO SUPERVISOR [redacted] DATED MARCH 3, 1988. b6 b7C

SUMMARY:

INSTANT COMMUNICATION SET FORTH DETAILS CONCERNING THE [redacted] b6 b7C b7D [redacted] IN WASHINGTON D.C. AND NEW YORK CITY AND ACTIVE IN A NUMBER OF U.S. CITIES.

ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE, [redacted] b6 b7C b7D [redacted] RULER OF PANAMA, GENERAL MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA.

[redacted] b7D

INBOX.4 (#512)

TEXT:

VZCZCMM0007

PP HQ BA DL LV LA NY TP WF

DE MM #0007 0682006

ZNY EEEEE

P 0682006Z MAR88

FM MIAMI (12B-1973 SUB I) (N-7) (P)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI PRIORITY

BALTIMORE PRIORITY

DALLAS (INFO) PRIORITY

LAS VEGAS (INFO) PRIORITY

LOS ANGELES (INFO) PRIORITY

NEW YORK PRIORITY

TAMPA (INFO) PRIORITY

WFO PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS E F T O SECTIO TWO OF THREE

ATTENTION BUREAU/SSA [redacted] CHIEF, COLOMBIAN/SOUTH

AMERICAN DRUG TRAFFICKERS UNIT, CID, ROOM 3075; ATTENTION

BALTIMORE/SA [redacted] ANAPOLIS RA; ATTENTION TAMPA/SA [redacted] ATTENTION/SA [redacted]

[redacted] COLOMBIAN/SOUTH AMERICAN

b6
b7C

INBOX.5 (#513)

TEXT:

VZCZCMM0008

PP HQ BA DL LV LA NY TP WF

DE MM #0008 0682008

ZNY EEEEE

P 0682008Z MAR88

FM MIAMI (12B-1973 SUB I) (N-7) (P)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI PRIORITY

BALTIMORE PRIORITY

DALLAS (INFO) PRIORITY

LAS VEGAS (INFO PRIORITY

LOS ANGELES (INFO) PRIORITY

NEW YORK PRIORITY

TAMPA (INFO) PRIORITY

WFO PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION THREE OF THREE

ATTENTION BUREAU/SSA [redacted] CHIEF, COLOMBIAN/SOUTH

AMERICAN DRUG TRAFFICKERS UNIT, CID, ROOM 3075; ATTENTION

BALTIMORE/SA [redacted] ANAPOLIS RA; ATTENTION TAMPA/SA [redacted] ATTENTION/SA [redacted]

[redacted] COLOMBIAN/SOUTH AMERICAN

b6
b7C

DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS (PANAMA/U.S.); REI; OO: MIAMI.

FBI/DEA JOINT INTELLIGENCE WORKING GROUP (MIAMI) VIA SA [redacted] FBI MIAMI, SQUAD N-7.

b6
b7C

BT

#0008

NNNN

FD-302 (REV. 3-10-82)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 1/25/88

[redacted] was interviewed at a secure b6
location in [redacted] He was advised of the identity b7C
of the interviewing Agent and that he was being interviewed b7D
concerning [redacted] especially
as regards [redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 1/20/88 at [redacted] File # Tampa 12B-997-III

by SA [redacted] bpt* Date dictated 1/22/88

b6
b7C
b7D

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1375139-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 106
Page 4 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 5 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 6 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 7 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 8 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 9 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 10 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 11 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 12 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 13 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 14 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 15 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 16 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 17 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 18 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 19 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 20 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 21 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
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Page 24 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 25 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 26 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 27 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 28 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 29 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 30 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 31 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 32 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 33 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 34 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 35 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 36 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 37 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 38 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 39 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 40 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 41 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 42 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 43 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 44 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 45 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 46 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 47 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 48 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 49 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 50 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 51 ~ b3; b7E;

Page 52 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 53 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 54 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 55 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 56 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 57 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 58 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 59 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 60 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 61 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 62 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 63 ~ b3; b7E;
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WITNESS LIST

HEARING BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
U.S. SENATE
DRUGS AND MONEY LAUNDERING IN PANAMA
JANUARY 28, 1988

Steven Michael Kalish
Convicted Narcotics Smuggler

William P. Rosenblatt
Assistant Commissioner
Office of Enforcement
U.S. Customs Service

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN

January 28, 1988

With today's hearing on the alleged involvement of Panama officials, specifically General Manuel Antonio Noriega, in narcotics trafficking and money laundering, PSI enters a new and momentous phase in its long-standing effort to examine key drug issues facing the Nation. Right at the outset, I want to emphasize that a great deal is at stake in the testimony we will hear this morning. At issue, for one thing, is the credibility and reputation of the leader of a country that has played and continues to play a vitally important strategic role in our Nation's military security and economic well-being.

Also in question, is our continuing ability to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S. I have often said that one of the biggest challenges we face in the war on drugs is obtaining strong, ongoing support from the people and governments of so-called source or transshipment countries. Without such support, I fear that we will be facing a lonely and extremely difficult, if not impossible, task in halting the flow of drugs across our borders.

Today's proceedings cap a Subcommittee investigation of long-standing allegations that link General Noriega and high level subordinates in Panama's Defense Forces with the Latin American drug trade. There have been numerous published reports on this subject, including allegations of connections between General Noriega and drug activities as long ago as the early 1970's, when he headed the Panamanian military intelligence service. Such reports have continued to appear periodically right up through the present time.

Recently, however, allegedly new information has surfaced, prompting renewed attempts to scrutinize the General's past record and persistent denials of wrongdoing. In a June, 1986 New York Times article, for example, General Noriega was described, "according to evidence collected by American intelligence agencies," as being "extensively involved in illicit money laundering and drug activities." According to published reports, by the latter part of last year, two federal grand juries had begun separate investigations of these continuing allegations against the General.

At the same time, U.S. support for General Noriega has declined, although the reasons for this include factors in addition to his alleged involvement in drug activities. For example, the Panamanian military has recently been criticized for its role in Panamanian politics, particularly its harsh response to the civil unrest that broke out last June.

As a result of these concerns, the Administration froze most of Panama's $26 million in U.S. aid in July of last year. Last month the Senate added a provision to the omnibus spending bill which contains far-reaching sanctions, including: a cutoff of virtually all economic and military assistance to Panama, including aid previously approved but still undelivered; the elimination of Panama's quota for sugar exports to the U.S.; and, mandatory U.S. votes against loans to Panama by international development banks.

To date, General Noriega has consistently denied any involvement with or assistance to drug traffickers. Faced by those denials and in the absence of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, these types of allegations and rumors have remained just that, allegation and rumor.

It is not the province nor the practice of this Subcommittee to act as a forum for empty allegations or unfounded rumors. This is no less the case when we deal with a foreign public official such as General Noriega. As such, I want to stress that we are here today to receive and consider not rumor or innuendo, but rather sworn testimony and documentary evidence as to General Noriega's alleged involvement in the drug trade.

Specifically, an individual who states he has personal knowledge of the involvement of Panamanian officials in drug trafficking and money laundering activities will provide testimony this morning that heretofore has not been heard in public. This witness, as a convicted drug smuggler, has been cooperating with federal authorities for some time in a number of investigations. Given the very serious nature of the allegations he makes, I intend to listen to his testimony very carefully this morning, as well as to consider very closely the law enforcement information and documentary evidence which bears directly on his credibility as a witness.

In closing, I want to commend Senator Roth and the Minority staff for taking the lead in this important and timely investigation. This is yet another example of this Subcommittee's long history of bipartisan efforts on issues of critical importance to the Nation, such as drug trafficking. Again, I congratulate Senator Roth for his efforts and look forward to this morning's testimony.

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Opening Statement
of Senator William V. Roth, Jr.
January 28, 1988

The world's attention has recently been focused on Panama. The reports from Panama include allegations of corruption, bribery, and even murder. As a result, there has been continued unrest in Panama -- disgruntled Panamanian citizens took to the streets, the military-dominated government attempted to stifle dissent and the U.S. Embassy was even attacked.

Panama is vitally important to the United States in part because of the Panama Canal, in part because of the close ties between the Panamanian people and the people of the United States.

Here today we focus on a problem of equal significance to the security interests of the United States -- the role played by Panamanian officials in facilitating the narcotics pipeline. To put it bluntly: Panamanian officials, including the most powerful

one in the country, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, are being charged with making lots of money by helping drug smugglers and money launderers ply their trade. Any such practices must stop.

Today we will hear from an admitted drug smuggler, Steven Kalish, who lived in Panama under the name "Skip" Brown who will state that he directly paid General Noriega for the privilege of using Panama not only as a safe repository for his money but as a base of operations for his smuggling activities. I must say any such role played by General Noriega and other Panamanian officials is nothing short of outrageous.

It has been no secret that for some years now that Panama has provided a safe and secret haven for the world's wealthiest narcotics traffickers. Easy creation of secret corporations and strict bank secrecy laws guarantee protection and anonymity to money launderers. Panama is close to the United States and uses the American dollar, which avoids the inconvenience of exchanging

currency. (Frankly, I wish we could convince the Japanese to do the same.)

As the staff discovered in the course of an 18-month investigation, which included a staff trip to Panama, we have learned that because of these facts, the Panamanian banking system has been flooded with American dollars. Consider that between 1982 and 1987, Panamanian banks had a surplus of over 3.8 billion in American dollars to return to the United States Federal Reserve. Where is the money coming from? As we will hear today from a representative of the Customs Service, in a recent U.S. Customs' operation known as Buckstop, over 16 million American dollars illegally bound for Panama was seized at three locations in only six months. If that's what we came up with in random seizures in just six months, you can imagine what slipped through. There are, in fact, very few drug money laundering operations that do not involve Panama in some way.

I expect that Panamanian officials will dismiss the testimony we will hear today as the fabrications of a narcotics trafficker out to save his own skin. If that is the case, if Mr. Kalish made all this up, then how did he come by several Panamanian passports, one of which bears diplomatic credentials? Why did Mr. Kalish's wife receive a handwritten note from General Noriega welcoming her to Panama? Mr. Kalish is, after all, an admitted drug smuggler. That was his business before he went to Panama and his business while he lived in Panama. How is it that Mr. Kalish received an irrevocable letter of credit from the National Bank of Panama for $1,995,000 to finance the purchase of a helicopter for the Panama Defense Forces? Clearly, we have evidence of drug-related corruption extending to the highest levels in Panama. We must confront this corruption and take measures to abolish it, if we are serious about winning the war against drugs.

This Subcommittee, under both my past chairmanship and that of our distinguished Chairman, Senator Nunn, has repeatedly attempted to highlight the indispensable role that money laundering plays in enabling the international drug trade to flourish. Back in 1982, we alerted the Congress to the role played by off-shore banking institutions to hide drug profits.

While some progress has been made in the intervening years, it seems perfectly clear that a number of countries have not gotten the message. We are involved in a war on the international drug trade, and in this war there can be no neutral bystanders. Our national security interests are just as directly threatened by the dope dealing and money laundering authorized or tolerated by public officials in Panama as our interests would be threatened by the closing of the Panama Canal. The best hope to eliminate these illegal activities is to ensure that a stable, democratic government exists in Panama, one that observes the

law, not one that violates it. The Panamanian people need a change in Panama; they need it now.

Congress has authorized the imposition of sanctions on those countries who won't help us, but the Executive Branch has not yet chosen to impose the anti-drug sanctions against any country. Although, as Senator Nunn has stated, the Administration froze U.S. aid after the attack on the U.S. Embassy and the Congress imposed additional sanctions in the omnibus spending bill. Moreover, last year, our distinguished Chairman and I proposed a bill, which is now law, to tighten standards for defining "full cooperation" by other countries in the fight against the international drug trade and to add sanctions against those countries which refuse to cooperate. We may need some more backbone in the Executive Branch to see that those sanctions are implemented.

I want to strongly commend Senator Nunn for holding these hearings. He certainly has been a leader in Congress in the fight against drug trafficking. As I previously stated, Senator Nunn and I have worked together on legislation to strengthen sanctions against foreign countries facilitating the drug trade. His staff has been most helpful in this investigation. I want to personally commend Eleanore Hill and her staff for their assistance. As is frequently the case with PSI, it has been a real joint effort. I intend to continue to work with Senator Nunn on this vital issue.

Minority Staff Statement
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
January 28, 1988

The Subcommittee began its examination of Panama in June of 1986 with the intention of looking at allegations that Panama served as a haven for narcotics dollars. Given PSI's long-standing concern with drug trafficking and related off-shore money laundering centers, the Subcommittee's interest was piqued by a June 12, 1986 article in the New York Times by Seymour Hersch. The article proclaimed Panama the largest haven in the western hemisphere for narcotics money and alleged that Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) was involved in money laundering, narcotics trafficking and technology transfer of embargoed items to Cuba.

In the course of an 18-month investigation, we sought to determine the extent to which Panama was being used as a haven for illicit money laundering and transit point for narcotics destined for the United States. We interviewed current and former U.S. government officials from virtually all agencies of the executive branch that deal with Panama, including the State Department; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Customs Service; the Internal Revenue Service; the Defense Department, including the Defense Investigative Agency; and the National Security Council. We also interviewed

various persons from the private sector, including bankers, former ambassadors to Panama, the former commander of U.S. military forces stationed in Panama, pilots, convicted drug smugglers and money launderers, local law enforcement officials, exiled Panamanian leaders, and others who have lived, worked or traveled in Panama. In August of 1986, the Subcommittee staff traveled to Panama and interviewed bank officials from American as well as Panamanian banks, leaders of the political opposition movement, former presidents of Panama, Panamanian narcotics officers, and customs officials. Within the official U.S. community, we talked to the American ambassador as well as his principal political and economic officers, U.S. AID officials, and officers in the U.S. Southern Military Command. We also canvassed U.S. Attorney's offices and U.S. Customs offices for cases involving Panama. Finally, we examined numerous agency reports of currency and drug seizures involving Panama and looked at records from an armored courier service of transfers of money from the Banco Nacionale to the Federal Reserve. (We were unsuccessful in obtaining certain records for money moving within Panama from the airport to the banks.)

We attempted to assess how much drug money was being laundered through Panama. A precise amount is impossible to determine, but one indicator is how much money is seized leaving the U.S. on its way to Panama. The Customs Service compiles records, and the Subcommittee will hear today from William Rosenblatt of the Customs Service. As he will explain, during

Customs' recent Operation Buckstop, $10.2 million was seized in two months alone from Los Angeles International Airport. These seizures resulted from random spot checks. These figures clearly suggest that much more money is finding its way to Panama. Another indicator is the large number of dollars repatriated from the Banco Nacional de Panama to the Federal Reserve. While the numbers of dollars has decreased substantially in the last two years, the surplus is still significant.

There are good reasons that Panama has achieved prominence as a money laundering center. The principal objective in laundering money is to erase any paper trail. Panama has provided this service with its tight bank secrecy laws more than adequately. Until recently, U.S. law enforcement officials viewed Panama as a kind of a black hole. Drug money that made its way safely to Panama was simply impossible to trace. As we will hear today, a drug smuggler could easily create secret corporations which, in turn, opened secret bank accounts. Given Panamanian secrecy laws which protect both the identity of the true owners of corporations as well as the real holders of bank accounts, there is no way to trace such money.

Recognizing the dearth of existing information, we set out to talk to those who had first-hand knowledge. We interviewed several convicted narcotics traffickers and money launderers who had used Panama as a base of operations (two will testify today). Those we interviewed reported time and time again that

Panamanian officials were integral parts of the money laundering and drug trafficking in Panama.

What is the evidence of official involvement? First, "approved" smugglers often land at Torrijos International Airport. By "approved", I mean those who pay the necessary officials. They land at the Airport and taxi their planes to the part of that airport operated as an Air Force Base by the Panama Defense Forces. Neither pilots nor their cargo are subject to any Customs or Immigration inspection upon entering Panama. Their planes are often met by armored courier trucks sometimes accompanied by Panama Defense Force guards. Some of the persons who make these money laundering trips are on the government payroll. Some of these smugglers have had direct contact with officials of the Panama Defense Forces, in some cases with General Noreiga himself. Sometimes, they deal with "front men" who covered for Noriega. Some of them received valuable information that specific American law enforcement authorities were investigating the operation. In sum, we learned that payment to the Panama Defense Forces is required and that nothing happens in Panama without Noriega's tacit approval. Indeed, one smuggler we spoke to indicated that Noriega demanded prior notification of each drug flight from Colombia to Panama and required payment in advance to allow the flight to be made.

In the course of our investigation, we attempted to corroborate as many allegations as possible. We reviewed flight

logs where they were available and cross checked certain alleged flights with information from the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) to verify tail numbers, plane ownership and flight times. We reviewed copies of bank records where they were available. We reviewed numerous other written documents.

The staff also looked at existing laws to see if they were being fully utilized and to see if there were any gaps that needed to be filled. Under the Foreign Assistance Act (22 USC 2291, as amended), the State Department annually prepares a list of countries which it deems to be either drug-producing or drug-transiting. The definition of a drug-transit country under that act includes one in which drug money is laundered "with the knowledge or complicity of the government."[1] The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provides that unless the President certifies by March 1 that a country on that year's list is cooperating in U.S. efforts to halt drug traffic, or that assistance to the country, despite its failure to cooperate, is vital to U.S. interests, that country will be subject to both mandatory and discretionary sanctions. Among the factors that the President must consider in making his determination for each country on the list is whether or not that country has taken steps to eliminate money laundering. If the President determines that a country is cooperating sufficiently, Congress still has the opportunity to override that determination by passing a joint resolution within 45 legislative days, in which case the mandatory sanctions would

apply. The discretionary sanctions may only be invoked by the President.

Some significant sanctions have been recently imposed against Panama, but not because of drug trafficking or money laundering. Rather, the sanctions came about as a result of the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Panama on June 30, 1987 and other human rights violations in Panama. That attack directly followed a Senate resolution (adopted on June 26, 1987) calling for democratic reforms and the withdrawal of the military from political affairs in Panama. Hence, as things stand now, there has been no official U.S. message by way of sanctions to Panama that we want Panama's drug trafficking and money laundering activities to stop. I have attached a list of the existing mandatory and discretionary sanctions to my testimony.

It is clear from investigation that official complicity in narcotics and money laundering operations must cease in order for there to be any meaningful cooperation between the U.S. and Panama in anti-narcotics efforts. It appears that wider use of available sanctions or imposition of new, more stringent sanctions is one way to induce corrupt officials to end their cooperation with drug traffickers.

Another possible aid would be negotiation of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the U.S. and Panama, giving the U.S. access to bank records in Panama. Officials we talked to all agreed that an MLAT would provide a significant tool to U.S. law

enforcement officials enabling them to prosecute more successfully larger numbers of narcotics traffickers. Panama recently passed a money laundering statute that gives the Attorney General of Panama discretion to grant other countries access to Panamanian bank records. Perhaps that law could be fortified to guarantee consistent access to necessary information.

Lastly, it may be a good idea to negotiate an extradition treaty with Panama. This would give law enforcement agencies guarantees that Panama would not hide fugitives from U.S. justice.

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[1]This is to be distinguished from cases in which the official government policy is to promote production or distribution of illegal drugs. A different provision of the Foreign Assistance Act establishes additional sanctions for such countries (22 USC, Sec. 2291-1).

MANDATORY SANCTIONS

From the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, amended by Title II of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986:

1. 50 percent of aid approved (excluding aid related to drug enforcement) shall be withheld for the current fiscal year, and 100% of such aid shall be withheld in subsequent fiscal years.

2. U.S. officials in international development banks must be instructed to vote against loans for that country.

From the Trade Act of 1974 as amended by Title IX of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986:

3. The country shall be denied a sugar quota; this effectively denies it the right to export sugar to the U.S.

DISCRETIONARY SANCTIONS

From the Trade Act of 1974 as amended by Title IX of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986:

1. The President may deny preferential tariff treatment to any or all products of that country under the Generalized System of Preferences, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, or any other such law.

2. The President may apply to any or all of the dutiable products of that country an additional duty at a rate not to exceed 50 percent of the worth of that product.

3. The President may apply up to a 50 percent duty on one or more duty-free products of that country.

From the Trade Act of 1974 as amended by Title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989:

4. The President may curtail air transportation between the U.S. and that country, suspend that country's air carrier rights to land in the U.S. and revoke the authority of any air carrier to service the country from the U.S.

5. The President <u>may</u> withdraw personnel and resources of the U.S. from participation in any arrangement with that country for the pre-clearance of customs by visitors between the U.S. and that country.

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY
THURSDAY, JANUARY 28, 1988

Statement of Steven M. Kalish

My name is Steven M. Kalish. I am a convicted marijuana smuggler and have been incarcerated for the past 43 months. While I have been involved in marijuana smuggling for most of my adult life the level of my illegal conduct significantly increased in the summer of 1983. At that time I was instrumental in the importation of 250,000 pounds of marijuana.

In the past the problems of buying the marijuana, arranging transport, off-loading and final distribution were successfully dealt with by my organization. However, the sheer volume of cash generated in 1983 soon overwhelmed our organization. As the marijuana payments came in from our distributors we stored the cash in Tampa, Florida. The currency filled entire rooms. Although we were sending out millions of dollars to pay our Colombian suppliers at one point we had in excess of $35,000,000 in Tampa. We used money counting machines but had to stop any counting because we could not keep up with the volume.

This experience made me realize that dealing with the cash from larger importations was a serious problem. I began to devote my attention to establishing secure methods of removing the cash from this country and banking it abroad. In addition to the proceeds of our recent importation I was far along in the planning of larger operations. I planned a 1,000,000 pound importation and had already purchased the marijuana in Colombia. This load was to be carried by ocean going tug and barge up the Mississippi River. A second 400,000 pound importation was planned using a containerized cargo vessel we had purchased.

I anticipated that these operations would produce $300 million. Accordingly, I began to seek out banking havens in earnest. We had worked in the Caymen Islands in the past but found it unacceptable for sums of this magnitude. I was aware of changing relations between the U.S. and the Cayman Islands and feared a loss of bank secrecy. The Cayman banks were simply not capable of dealing with this volume of money. After looking into European and Caribbean havens my attention was drawn to Panama. Its reputation as a large scale banking center was attractive.

I arranged through two intermediaries to visit the country for a test run. I was told to bring at least $2 million as a show of my seriousness. I placed $2.3 to $2.5 million in a suitcase and traveled to Panama on a private jet.

On September 22, 1983, my chartered Lear Jet was met by a limousine at the Omar Torrijos airport in Panama City. My luggage was not searched at Customs. I was driven to the offices of Cesar Rodriquez. He had impressive offices on two floors in the Bank of Boston building. Rodriquez had surprising resources. I met with lawyers, bankers and government officials on my first visit to the office. I purchased shell corporations from him and immediately set up accounts and deposited most of the money I had brought with me. When I explained that I had millions of dollars to bank and invest he offered me an entire package of corporate, banking and investment services and even armored car delivery from the airport.

Rodriquez took me to dinner with his partner Enrique Pretelt who was described to me as also having close ties to the government. Over dinner I expressed interest in bringing into Panama $100 million. I did not want to disclose at this point my plan to bring in three times that amount. I also mentioned my concerns over safety and security. During my initial meeting at Rodriquez's office a Panamanian official was present. He informed Rodriquez that the DEA had notified G-2, the intelligence arm of the Panamanian military, that my plane was under surveillance.

I was advised to send the plane back to the U.S. which I did. Rodriquez and Pretel were extremely interested in doing business. To impress upon me the level of their influence in Panama they informed me that General Noriega, Panama's military ruler, was their partner. They quickly proved that this was not idle talk.

The next day I was taken to General Noriega's private home. I had been instructed to bring a gift for the General - large enough to show how serious I was about doing business in Panama. I brought $300,000 cash in a brief case. During a casual discussion with the General that lasted about 30 minutes, I discussed my desire to live and invest in Panama. It was made clear that I was dealing with extremely large amounts of money. As the meeting broke up I left the briefcase and began to exit the room. General Noriega called me back and said I forgot my briefcase. I told him it was for him and he smiled.

That night I was invited to a party with the General at the Panama Canal offices. He was extremely friendly and told me to continue to deal with Pretel and Rodriquez and that he would do whatever he could for me. He also thanked me for the gift.

Throughout the next 10 months, I used Panama as my base of operations, first leasing a condominium and then buying a house

around the corner from Noriega's. My relationship with General Noriega became closer until he became a full-scale co-conspirator in my drug operation.

I transported nearly all of my money to Panama. My jet was given special treatment at Omar Torrijos airport on all of my trips to Panama. I taxied to the Air Force base at a corner of the airport so that my arrivals and departures would not be observed. I became a full partner in Rodriguez, Pretel and Noriega's business, Servicios Touristicos. Two hundred thousand dollars of my $400,000 payment for 25 percent of the stock was for Noriega who was indeed our partner in all of our deals. My partners had several lucrative contracts with the government and the Forces of Defense. Pretel and Rodriguez owned aircraft used by the Forces of Defense. As a favor to the General, I financed and arranged the purchase of a helicopter and a 727/100 aircraft.

In late 1983, Noriega discussed with me his desire to purchase a Boeing 727 jet aircraft. I negotiated the purchase for $2.2 million. I made the initial deposit of $500,000 and assisted in obtaining financing for the balance. Noriega later agreed to use the plane for our money laundering operation. We planned to fly plane loads of money out of Washington, D.C. under diplomatic cover. I also purchased an executive helicopter for Noriega. I provided long-term financing secured by a government guarantee.

My partner in the U.S. and I had purchased a Lear jet which I made available to Noriega. In fact, he borrowed the jet, he told me, to fly to Washington to meet with President Reagan in November of 1983. Our relationship was not one-sided. Noriega provided me with military protection and favorable treatment. I was issued three Panamanian passports, one being a Panamanian diplomatic passport.

During my time in Panama I was brought ever more into Noriega's confidence. He discussed with me his concerns over the upcoming election of Nicholas Barletta. In fact it was his plan to use his share of the money laundering and smuggling proceeds to finance Barletta's election.

In the spring of 1984, events brought me closer to General Noriega. Prior to that time I decided to attempt an importation directly into a U.S. commercial port. Since any direct shipment from Colombia would be scrutinized I arranged a transshipment through Panama and obtained customs seals by large payoffs of Panamanian officials. For a fixed fee, Noriega personally approved of the operation.

A series of events lead General Noriega to ask to me postpone the operation. A large amount of ether, a necessary commodity to manufacture cocaine, was seized in Colon, Panama. An operating cocaine lab was discovered in the remote

Panamanian jungle. One thousand kilograms of cocaine was seized in Miami from a Panamanian cargo plane. General Noriega asked me to contact the Colombians and find out what was going on. I learned from sources in the Medellin Cartel that a $5 million bribe was paid to Panamanians to protect their operations in Panama. A high ranking Panamanian military official, Colonel Melo had been bribed. Melo was behind the cocaine lab and ether shipments and was planning to assassinate Noriega and seize control. I passed word to Noriega who was in Europe and Melo, his associates and the Colombians were arrested. The arrests angered the Colombians and I was caught in the middle.

I arranged the release of the Colombians and established my ability to facilitate their business in Panama. The Cartel was looking for a way to continue to launder $50 to $100 million a month produced from its west coast U.S. cocaine operations. My links to Panama made laundering of this volume of money possible. The general embraced the scheme for his percentage and I began to negotiate with the Medellin cocaine cartel to ship and launder vast amounts of cocaine profits. These same events brought me closer to Noriega. He now dealt directly with me and asked that I cut out Rodriquez and Pretel.

Noriega was always extremely concerned about the discovery of Panamanian involvement in drug trafficking. On February 16, 1984, my future wife and myself visited Noriega at his ranch in

the interior of Panama. He ordered flowers for my wife and left her a note that I believe you have seen. His real purpose for inviting me was not social. He had previously agreed to a $4 million fee, $1 million up front for facilitating and permitting the transshipment of marijuana I had planned. He, however, wanted additional assurances that the U.S. end was covered and that Panama's role was insulated. I also guaranteed that all of the proceeds would come back to Panama.

My involvement in Panama abruptly terminated with my arrest in Tampa on July 26, 1984. I have been incarcerated ever since.

STATEMENT OF

WILLIAM ROSENBLATT

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS FOR ENFORCEMENT

BEFORE THE

SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

JANUARY 28, 1988

MR. CHAIRMAN AND SENATOR ROTH, IT IS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE CUSTOMS SERVICE AS THEY RELATE TO YOUR INQUIRY CONCERNING PANAMA. I AM AWARE OF THE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES INVOLVING PANAMA WHICH HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE MEDIA ATTENTION RECENTLY. AS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, I WILL DIRECT MY REMARKS TODAY STRICTLY TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH PANAMA AND LEAVE THE DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY ISSUES FOR OTHERS TO ADDRESS.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, CUSTOMS SPECIAL AGENTS INVESTIGATE AND BRING TO PROSECUTION CASES IN A VARIETY OF FIELDS. THE MOST PROMINENT OF THESE ARE NARCOTICS SMUGGLING, BANK SECRECY ACT AND MONEY LAUNDERING VIOLATIONS, COMMERCIAL FRAUD, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IMPORTATION, THE ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF ARMS AND CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY. BECAUSE OF OUR SPECIAL STATUS AS A BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, WE FIND THAT INVESTIGATIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FREQUENTLY REQUIRE INFORMATION ONLY OBTAINABLE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. WE HAVE 18 FOREIGN OFFICES TO SUPPORT THESE INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS.

OUR INVESTIGATIVE ATTACK ON NARCOTICS SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS USING PROVISIONS OF THE BANK SECRECY ACT HAS PAID EXCELLENT DIVIDENDS WHEN MEASURED BY ITS IMPACT ON THE LARGEST SMUGGLING GROUPS OPERATING IN THIS COUNTRY. MULTI-AGENCY

INVESTIGATIVE AND PROSECUTORIAL TEAMS, OPERATING UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF LOCAL U.S. ATTORNEYS, ARE CURRENTLY ACTIVE IN THOSE CITIES WITH A HISTORY OF LARGE SCALE CURRENCY MOVEMENTS AND THOSE CITIES MOST ACTIVE IN DRUG TRAFFICKING. A 1986 CUSTOMS NATIONAL OUTBOUND CURRENCY INTERDICTION PROGRAM KNOWN AS OPERATION BUCKSTOP RESULTED IN 162 CURRENCY SEIZURES TOTALLING MORE THAN $42 MILLION.

AS THE LEAD FEDERAL AGENCY FOR DRUG INTERDICTION, WE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. COAST GUARD AND THE MILITARY TO PREVENT DRUGS FROM REACHING OUR SHORES. IN THE INVESTIGATIVE AREA, WE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AND THE FBI. I BELIEVE THE LEVEL OF INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION IS BETTER TODAY THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME.

OUR MOTIVATION AS FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IS TO PREVENT ILLEGAL NARCOTICS FROM REACHING THE U.S., TO DISRUPT NARCOTICS SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS AND, HOPEFULLY, TO PUT AS MANY ORGANIZATIONS OUT OF BUSINESS AS POSSIBLE. WE ARE STOPPING RECORD QUANTITIES OF DRUGS AT OUR BORDERS EACH YEAR AND TOGETHER WITH OTHER AGENCIES MORE AND MORE SIGNIFICANT ARRESTS CONTINUE TO BE MADE.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE SMUGGLERS ARE GROWING AND PRODUCING DRUGS IN EVEN GREATER AMOUNTS THAN EVER BEFORE. THEY ARE NOT DOING THIS FOR PHILOSOPHICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS. THEY ARE DOING IT FOR MONEY. THE AMOUNT OF MONEY GENERATED BY THE DRUG TRADE STAGGERS THE IMAGINATION. JUST TO GIVE YOU AN IDEA OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DOLLARS INVOLVED, CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING: COLOMBIAN DRUG SMUGGLERS OPENLY OFFERED TO PAY OFF COLOMBIA'S ENTIRE NATIONAL DEBT IN RETURN FOR AMNESTY FROM PROSECUTION AND EXTRADITION.

WITH SUCH HUGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY BEING GENERATED BY THESE ILLEGAL ENTERPRISES, ONE OF THE MAJOR VULNERABILITIES OF THE CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS IS THE MOVEMENT AND HANDLING OF THE NARCO-DOLLARS. FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES THE REPORTING OF CURRENCY AND BEARER INSTRUMENTS OVER $10,000 TRANSPORTED INTO AND OUT OF THE U.S. SMUGGLERS SEEK TO EVADE THE CURRENCY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS BECAUSE OF THE PAPER TRAIL IT LEAVES BEHIND. THEY HAVE A CONSTANT REQUIREMENT TO LAUNDER THEIR MONEY SO THAT IT WILL NOT LEAVE A TRAIL. OUR INVESTIGATIONS HAVE DISCLOSED THAT PANAMA IS ONE OF THE COUNTRIES IN WHICH DRUG SMUGGLERS CURRENTLY LAUNDER MONEY.

YOUR INQUIRY INTO THE ROLE OF PANAMA REGARDING DRUGS AND MONEY LAUNDERING IS BOTH TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE. I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE IN REGARD TO CUSTOMS ROLE IN STOPPING THE FLOW OF DRUGS INTO THIS COUNTRY AND OUR EFFORTS TO CONFISCATE THE ILLICIT PROFITS GENERATED BY THESE VENTURES.

12B-997-114

SEARCHED _____

INDEXED _____

SERIALIZED MCL

FILED MCL

U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney
Middle District of Florida

500 Zack Street, Suite 400
Tampa, Florida 33602

813/225-7300
FTS/826-7300

February 5, 1988

PRESS RELEASE

Robert W. Merkle, United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida, announced today that a federal grand jury in Tampa returned a three count Indictment against General Manuel Antonio Noriega and Enrique Pretelt, citizens of the Republic of Panama. Noriega and Pretelt are charged with conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana and the attempted importation of in excess of 1,000,000 pounds of marijuana. General Noriega, 49, is the Commander-In-Chief of the Panamanian Forces of Defense. Enrique Pretelt, 45, is a prominent Panamanian businessman and close associate of Noriega.

The charges relate to the importation and planned importation of enormous quantities of marijuana during the years 1983 and 1984. The grand jury alleges that millions of dollars in U.S. currency representing the proceeds from the successful importation, in June of 1983, of 280,000 pounds of marijuana into the United States by Steven Michael Kalish, Leigh Bruce Ritch and others, were transported to Panama and laundered

through Panamanian banks and businesses. This illegal activity is alleged to have been conducted with the approval and assistance of Noriega, Pretelt and their since deceased co-conspirator Ceasar Rodriguez-Contreras ("Rodriguez") also a prominent Panamanian businessman and a close associate of Noriega's. The indictment further alleges that Noriega, Pretelt and Rodriguez agreed to facilitate the importation of 400,000 pounds of marijuana and the laundering of more than $100 million dollars in proceeds that Kalish and Ritch expected to realize from the importation of in excess of 1,000,000 pounds of marijuana during 1984. It also alleges that during the course of the conspiracy, Kalish made payments to Noriega, Pretelt and Rodriguez of approximately 1 million dollars for Noriega's authorization and approval of marijuana smuggling and money laundering activities within Panama, and had agreed to future payments.

The indictment alleges that it was part of the conspiracy that Noriega, Pretelt, Rodriguez, Kalish and others deposited drug proceeds in various financial institutions within the Republic of Panama. It alleges that the group also planned more aggressive laundering efforts through such institutions in the future. The indictment alleges that it was part of the conspiracy that Noriega, Pretelt, Kalish, Rodriguez and others would, among other things, invest the deposited drug proceeds in various businesses owned by Servicios Turisticos, S.A., a Panamanian corporation in which Noriega, Pretelt, Kalish and Rodriguez had an interest. The indictment further alleges that

it was also a part of the conspiracy to launder proceeds from the distribution of marijuana and cocaine by drug organizations other than the Kalish and Ritch organization. Toward this end, the indictment alleges that, among other things, Kalish purchased and caused to be purchased a Boeing 727 aircraft for the Panamanian Forces of Defense to be used for, among other things, the transportation of U.S. Currency derived from illegal drug trafficking activities from the United States to Panama.

The indictment also alleges that Noriega authorized the transshipment through Panama from Colombia of 400,000 pounds of marijuana destined for importation into the United States, disguised as a containerized cargo of plantains, a banana like fruit. Pretelt assisted in arranging for the transshipment through Panama. It is alleged that as part of this conspiracy: Kalish paid $50,000 to a Panamanian shipping agent for the facilitation of the transportation of the containerized shipment of marijuana; that Noriega approved the issuance of a Panamanian diplomatic passport to Kalish and authorized the payment of $185,000 to an official of Panamanian Customs to obtain official Panamanian Customs seals indicating the contents originated in Panama and not Colombia.

It is further alleged that as part of this conspiracy, Kalish and Ritch purchased the Cari Cargo I, a Panamanian vessel. They sent the Cari Cargo I from the Cayman Islands to Port Everglades, Florida, where it was outfitted for transport of the containerized shipment of marijuana. Kalish and Ritch then sent the Cari Cargo I from Port Everglades to Colon,

Panama. It is also alleged that during the Spring of 1984, 400,000 pounds of marijuana was collected and packaged in Colombia for shipment to the United States aboard the Cari Cargo I. It is further alleged that $800,000 was paid to Eugene Davis, a teamster official, for assistance in the use of a New York City, New York, pier to off-load the Cari Cargo I of its 400,000 pounds of marijuana. Mr. Davis is currently under indictment in the Eastern District of Michigan on related charges.

These efforts came to a halt with the July 26, 1984 arrest of Kalish in Tampa, Florida.

Counts One and Two of the Indictment each carry maximum sentences of 15 years imprisonment and $125,000 fines. The maximum sentence that can be imposed on Count Three is 5 years imprisonment and a $15,000 fine.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration and the United States Customs Service have jointly conducted this investigation. Earlier related investigations by these federal agencies along with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement resulted in the convictions of Kalish, Ritch, Albert Samuel Fortna and twenty-seven others relative to the importation and distribution of enormous quantities of marijuana and cocaine. Copies of press releases more fully describing these prosecutions are attached. Throughout these investigations these agencies have quietly displayed the highest form of sustained professional effort. As a result, in part, of

information generated by this series of investigations, 82 defendants in 3 Districts have been indicted and information concerning scores of other traffickers has been generated. This series of indictments is a classic example of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force concept of a unified investigating team combining federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, the United States Attorney's Office and the Department of Justice to eliminate major drug networks and those that facilitate their efforts.

Mr. Merkle thanked each of these agencies for their vigorous efforts throughout these investigations. He also thanked U.S. Attorney Leon Kellner for his part in ensuring cooperation between this investigation and the one conducted in the Southern District of Florida which culminated in a racketeering indictment which is being simultaneously announced in Miami.

This indictment provides yet another piece of the mosaic which demonstrates conclusively that drug trafficking is inherently violent and drug use is not a matter of personal choice nor a mere incidence of an individual's life style. The consumption of drugs in this country, even the so called "soft" drug of marijuana, provides the direct means whereby entire communities are ravaged, foreign and domestic, governments are corrupted, economies destroyed, terror is spawned, human rights suppressed and the stability and security of nations threatened. In any other context, these stakes suggest the existence of a state of war. This is a war which respects no national

boundaries and is fought principally on the battle field of popular will. The two principal weapons at our disposal in waging this war are the individual and collective determination to reject the use of drugs and the determination to vigorously prosecute without fear or favor those who traffic in drugs.

The significance of this case lies in its reaffirmation of the collective will of the United States to prosecute any member of this evil industry, no matter who or where they are. In the end, as in any war, physical victory first requires victory in the battle of wills. The cooperative investigative and prosecutorial efforts throughout this case not only reflect and implement that will but hopefully will serve to strengthen it abroad. The two grand jury indictments are formal legal expressions of our national commitment sent by two entirely different groups of ordinary Americans in separate cities.

This case is being prosecuted by Robert T. Kennedy, Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division and Mark V. Jackowski, Assistant United States Attorney.

An Indictment is merely a formal charge that a Defendant has committed a violation of the federal criminal law and every Defendant is presumed innocent until, and unless, proven guilty.

File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File _____ _____ _____ Date _____
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
12-997-118		
transferred to		
12-997 Sub B		

_____
Employee

RECHARGE Date _____

To _____ From _____

Initials of Clerk { _____ _____ _____ } Date { _____ _____ _____ }

_____
Date charged

_____
Employee

_____
Location

12B-997-119

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Tampa, Florida
March 11, 1988

STARBANK;
GENERAL MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA; [redacted] b6 b7C
NARCOTICS MATTER

On February 4, 1988, General MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA, Commander-in-Chief of the Panamanian Forces of Defense, and [redacted] were indicted in the Middle District of Florida, Tampa, Florida. In a three-count indictment, both defendants were charged with violations of Title 21, USC, Sections 952 and 841(a)(1), Title 21, USC, Sections 952 and 963, and Title 18, USC, Section 2, i.e. conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana (1,000 pounds) and attempted importation of in excess of 1,000,000 pounds of marijuana and attempt to import approximately 400,000 pounds of marijuana on a separate occasion. b6 b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] General NORIEGA before the United States Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] by Judge WILLIAM TERRELL HODGES in the Middle District of Florida, Tampa, Florida. b6 b7C b7D

During the summer of 1987, an intensified investigation against NORIEGA was commenced in Tampa by a Task Force comprised of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Customs Service (USCS), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7D

[redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

6 - Bureau
2 - Tampa (12B-997) (SQ. 5) (P)
VLJ:bt
(8)

12B-997-123
SEARCHED ____
INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED mcm
FILED mcm

STARBANK

GENERAL MANUEL ANTONIO NOREIGA

1. Last Name - NOREIGA
2. Family Name - NORIEGA
3. Forename - MANUEL ANTONIO
4. Aliases - TONY; THE GENERAL
5. Sex - Male
6. Date of Birth - February 11, 1938, Alternate February 11, 1936
7. Place of Birth - Panama
8. Father's Name - Unknown
9. Mother's Maiden Name - (First Name Unknown) MORENO
10. Nationality - Panamanian (Unconfirmed)
11. Identity -
12. Occupation - Commander-in-Chief of Panamanian Defense Forces
13. Areas Subject May Visit - London, Paris, Cuba, Switzerland, Costa Rica
14. Date of Photograph -
15. Identity Documents - Panamanian Passport #1247D. Further information is unknown at this time.
16. Physical Description - Height 5'9"
    Weight 180
    Hair Black
    Eyes Brown
    Scars - Pock marks on face

STARBANK

NORIEGA, in a very sophisticated money laundering and drug trafficking conspiracy which utilized Panamanian government officials.

NORIEGA CESAR RODRIGUEZ-CONTRERAS (deceased) b6 b7C b7D

to NORIEGA

The relationship between NORIEGA b6 b7C b7D

also planned and began to implement b6 b7C b7D NORIEGA's concurrence and assistance, Panama to the United States.

In or about b6 b7C b7D

Plans for both these deals fell through

It should be noted that in addition to the information received from b6 b7C b7D

The following information regarding each defendant will be pertinent to the request for their inclusion into Interpol:

STARBANK

17. Languages Spoken - Spanish, English

18. Warrant Information -

a) Number - 8818-0140T
b) Date of Issue - February 9, 1988
c) Court of Issue - U. S. District Court,
Middle District of Florida
by: Honorable GEORGE C. CARR
d) Federal Criminal Statute

Title 21, USC, Sections 952, 841(a)(1), 963;
Title 18, USC, Section 2

e) Type of Offense -

Conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana; attempt to import marijuana

f) Maximum Penalties -

Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment each carry maximum sentences of 15 years imprisonment and $125,000 fines. The maximum sentence for Count 3 is five years imprisonment and a $15,000 fine.

19. Summary of Facts - See narrative above.

20. Previous Convictions - Unknown. No previous record available from NCIC data base.



b6
b7C

File - Serial Charge Out
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File. 12B - 997 _____ Date _____
Class. Case No. Last Serial

☐ Pending ☐ Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
124		2/20/92

Case Agent
Employee

RECHARGE Date _____

To _____ From _____

Initials of Clerk { _____ _____ _____ }

Date { _____ _____ _____ }

_____
Date charged

_____
Employee

_____
Location

★ U.S. GPO:1989-241-706/08023